1. The plaintiff's claims against the defendants are all dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. Basic facts

A. The forest survey report prepared during the Japanese occupation point period is written as follows: E having the address in Gyeongcheon-si D is written as having received the assessment of the 110 Mad 4 Mad 9 (hereinafter “the forest of this case”).

B. On December 17, 1934, G, the permanent domicile of which is H, died in G, the Republic of Korea, solely inherited G’s property, but died on August 15, 1986. On August 15, 1986, I, the wife of H, and the Plaintiff, J, K, and L jointly inherited H’s property.

C. As to the forest land of this case, the defendant Republic of Korea filed a registration of ownership preservation (hereinafter "registration of ownership preservation of this case") as the receipt No. 272 on February 5, 1960 with the Jung-gu District Court Macheon Registry Office, and the defendant B completed the registration of ownership transfer as the receipt date No. 274 on the same date with the same registry office, and the defendant Hanyang Institute as the receipt date No. 295 on January 19, 1962 with the same registry office.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, entry of Gap evidence 1, 2, and 4 (including virtual number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Judgment on the ground of the Plaintiff’s claim

A. The person registered as the owner in the land survey book or forest survey book prepared during the Japanese occupation period, such as the identity of the Plaintiff and the land survey title holder G, etc. of the forest of this case shall be presumed to have been assessed as the owner of the land unless there is any counter-proof that the situation has been changed by the adjudication, etc.

As seen in the above facts, in light of the fact that the assessment titleholder of the forest of this case and the Plaintiff’s fleet G name are equal to the Chinese characters, and that the domicile and permanent domicile coincide with that of the G, it is reasonable to see that the assessment titleholder of the forest of this case and the Plaintiff’s fleet G are the same person.

Therefore, the forest land of this case is owned by the Plaintiff’s fleet G under the circumstances.