The validity of an appeal against a judgment revoking an administrative disposition when the defendant renounced the right to appeal after the intervenor filed an appeal against the judgment by the defendant.

The judgment revoking an administrative disposition shall have its effect on the parties as well as the third parties in relation thereto, so the restriction under Article 63 (1) of this Act shall be excluded by analogy of paragraph (2) of this Article. The supplementary intervenor's appeal shall continue to have its effect, even if the supplementary intervenor waives his right to appeal and withdraws the appeal after the supplementary intervenor filed a final appeal.

Article 63(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 70(2) of the Civil Procedure Act

Plaintiff

Do Governor of Gyeonggi-do;

Intervenor joining the Defendant

Daegu High Court Decision 66 Gu1 delivered on May 25, 1966

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Intervenor joining the Defendant.

1. Although the supplementary intervenor filed a final appeal on this case, since the defendant waived his right to appeal and the withdrawal of the final appeal became effective, the supplementary intervenor's final appeal on the grounds that it conflicts with the defendant's procedural acts and lost its validity. However, the decision of revocation of administrative disposition is effective not only for the parties, but also for the third party. The decision of revocation of administrative disposition on the party's lawsuit becomes effective in relation to the relation between the supplementary intervenor and the party's other party, the restriction under Article 70 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act is excluded by taking advantage of Article 63 (1) of the same Act, and even if the supplementary intervenor waivers his right to appeal and withdraws the final appeal after the supplementary intervenor filed the final appeal, the supplementary intervenor's final appeal on the grounds that the supplementary intervenor's refusal

2. The Defendant’s Intervenor’s Intervenor’s ground of appeal No. 1 is examined.

The restriction on the distance of facility standards by type of business under Article 26 subparagraph 6 of the Enforcement Rule of the Food Sanitation Act is in accordance with Article 22 of the Food Sanitation Act, and there is no simple administrative regulation, and the owner, etc. of facilities that require accommodation by illegal business permission, who is in danger of adverse effects on health, sanitation, or business due to the act of business, has a legal interest in seeking the cancellation of the administrative disposition. Therefore, the judgment of the court below that determined to the same effect is just,

The second ground of appeal No. 2

The freedom of business can be restricted by law in cases where it is necessary for the maintenance of order or public welfare, and the court below should have deliberated and decide on the illegality of the disposition on the business permission. The court below did not deliberate and decide on the business facility status, number of employees, number of accommodation, etc. of the defendant joining the defendant based on the business permission. In addition, there was no error in the misapprehension of the legal principles in the original judgment. Thus, it is not reasonable as an independent opinion.

The third ground of appeal is examined as follows:

Inasmuch as there is a provision of the proviso on the distance limitation of the above facility criteria, it is impossible for the competent authorities to disregard the restriction, and in the following facility standards, the term “a hospital” means a hospital which has completed the establishment report under the Medical Service Act, and thus, the court below erred in its other opinion. However, the court below erred in finding that the plaintiff’s medical facilities do not constitute a hospital, and the above error in its judgment does not affect the conclusion of the judgment. Accordingly, the court below erred in finding that the defendant's act constitutes the above facility criteria, since the defendant revoked the disposition of granting an essential permission under Article 23 of the Food Sanitation Act, which was issued to the defendant as of August 22, 1965, under Article 25 of the Daegu-gu Office of Seoul Special Metropolitan City, which was issued to the defendant as of August 22, 1965. Thus, the court below did not err in the judgment of the court below because it did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles, or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations.

The ground of appeal No. 4 is examined as follows:

Based on evidence, the judgment below acknowledged that the defendant joining the defendant was able to see the fact that the defendant spawn the fence attached to the wall, but it was not possible to function as soundproofing devices to prevent noise. Among each evidence cited in the debate paper, the non-party witness's testimony was rejected by the court below, and the remaining evidence cannot be determined and determined by the records, even if the court below did not make a judgment, the error does not affect the conclusion of the judgment. In addition, even if the court below did not determine it, the court below did not recognize the facts by the spawn evidence, or did not find that there were any errors by the rules of evidence. Thus, the argument is groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant joining the defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Supreme Court Judge Madung (Presiding Judge) Kim Gung-bun and Madlebro