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(영문) 울산지방법원 2021.5.14. 선고 2020고단2928 판결
공무집행방해
Cases

200 Highest 2928 Performance of Official Duties

Defendant

A, 200 N, South, and North

Residence

Reference domicile

Prosecutor

Before his/her term of office (prosecution), gambling, Lee Jin-jin (Public trial)

Defense Counsel

Attorney Yang Pung-hee (Korean)

Imposition of Judgment

May 14, 2021

Text

The defendant shall be innocent.

The summary of the judgment against the defendant shall be published.

Reasons

1. Summary of the facts charged

At around 03:30 on January 29, 2020, the Defendant: (a) Dansan Police Station called to the site according to the 112 report that “A minor drinks alcohol while drinking alcohol with two minors” was called to the site; (b) Donsan Police Station Don was placed in the guardian of the minor; and (c) Donman was placed in the guardian of the minor; (d) around 04:25 on the same day, D was placed in the back of the patrol to return to the police station to the police after completing the investigation of the minor; and (e) D was placed in the back of the patrol to take a bath to D; and (e) D was placed with the defect that D was trying to get the minor to get off the vehicle from the vehicle, kid the bnish with the bnish with the bomb’s hand, and the part that D was sealed by assaulting D’s hand.

Accordingly, the defendant interfered with the criminal investigation by police officers and the legitimate execution of duties concerning the protection of people's lives and bodies.

2. Determination,

A. Basic facts based on the records

1) The Defendant: “A police officer of the Gyeyangsan Police Station dispatched to the site in accordance with the 112 report that “A minor drinks alcohol while drinking alcohol together with F and two women,” she takes her f and her own felb to voluntarily drive her fel according to the water-prohibited area of the Yangsan Police Station; and her f took her felb to the patrol vehicle and went to the water-prohibited area (F took a separate seat due to lack of seat seat).

2) After completion of an investigation into women’s post-ship, the Defendant provided transportation from 4 teams of the Yangsan Police Station water-prohibited Zone 4 teams of the Yangsan Police Station with women’s post-ship, and was on board the back seat of the patrol team with women’s post-ship. In the process of demanding the police officer to post-ship the F to the patrol team, the Defendant provided the police officer with horses or bath, and provided the police officer with a view to failing to comply with the demand to take a stop at the patrol team, but instead provided the police officer with a view to a considerable period of time.

3) The head E (D’s leader) belonging to the Yangsan Police Station 4 Team was demanded to report the above situation to the patrol vehicle and return it to the Defendant, but the Defendant did not continue to do so while making a speech or bath.

4) Accordingly, E took the Defendant’s arms (the rear door of the patrol car at that time was opened), and the Defendant resisted the idea that E intended to forced the Defendant to force the Defendant, and committed assault as indicated in the instant facts charged, such as flating flat, etc., in line with the intent that E forced the Defendant to force her.

B. Determination

1) Relevant legal principles

The crime of obstruction of performance of official duties under Article 136 of the Criminal Act is established only when the execution of official duties is legitimate. Here, legitimate performance of official duties refers to not only where the act belongs to the abstract authority of a public official, but also where the act satisfies the legal requirements and methods concerning specific performance of official duties. Thus, the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties is not established on the ground that the act of assault or intimidation against a public official who performs an act of lacking legality is committed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2008Do8214, Dec. 11, 2008).

Meanwhile, Article 6 of the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers provides that “If a police officer deems that a criminal act is about to be committed in front of the police officer, the police officer may issue a warning to interested persons to prevent such criminal act, and if it is urgent because such act is likely to inflict harm on human life and body or grave damage to property, the police officer may restrain such act.” The provision on the restraint of police officers refers to the provision on the act of power factual which realizes necessary conditions for the police officer by directly using force without any premise of nonperformance in circumstances where it is necessary to remove an imminent obstacle to the police officer in front of the snow and it is difficult for the police to order his/her duty to do so without sufficient time, or where it is difficult for the police officer to order his/her duty to do so. In order to evaluate a police officer’s restraint pursuant to Article 6 of the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers to properly perform his/her duty, an act subject to criminal punishment can be objectively deemed to have been committed in front of the police officer’s legitimate performance of duty, and it should not be determined by the aforementioned method of 17 p.

2) In this Court, the Defendant’s use of assault against E and the follow-up measure to force the Defendant to force the Defendant in E was stated in this Court to the effect that “In the process, the Defendant was laid down without getting off from the train, so, the Defendant was laid up in the train.” The Prosecutor asked from the public prosecutor that he was forced to force the Defendant after the Defendant’s assault, and then asked the Defendant to the effect that “the Defendant was frightd, frightd, frightd, and frightd, the Defendant was frighted from the Defendant, and frightd to the Defendant after the Defendant’s use of assault, such as stating that “the Defendant was frightd, frightd and let the Defendant get out of the train.”

However, the Defendant consistently made a statement from the investigative agency to this court to the purport that “the police officer tried to force the Defendant to go against the police officer,” and that “F, at the time, observed the scene, made a statement to the effect that “the Defendant resisted the Defendant in the situation where the Defendant did not get out of the patrol but the police officer raised the Defendant.” In addition, the police officer made a statement to the effect that “the Defendant was forced to go out of the patrol,” and that “the Defendant was forced to go out of the patrol,” and it is reasonable to view the Defendant’s act of forcing the police officer and the Defendant to go out of the patrol in order to solve the situation that occurred between the police officer and the Defendant.” In addition, it is reasonable to deem that the Defendant’s act of forcing the police officer and the Defendant to go out of the patrol prior to the time of the patrol as follows.

2) Whether the compulsory discharge measures are legitimate

A) As stated in the facts charged in the instant case, the police officer’s duties include criminal investigation and the protection of the lives and bodies of the people, and various authorities are granted under relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers, the Criminal Procedure Act, etc. to facilitate the performance of their duties. Accordingly, police officers performing specific duties may exercise the authority assigned to them in response to all circumstances and take necessary measures, and such authority is generally delegated to police officers’ reasonable discretion based on their professional judgment. In general, taking into account the Defendant’s behavior and the purpose of the patrol, such as refusing to leave the police officer from the patrol car for a considerable period of time, and taking into account the Defendant’s behavior, the police officer’s action to force the Defendant is likely to be permitted.

B) However, even if a police officer’s purpose is to perform the duties of a police officer as prescribed in each subparagraph of Article 2 of the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers, the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers, the Criminal Procedure Act, or any other act other than the authority conferred by the law, such as the Criminal Procedure Act, is not possible or possible, it should be interpreted very narrowly. Articles 3 through 8 of the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers stipulate the requirement that a police officer may take personal or material compulsory measures to investigate into an investigation to achieve the purpose of investigation, and Article 199(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that “If a police officer takes personal or material compulsory measures for performing his/her duties as prescribed in each subparagraph of Article 2 of the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers, such as the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers, the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers, the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers, and the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers must have specific grounds, individual and specific grounds under the Act and subordinate statutes.

According to the facts acknowledged above, measures taken to compel the defendant whom E refused to leave the police officer cannot be deemed to have commenced a compulsory investigation under the Criminal Procedure Act, such as arrest of flagrant offenders (the facts charged in this case was assaulted by the police officer when the defendant wants to get the police officer to leave the patrol vehicle, but the defendant was arrested after getting the police officer, and the arrest letter of flagrant offender prepared at the time was also stated in the criminal facts, and there is no evidence to acknowledge that the police officer had started a compulsory investigation under the Criminal Procedure Act, such as arrest of the defendant on board the patrol vehicle, etc. However, it appears that Article 6 of the Act on the Performance of Duties by the police officer could be a basis law, and that the defendant refused the police officer to leave the patrol vehicle for a considerable time. However, at that time, it was acknowledged as above that the defendant did not directly harm another person's life and body or to protect another person's body from operating the police officer's body unless it was proved that the defendant did not have any imminent situation or had any danger to harm another person's body."

C) Therefore, the police officer’s measures to have the Defendant forced to leave the Defendant cannot be deemed legitimate execution of official duties. Thus, even if the Defendant resisted against the police officer, the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties is not established.

3. Conclusion

Thus, since the facts charged in this case constitute a time when there is no proof of crime, the court rendered a judgment of innocence under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and publicly announced the summary of this judgment under Article 58(2)

Judges

Judges Park Jong-de

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