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(영문) 대법원 1997. 12. 26. 선고 97후1122 판결
[거절사정(상)][공1998.2.15.(52),517]
Main Issues

The case holding that "Twee" does not constitute a technical trademark on the ground that the term "Twee" of applied goods with sackers, sacks, etc. as designated goods does not directly affect women who are consumers as consumers in the meaning of "equitable, earn"

Summary of Judgment

In determining whether a trademark is a trademark consisting solely of a mark indicating the shape, quality, etc. of goods under Article 6 (1) 3 of the Trademark Act in a common way, the meaning of the trademark shall be that general consumers can report the trademark in a direct manner, and that it shall not be subject to consideration for general consumers to have knowledge of its purport only after examining the trademark or finding a prior report, and since the trademark applied for trademark "Twee" cannot be deemed as a word commonly used in our society, it is hard to see that the main trader or consumers, such as skis and skis, which are designated goods, can not be perceived as a word having meaning, such as "equitable, bad, bad, etc.," and thus, it does not constitute a technical trademark.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 6 (1) 3 of the Trademark Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 92Hu636 delivered on November 13, 1992 (Gong1993Sang, 117) Supreme Court Decision 94Hu114 delivered on November 11, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 3277) Supreme Court Decision 94Hu1923 delivered on March 24, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 1755)

Applicant, Appellant

Ada Co., Ltd. (Patent Attorney Lee Chang-hoon, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Other Parties, Appellee

The Commissioner of the Korean Intellectual Property Office

Judgment of the court below

Korean Intellectual Property Trial Office Decision 96Na249 dated February 28, 1997

Text

The decision of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Korean Intellectual Property Office.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the reasoning of the decision of the court below, the court below determined that the trademark of this case was just the original condition which rejected the registration pursuant to Article 6 (1) 3 of the Trademark Act, on the ground that the trademark of this case is "Twee" with the meaning of "for example, bad, bad, bad, bad, bad, etc." and the meaning of "for example, bad, bad, bad, bad, etc.," since ordinary consumers recognize it as "for example, bad, bad, bad, etc.," and the trademark of this case was merely a mark indicating the shape, quality, etc. of the designated goods.

In determining whether a trademark constitutes a trademark consisting solely of a mark indicating the shape, quality, etc. of goods under Article 6 (1) 3 of the Trademark Act in a common way, the meaning of the trademark shall be that general consumers can report the trademark in a direct and direct manner, and it shall not be subject to consideration to the fact that a general consumer can have been aware of the fact only after an examination or a prior report (see Supreme Court Decision 94Hu1923, Mar. 24, 1995).

However, since the pending trademark "Twee" cannot be deemed as a trademark commonly used in our society, it is difficult to view that women, who can be seen as the main traders or consumers, such as skacks and scoos, which are designated goods, can be directly recognized as the word having the above meaning. Accordingly, on the premise that ordinary traders or consumers recognize the meaning of the applied trademark of this case as above, the original decision of the court below that held that the pending trademark of this case was a trademark consisting solely of the mark directly indicated the designated goods as the designated goods, is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to Article 6 (1) 3 of the Trademark Act, or in failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, and the arguments pointing this out

Therefore, the decision of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Korean Intellectual Property Office for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)

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