[1] The standard for determining whether the Plaintiff employee is “temporary placement of workers” subject to the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers in case where the Plaintiff employee allows the employee to perform duties for a third party

[2] In a case where Gap et al., employed by a business entity other than the Korea Highway which entered into a service contract for the collection of tollss with the Korea Expressway and sought confirmation of workers status against the Korea Expressway Corporation, the case affirming the judgment below which held that since Gap et al., et al., who entered into a service contract with a business entity other than the Korea Expressway, provided labor for the Korea Expressway Corporation under direct command and order from the Korea Expressway Corporation which entered into a service contract with the business entity

[3] In a case where a user company and a temporary agency worker are deemed to establish a direct employment relationship between the user company and the temporary agency worker, or where the temporary agency worker is resigned or dismissed in relation to the temporary agency worker, whether it affects the legal relationship between the user company and the temporary agency worker (negative in principle)

[1] According to Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Dispatched Workers (hereinafter “Dispatch Act”), temporary placement of workers means that a temporary work agency employs workers and has them engage in work for a user company under the direction and order of the user company in accordance with the terms of the temporary placement contract while maintaining the employment relationship. In a case where a user company allows a certain employee to perform the work for a third party, whether the legal relation is a temporary placement of workers subject to the Dispatch Act does not go against the name or form of the contract attached by the party, but rather, whether a third party is actually incorporated into a third party’s business, such as directly and indirectly giving binding instructions on the performance of the work, and whether the pertinent worker can be deemed as having been directly and indirectly incorporated into a single work group composed of the workers belonging to the third party, or whether the purpose of the contract is to exercise the authority to determine whether the purpose of the contract is to independently and specifically determine whether the worker is a temporary placement of workers, such as selection of workers who will be placed in the work, training, working hours, and inspection attitude, etc.

[2] In a case where Gap et al. requested the Korea Expressway to verify the status of workers employed by a business entity other than the Korea Expressway who entered into a service contract for the collection of tolls with a foreign national expressway, the case affirming the judgment below that since the employees employed by a business entity other than the Korea Expressway were bound to employ employees belonging to the Korea Expressway according to the number of employees employed by the business entity and the number of employees employed by the business entity other than the Korea Expressway, it was difficult to view that the employees employed by the business entity other than the Korea Expressway to independently determine the status of workers, through mutual organic reports, instructions, and cooperation with the Korea Expressway through the regulations or guidelines of the Korea Expressway Corporation, and that the employees employed by the business entity other than the Korea Expressway participated in the process of performing the duties of the employees employed by the business entity other than the Korea Expressway, and that the employees employed by the business entity Gap and the manager of the business entity other than the Korea Expressway were deemed to have performed the duties of the Korea Expressway Corporation as a whole as a single work group, and that the employees employed by the business entity other than the Korea Expressway did not directly perform the duties of the Korea Expressway.

[3] Article 6(3) of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (amended by Act No. 5512, Feb. 20, 198; hereinafter “former Dispatch Act”) provides that “If a user company continues to use temporary agency workers for more than two years, it shall be deemed that the temporary agency workers are employed from the day following the expiration of the two-year period.” (hereinafter “direct employment deeming provision”), the user company and the temporary agency worker should immediately be deemed to have a direct employment relationship between the user company and the temporary agency worker if the user company violated the restriction on temporary agency period. The Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (hereinafter “former Dispatch Act”) amended by Act No. 8076, Dec. 21, 2006, instead of the direct employment deeming provision, Article 6-2(1)4 of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers provides that if the user company has been provided with temporary agency workers continuously for more than two years from the person performing temporary agency work without the permission of the Minister of Labor, it should directly be deemed to be “the temporary agency workers”

The provision on deeming direct employment prescribed by the Act on Dispatching Dispatch, or the provision on the direct employment obligation prescribed by the former Dispatch Act, with respect to the continuous use of temporary agency workers in violation of the restriction on the period of secondment, the legislative purpose of the Act is to prevent commercialization and long-termization of temporary agency workers by deeming the establishment of direct employment relationship or imposing the duty of direct employment on the user company in the judicial relationship between the user company and the temporary agency worker separate from administrative supervision or criminal punishment. Furthermore, the provision on direct employment under the amended Dispatch Act requires the user company to bear the duty of direct employment of the temporary agency workers immediately if the temporary agency workers are used in violation of the Dispatch Act, such as receiving the service of temporary agency workers from the person who operates the temporary agency business without permission. This is to further protect the temporary agency workers by improving the problem that the employment unstable for the temporary agency workers is unstable.

In light of the content, process, legislative purpose, etc. of a direct employment deeming provision or a direct employment obligation provision under the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers, a direct employment deeming provision or a direct employment obligation provision establishes the legal relationship arising between a user company and a temporary agency worker and the legal effect therefrom, and its content is not directly related to a temporary work agency, and it cannot be deemed as a requirement to continue the validity of the employment relationship between a temporary work agency and a temporary agency worker after the establishment of such legal relationship or the legal effect thereof. Therefore, even if a user company and a temporary agency worker are deemed to establish a direct employment relationship between the user company and the temporary agency worker, or the temporary agency worker retires or was dismissed from the relationship between the user company and the temporary agency worker, such circumstance does not affect the legal relationship related to the direct employment deeming provision or the obligation

Meanwhile, the proviso of Article 6(3) of the Act on Dispatching Dispatch, and Article 6-2(2) of the former Dispatch Act and Article 6-2(2) of the same Act provide that “where the relevant temporary agency worker explicitly expresses his/her objection, the provision on deeming direct employment or the provision on deeming direct employment does not apply.” In light of the provision on deeming direct employment or the legislative purpose of the provision on deeming direct employment and its provisions are not directly related to the temporary work agency, “where the relevant temporary agency worker explicitly expresses his/her objection,” “where the relevant temporary agency worker explicitly expresses his/her objection to the direct employment of the user company.” Therefore, even if the temporary agency worker expressed his/her intention to terminate his/her labor relationship with the temporary work agency, it cannot be readily concluded that the relevant temporary agency worker constitutes “where the relevant temporary agency worker

[1] Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers / [2] Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers / [3] Article 6 (3) of the former Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (Amended by Act No. 8076, Dec. 21, 2006); Article 6-2 (1) 4 (see current Article 6-2 (1) 5) and (2) of the former Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (Amended by Act No. 8372, Apr. 11, 2007); Article 6-2 (1) 5 and (2) of the former Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (Amended by Act No. 1168, Mar. 22, 2013)

[1] [3] Supreme Court Decision 2013Da14965 Decided November 26, 2015 (Gong2016Sang, 4) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 2010Da106436 Decided February 26, 2015 (Gong2015Sang, 515)

Plaintiff 266 (Law Firm LLC et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

See Attached List of Plaintiffs (Law Firm LLC et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea Highway Corporation (Attorneys Temporary rules and three others, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2015Na203531, 2033548, 20355, 20355, 2033562, 203579, 2033579, 203586, 2033593 decided February 3, 2017

The part of the lower judgment against Plaintiffs 266 and 47 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The Defendant’s remaining appeals are all dismissed. The costs of appeal between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant except Plaintiffs 266 and 47 are assessed against the Defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the defendant's grounds of appeal Nos. 1 through 5, and No. 7

A. According to Article 2 subparag. 1 of the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers (hereinafter “Temporary Agency Act”), temporary placement of workers means that a temporary work agency employs workers and has them engage in work for a user company under the direction and order of the user company in accordance with the terms and conditions of the temporary placement contract while maintaining the employment relationship. In a case where a user company allows a certain employee to perform the work for a third party, whether the legal relationship is a temporary placement of workers subject to the Dispatch Act does not go against the name or form of the contract attached by the party, but rather, whether the legal relationship is a temporary placement of workers subject to the Dispatch Act, directly or indirectly, by giving a binding order directly or indirectly to the relevant worker, and can be deemed as having been actually incorporated into a third party’s business, such as the selection of workers who will be placed in the work for the Plaintiff company or the number of workers, training, working hours, leave, inspection of attitude, etc., whether the purpose of the contract is within its own scope, and whether the work is independent and specific and necessary for the relevant worker’s work.

B. The court below acknowledged the facts in light of the adopted evidence, and determined that the rest of the plaintiffs and the defendant, except the plaintiff 266, were dispatched to the worker, on the following grounds, since they were employed by each of the non-resident enterprises in the judgment (hereinafter referred to as "non-resident enterprise in the case" and the person operating the non-resident in the case of this case was directly directed and ordered by the defendant who entered into the service contract in the case of this case with the non-resident in the case of this case with the non-resident in the case of this case and provided labor for the defendant.

1) A) In light of the need for the uniform operation and management of the Defendant’s place of business which is currently scattered across the country, the employees and the Defendant’s employees belonging to the Foreign Legal Entities seem to have performed their duties through mutual organic reports, instructions, and cooperation.

B) The Defendant’s business regulations, business operation guidelines, and various business operation guidelines or work-related manuals are considerably detailed and detailed. Employees belonging to the Foreign Aid & Aid Enterprise in this case who violated the Defendant’s guidelines or arbitrarily changed their work process, and were not able to perform duties. The employee of the Foreign Aid & Aid Enterprise in this case does not need any individual and direct direction or work instruction in carrying out the actual duties because they belong to a relatively simple and repetitive work. Accordingly, they do not seem to have different from those of the Defendant’s instructions on the performance of duties by themselves through the Defendant’s regulations or guidelines. In addition, in light of the Defendant’s various business operation guidelines and the scope, depth, method of delivery, and frequency of delivery, it is difficult to view that the Defendant simply designated the scope of duties.

C) Workers belonging to the Foreign Aid Enterprise shall obtain approval or confirmation from the Defendant’s employees by entering the results of performing their duties in various branches and ledgers, such as a written confirmation of duties, a register of detection of limited vehicles, a register of examination of abnormal unpaid vehicles, the details of detection of illegal vehicles, and a written measure, etc. according to the forms provided by the Defendant. The Defendant’s business operation standards also stipulate that the duties performed by the employees belonging to the Foreign Aid Enterprise are one of the duties of the Defendant employees. In light of such circumstances, the Defendant may be deemed to have participated in the process of performing duties of the employees belonging to the Foreign Aid Enterprise, and managed and supervised

D) Around December 2007, the Defendant took measures, such as changing terms or approval forms that may confuse the organization with the Defendant on the documents and management ledger form, etc. of the foreign injection entity of this case, and improving educational methods, business instructions, and methods of supervision, etc. In light of these circumstances, at least before and after December 2007, it is deemed that the Defendant voluntarily recognized that the employees belonging to the foreign injection entity of this case performed duties under the Defendant’s control as seen above, as seen earlier, as well as that the Defendant was involved in the content and form of the documents and management ledger, etc. of the foreign injection entity of this case.

E) It seems that the work instruction given by the business owner of the instant case to his employees is merely the delivery of the decision of the Defendant, or repeated and strong work guidelines.

2) In light of the fact that the employees belonging to the external management entity of the instant case wear the Defendant's log while wearing the Defendant's clothes and name tags, comply with the various regulations presented by the Defendant at the Defendant's place of business located in the same space as the Defendant's employees, and that the employees belonging to the external management entity of the instant external management entity and the manager of the Defendant's place of business carried out the duties of collecting tollss, regulating delinquent vehicles, and regulating restricted vehicles, it is reasonable to view that the employees belonging to the external management entity of the instant external management entity and the manager of the Defendant's place of business were actually engaged in the Defendant's essential and regular duties as a whole as a single work group, and in the process

3) The outsourcing employer of the instant case had no choice but to employ employees according to the number of employees employed by the Defendant and the number of employees employed by each position. The Defendant appears to have employed a commissioned or daily worker with the Defendant’s approval. The Defendant distributed a business office labor management guide or conducted labor management training for the employees of the instant outsourcing company. Meanwhile, it is recognized that the instant outsourcing company established the employment schedule and conducted work evaluation, and conducted reward and disciplinary action for the employees under its control, and managed the workplace, year, week, week, sick, and leave of absence. However, in light of the fact that the Defendant was subject to education and training for the employees under its control, it is difficult to view that the outsourcing company of the instant case conducted the work schedule, personnel assignment, and commuting, etc., of the employees under its control, and that it was difficult to view that the Defendant’s basic guidelines for the management of the employees under its control, including the Defendant’s local headquarters or training guidelines for the employees under its control, etc., and that the Defendant’s local headquarters or training guidelines for the Plaintiffs.

4) The instant service agreement is intended for the purpose or purpose of the Defendant’s operation of the Defendant’s place of business, which is an essential and regular business, and includes “other duties (business or operation) duties directed by the Defendant” in the contents of the business to be performed by the Defendant. Indeed, the Defendant specifically identified the duties of the employees belonging to the Foreign Educational Institution through various guidelines, and accordingly, the employees belonging to the Foreign Educational Institution engaged in the instant business, in addition to the toll collection duties, performed non-exclusive duties, such as “the cooperation in the public relations campaign during the permanent closure period, public relations on the advancement of toll payment means, discount sales, credit card-type sales, media coverage, and entertainment response guidelines.” In addition, in light of these various circumstances, it is difficult to view that the Defendant’s special terms and conditions of the instant service agreement incorporated into the content of the instant service agreement and the comprehensive instruction or involvement of the Defendant in the instant business instruction within a limited scope of the purpose or scope of the instant service agreement have become definite.

5) On the other hand, the external management entity of the instant case is operated by the former employee of the Defendant even before the conclusion of the instant service contract, and only formed through the externalization process of the Defendant’s toll collection affairs, and operated the business against the Defendant only. Most of the external management entities of the instant case appoint a chief secretary as an intermediate manager and incorporate them into the organization of the Defendant’s place of business, and does not have a separate organizational system. No particular investment is made for the operation of the Defendant’s place of business. Moreover, it is difficult to view that the external management entity bears a special risk of business, since it is difficult to deem that the external management entity of the instant case bears a certain amount of profit only when it puts a worker equal to the number of persons the Defendant had set up in advance and pays wages within

C. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on

2. As to the defendant's ground of appeal Nos. 6-1 and 6-2

A. Article 6(3) of the Dispatch Act (amended by Act No. 5512, Feb. 20, 198; hereinafter “Dispatch Act”) provides, “If a user company continues to use temporary agency workers for more than two years, the user company shall be deemed to have employed the relevant temporary agency workers from the day following the expiry of the two-year period.” (hereinafter “direct employment deeming provision”), the user company and the temporary agency worker should immediately be deemed to have a direct employment relationship between the user company and the temporary agency worker if the user company violated the restriction on the period of secondment. Article 6-2(1)4 of the Dispatch Act amended by Act No. 8076, Dec. 21, 2006 (hereinafter “former Dispatch Act”) provides, “If the user company has been provided temporary agency workers for more than two years without the permission of the Minister of Labor, it must directly employ the relevant temporary agency worker,” and Article 6(1)4 of the Act directly dispatch the relevant temporary agency worker worker from the user company without the permission of the Minister of Employment and Labor (hereinafter “Notice Act”).

The provision on deeming direct employment prescribed by the Act on Dispatching Dispatch, or the provision on the direct employment obligation prescribed by the former Dispatch Act, with respect to the continuous use of temporary agency workers in violation of the restriction on the period of secondment, the legislative purpose of the Act is to prevent commercialization and long-termization of temporary agency workers by deeming the establishment of direct employment relationship or imposing the duty of direct employment on the user company in the judicial relationship between the user company and the temporary agency workers separate from administrative supervision or criminal punishment. Furthermore, the provision on direct employment under the amended Act requires the user company to bear the duty of direct employment of the relevant temporary agency workers immediately if the temporary agency workers are used in violation of the Dispatch Act, such as receiving temporary agency services from the person who operates the temporary agency business without permission. This is to further protect the temporary agency workers by improving the problem that the employment unstable for the temporary agency workers is unstable.

In light of the content and process of amendment of the provision on deeming direct employment or the provision on direct employment obligation under the Dispatch Act, legislative purpose, etc., the provision on deeming direct employment or the provision on direct employment obligation establishes the legal relationship arising between the user company and the temporary agency worker and the legal effect therefrom, and its content does not directly relate to the temporary work agency (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da14965, Nov. 26, 2015). Therefore, it cannot be said that the establishment of the above legal relationship or the legal effect of the provision on direct employment relationship between the user company and the temporary agency worker is not required as a requirement to continue the validity thereof. Therefore, even if the user company and the temporary agency worker were deemed to have established, or the temporary agency worker was resigned or dismissed in the relationship between the user company and the temporary agency worker, such circumstance does not affect the legal relationship between the user company and the direct employment deeming or the obligation on direct employment.

Meanwhile, the proviso of Article 6(3) of the Act on Dispatching Dispatch, and Article 6-2(2) of the former Dispatch Act and Article 6-2(2) of the same Act provide that “where the relevant temporary agency worker explicitly expresses his/her objection, the provision on deeming direct employment or the provision on deeming direct employment does not apply.” In light of the provision on deeming direct employment or the legislative purpose of the provision on deeming direct employment and its provisions are not directly related to the temporary work agency, “where the relevant temporary agency worker explicitly expresses his/her objection,” “where the relevant temporary agency worker expresses his/her intention to object directly to the user company.” Therefore, even if the temporary agency worker expressed his/her intention to terminate his/her labor relationship with the temporary work agency, it cannot be readily concluded that the relevant temporary agency worker constitutes “where the relevant temporary agency worker explicitly expresses his

B. The lower court rejected the Defendant’s assertion that the Plaintiffs, who retired or were subject to disciplinary action in relation to the external employer of this case after the date of occurrence of the Defendant’s direct employment obligation or the date of occurrence of the direct employment obligation, are excluded from the application of the direct employment deeming provision or the direct employment obligation provision.

C. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the legal effect of deeming direct employment

3. As to Defendant’s ground of appeal No. 6-3

A. Determination on the grounds of appeal against Plaintiff 47

1) The lower court, on July 2, 2002, deemed that the establishment of a direct employment relationship with the Defendant was deemed in accordance with the Act on Dispatching, and accepted the Plaintiff’s claim for confirmation of the status of an employee, since Plaintiff 47 provided the Defendant with dispatched work more than two years from July 1, 200, after the Plaintiff 47 was employed by the external employment business entity of this case.

2) However, it is difficult to accept such a determination by the lower court for the following reasons.

A) According to the records, Plaintiff 47, from July 1, 2000 to the Defendant, provided temporary agency services under employment by the instant external agency, and on October 30, 2002, retired from the instant external agency, and Plaintiff 47, who provided services under employment by the Defendant on July 1, 2003, and retired from the Defendant on December 31, 2003.

B) Examining these facts in light of the relevant legal principles, even if Plaintiff 47 deemed the establishment of a direct employment relationship with the Defendant on July 2, 2002 under the Act on Dispatching, it cannot be asserted that Plaintiff 47 was the Defendant’s worker status based on the establishment of such direct employment relationship, barring any special circumstance.

3) Nevertheless, the lower court did not completely examine the impact of Plaintiff 47’s retirement on the legal relationship based on the direct employment deeming that Plaintiff 47 continued to be an employee of the Defendant on or after July 2, 2002. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of the provision on deeming direct employment, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations. The allegation contained in the grounds of appeal assigning this error is with merit (However, even if the status of Plaintiff 47’s employee is not recognized due to the aforementioned withdrawal at the lower court’s trial after remand, if Plaintiff 47 continued to provide temporary agency services for more than two years after being employed by another external agency, then it pointed out that the obligation of direct employment may arise to the Defendant under the former Dispatch Act).

B. Determination on the grounds of appeal against Plaintiffs 48 and 63

1) The lower court determined on December 21, 2003 that, since Plaintiff 48 provided temporary agency services for more than two years after being employed by the instant external agency from December 21, 2003, the direct employment relationship with the Defendant was established on December 22, 2005, and that Plaintiff 63 continued to provide temporary agency services for more than two years after being employed by the instant external agency from January 1, 2009 to the instant external agency, the Defendant was obligated to directly employ the Defendant on January 2, 201.

2) The assertion that Plaintiff 48 and 63 retired respectively from the Foreign Aid Enterprise before two years have passed since the beginning of the first service at the Foreign Aid Enterprise, and that Plaintiff 48 and 63 began to work at another Foreign Aid Enterprise, which had a certain period of suspension thereafter, is asserted only in the final appeal, and thus, does not constitute a legitimate ground for appeal against the lower judgment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2001Da63575, Jan. 25, 2002). Furthermore, examining the record, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

4. As to the ground of appeal by Plaintiff 266

A. The lower court revoked the relevant part of the judgment of the first instance, which accepted Plaintiff 266’s claim, and dismissed the relevant claim on the grounds that there is no evidence to support the fact that Plaintiff 26 entered into an employment contract with the Foreign Legal Consultant around May 2014.

B. However, we cannot accept the above determination by the court below for the following reasons.

1) Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence and records duly admitted reveals the following facts.

A) Plaintiff 266 asserted that, from the time of filing the instant lawsuit, he/she was employed by the instant out-of-the-counter business entity on May 1, 2014, and that the Defendant provided temporary agency work at the Defendant’s ○○ business office.

B) The Defendant did not clearly dispute the above assertion of Plaintiff 266 in the first instance trial, and Plaintiff 266 won the first instance trial.

C) The Defendant did not dispute Plaintiff 266 until the date for preparatory pleading of the lower court’s first or fourth date for preparatory pleading, and submitted a preparatory document dated November 15, 2016, stating that there was no evidence that Plaintiff 266 had worked for an external vaccination enterprise of this case, and stated the said preparatory document on November 16, 2016 at the first date for preparatory pleading of the lower court.

D) However, on May 1, 2014, Plaintiff 266 entered the said preparatory document and worked at the Defendant’s ○○○○○ Office. In addition, the Defendant asserted in the said preparatory document that part of the Plaintiffs’ labor relations with the instant external injection firm was terminated on the basis of November 10, 2016, and among them, Plaintiff 266 was also included.

2) Examining these facts in light of the relevant legal principles, the Defendant asserted that Plaintiff 266 did not have any evidence of working for the instant external vaccination business entity; on the other hand, Plaintiff 266 was employed by the external injection business entity from May 1, 2014 to November 10, 2016, and made a mutually contradictory statement, such as the person employed by Defendant 266 from the instant external injection business entity and employed by Defendant 266 up to November 10, 2016. As long as the Defendant asserted that the litigation relationship is unclear, the lower court should have deliberated and determined whether Plaintiff 266 was recognized as working for the instant external injection business entity by actively exercising his/her right of explanation and urging adequate proof.

Nevertheless, the lower court rejected Plaintiff 266’s assertion on the sole ground as indicated in its reasoning without reaching it. In so determining, the lower court erred by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations in violation of the duty to carry out Elucidation. The allegation contained in the grounds of appeal on this point is with merit.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against plaintiffs 266 and 47 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. All of the defendant's remaining appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal between the plaintiffs and the defendant except plaintiffs 266 and 47 are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

[Attachment] List of Plaintiffs: Omitted

Justices Park Sang-ok (Presiding Justice)