Whether a swimming pool facility, which is a swimming pool and a water tank, can be the object of mortgage under the Factory Mortgage Act.

A swimming pool facility for the purpose of sports, recreation, and relaxation, consisting of one building and a 1st floor and a 2nd floor and a store and a sloping room, one slick and children's pool, one slick and water tank water tank, etc., cannot be considered as a place used for the purpose of manufacturing, processing, printing, or photographing goods or for the purpose of supplying electricity or gas, 'the place used for the purpose of manufacturing, processing, printing, or photographing goods' as provided in Article 2 (1) and (2) of the Factory Mortgage Act, or the place used for the purpose of supplying electricity or gas'. Accordingly, the building and structure does not fall under the common goods of the factory and the machinery, apparatus, and other factories attached to the building and structure, and thus, it does not fall under the common goods of the factory as provided in Articles 5 and 4 of the same Act, and thus, the part of the registration of the establishment of the neighboring structures of the building and structure is null and void.

Articles 2, 4, 5, 7, and 10 of the Factory Mortgage Act

Plaintiff

Defendant-Appellee et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Busan High Court Decision 92Na14465 delivered on April 22, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the first ground for appeal

In light of the records, when the defendant is awarded a successful bid of the building of this case (the first floor: neighborhood life, the second floor: the store and the sloping room) at the court below, the defendant merely asserted that the construction of this case (the sloping and the sloping pool for children) was awarded a successful bid or the public auction disposition of the building of this case is effective as a matter of course against the building of this case, and that there was an implied agreement such as the theory of lawsuit on the transfer of ownership of the building of this case between the plaintiff and the defendant cannot be found. Accordingly, the argument is not legitimate ground for appeal since the defendant asserted a new fact that was not at the court below, and thus, it does not constitute a legitimate ground for appeal.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below cannot be said to contain an error of law such as omission of judgment as the theory of lawsuit.

2. On the second ground for appeal

In the event that the tax authorities seize the building mortgaged established under the Factory Mortgage Act and then dispose of it by public auction, the effect of the seizure and public auction shall extend to the goods attached to the building and the machinery, apparatus, and other factory. Meanwhile, on September 7, 1982, prior to the seizure of the building under the disposition of national tax in arrears, the Plaintiff included the building in the list of factory mortgage subject to the registration of the establishment of factory mortgage under Article 7 of the Factory Mortgage Act with respect to the building of this case. The above mortgage right after the disposition of this case on the building of this case is ex officio because the building of this case and the building of this case are one floor, and the building of this case and the building of this case are two floors and the building of this case, so it cannot be seen that the ownership of the building of this case and the building of this case can still be seen as being the object of the above factory mortgage or the building of this case, and it cannot be seen as being the object of the sale or mortgage of this case's new building and the building of this case, the building of this case and the building of this case's building of this case can be seen as its use.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)