In a case where a member of the National Assembly made a statement to the effect that “A member of the National Assembly, who was the largest shareholder of the Party B, was reappointed for the consecutive terms of the representative director to the executive officers of the Company B through the presidential vice-president and the presidential vice-chairman, the case holding that A cannot be held liable for civil liability on the grounds that the above statement within the scope of the National Assembly member’s exemption privilege, is within the scope of the National Assembly member’s exemption privilege.”

In a case where a National Assembly member Gap made a statement to the effect that "the representative director Byung of Eul company, the largest shareholder of which is Eul, was reappointed for the consecutive terms of the representative director Eul company's officers through the presidential vice-chairman and the presidential vice-chairman," while putting an interpellation against the Minister of Justice at the plenary session of the National Assembly, the case holding that although the above statement constitutes defamation expressions against Eul company Byung, even if it is based on the content itself, it cannot be deemed that it does not constitute defamation against others by clearly stating that it does not have any relation with his/her duties or by clearly stating false facts, and thus, it is within the scope of the National Assembly member's exemption privilege, and thus, Gap cannot be held liable for civil liability for the above statement.

Article 45 of the Constitution, Article 751 of the Civil Act

Suwon Shipbuilding Marine Co., Ltd. and one other (Law Firm Apex, Attorneys Ansan-si et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Law Firm, Attorneys Park Dong-seok et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

June 30, 2011

1. All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The defendant shall pay 200,000,000 won to the plaintiff Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Co., Ltd., and 100,000,000 won to the plaintiff 2, and 5% per annum from November 1, 2010 to the service date of a copy of the complaint of this case, and 20% per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

1. Basic facts

A. Status of the parties

On March 7, 2006, Plaintiff 2 was appointed as the representative director of the Plaintiff Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Plaintiff Co., Ltd.”). On March 13, 2009, after the term of office expires, the person appointed again as the representative director of the Plaintiff Co., Ltd. was appointed again, and the Defendant is the 18th member of the Democratic Party.

B. Cruing Plaintiff 2’s reappointments

1) From July 2010, the media companies in Korea filed reports with the intent of Plaintiff 2 to raise doubt that Plaintiff 2 had paid for political power through Nonparty 1, the president of ○○○○○○○ for the reappointment of the representative director of the Plaintiff company, and urged the prosecution to investigate fair criminal investigation. The Defendant also raised doubt about the possibility of the Plaintiff 2’s reappointment.

2) On October 19, 2010, Nonparty 2, a member of the 18th National Assembly belonging to a Democratic Party, asked Nonparty 3 to the president of the Korea Development Bank who is a major shareholder of the Plaintiff Company about the conditions of the Plaintiff Company’s management and supervision of the company’s insolvency, and asked Nonparty 2 to Nonparty 1 through Nonparty 4 Co., Ltd., which is the Plaintiff Company’s partner, and Nonparty 1 offered a bribe to Nonparty 2 in return for his reappointment to the Korea Development Bank, etc., and Nonparty 2 was reappointed. In this process, Nonparty 2 asked Nonparty 5 for the reappointment of Plaintiff 2 to Nonparty 5, and Nonparty 5 asked Nonparty 3 to be reappointed on February 2, 2009.

C. The defendant's remarks among the public figures

In this situation, on November 1, 2010, the Defendant made an interpellation against Nonparty 6 at the 8th regular session of the National Assembly of 294 plenary session of the Republic of Korea, and made the remarks listed in the attached Form (hereinafter “instant remarks”). On November 1, 2010, the lower part asserted that the Plaintiffs were core in the content of the instant remarks, and the said remarks can be summarized as follows:

On January 19, 2009, in the main text, Plaintiff 2, who was admitted to the Seoul University Hospital by Nonparty 7, was using golf, was aware of the president’s pathary schedule of the president’s denial through Nonparty 7’s denial, and met the father in the ward room with his denial. Plaintiff 2’s refusal was made through Nonparty 8, the first president’s Dong of the first president in February, 200, and sent to the Youngbu and Nonparty 8 in order that Plaintiff 2’s reappointment was bound by the vice president’s reappointment. In the process, Nonparty 2 tried to be reappointed of Plaintiff 2 to Non-Party 3 and Non-Party 8. Nonparty 2 tried to be reappointed to Non-Party 3 and Non-Party 3 and Non-Party 2 tried to be reappointed to Non-Party 3 and Non-Party 8. The case was made by the vice president for Non-Party 1 to Non-Party 3 and Non-Party 2 to the prosecution.

[Based on Recognition] In the absence of dispute, Gap evidence No. 1, Eul evidence No. 1-7, Eul evidence No. 2-1, 2, Eul evidence No. 3-1, 3, 4, 5, Eul evidence No. 4-1, 2, Eul evidence No. 5-1, Eul evidence No. 5-6, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiffs' assertion

Although the defendant recognizes that the statement in this case is false, the defendant has damaged the plaintiffs' reputation by openly pointing out false facts, which deviates from the scope of the immunity privilege held as a member of the National Assembly. Therefore, the defendant is obliged to pay consolation money for mental suffering suffered by the plaintiffs due to illegal acts under Article 750 of the Civil Act as above.

3. Determination

A. Whether the statement of this case impairs the plaintiffs' honor

The statement of this case is that the plaintiff 2 succeeded to the reappointment of the representative director by making the expenses for the reappointment of the representative director to the executive officers of the plaintiff company through the presidential vice-presidents, Cheongbu, and Cheongbu.

There is no room for the theory that the statement of the above facts constitutes defamation that may infringe on the social value or evaluation of the Plaintiff 2. Also, the above alleged facts are sufficient to undermine the social evaluation of the Plaintiff Company by causing the fairness in the process of appointing the representative director of the Plaintiff Company, the ethics of the Plaintiff Company, and the transparency in fund enforcement. As such, the instant statement constitutes defamation expressions against the Plaintiff Company.

B. Whether the instant speech deviates from the scope of the immunity privilege

1) Scope of immunity

Article 45 of the Constitution provides, “A National Assembly member shall not be held responsible for any speech and vote on his/her duties outside the National Assembly,” thereby guaranteeing the privilege of a National Assembly member constitutionally. The above privilege of a National Assembly member is to ensure that the National Assembly member can freely speak and vote within the National Assembly as a representative of the people, thereby ensuring that the National Assembly is able to appropriately exercise the authority granted by the Constitution, such as legislation and national control, and to smoothly perform its functions.

In light of the purpose, purport, etc. of such immunity, even though it is clear that the content of the speech itself does not have any relation to his/her duties, or it does not constitute an object of immunity even in cases where the content of the speech is obviously false and impairs another person’s reputation by pointing out false facts. However, if the content of the speech did not recognize that it is false, even though the content of the speech lacks some grounds or did not properly conduct an investigation to confirm whether it is true or true, it is an object of immunity (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da5752, Jan. 12, 2007).

2) Relation to the instant speech’s duty

According to the facts acknowledged earlier, the Defendant made the instant speech at the plenary session in the process of urging the investigation of Plaintiff 2’s suspicions for the reappointment of the representative director of Plaintiff 2, who had been raised at the time of the plenary session to the Minister of Justice, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the instant speech constitutes a case where it is evident that the instant speech itself does not have any relation to his duties even if it is based on the content itself.

3) Whether to recognize the falsity of the instant remarks and the Defendant’s falsity

A) The Plaintiffs asserted that the instant remarks were false, and based on the following circumstances, which can be acknowledged by comprehensively considering the purport of the entire pleadings in each of the statements in subparagraphs 3, 3, and 12 of No. 2-3, 3, and 1-12 of No. 2-2 (excluding the following, the grounds cited by the Plaintiffs, other than the statement, are not determined separately by deeming that there is no evidence supporting the assertion or that there is no relation to the core part of the instant remarks

① After the instant statement, the president of Nonparty 3 asserted that, on February 2009, Nonparty 5 met the number of Non-Party 5’s public-private partnership members on two occasions. However, the Plaintiff 2’s reappointment was not divided at all. The Defendant’s argument regarding the presidential vice president was all fluorous.

② The Defendant’s check of USD 1,000 on a face value 1,000 issued in Americs Nos. 1,00, arguing that it was sent to the President, etc. as a honorarium for the reappointment of Plaintiff 2 from the instant speech, was issued only until January 2009, and was not issued thereafter.

③ On September 2010, Seoul Central District Inspection Special 1 published the result of the intermediate investigation conducted by Nonparty 4 Company, and published that Nonparty 4 Company was directly used by the said Company. In this regard, Plaintiff 2 was unable to find out the suspicion of receiving rebates, raising a non-financial expense, and making a reappointment.

④ On July 2010, the Defendant asserted that Plaintiff 2 spent a reappointment by Nonparty 1’s president via Nonparty 1, ○○○○○. At the time of the instant speech, the Defendant changed its assertion that Plaintiff 2 spent a reappointment by the presidential vice president rather than Nonparty 1.

B) However, for the following reasons, it is difficult to find that the foregoing rationale cited by the Plaintiffs alone proves that the instant remarks were false, and there is no other evidence to prove that the instant remarks were false.

(1) Even if the President, Young-gu, and Non-Party 3, the president of the Korea Development Bank, and Non-Party 3, were brupted to the facts indicated in the instant remarks, insofar as they were in the core position of the parties to the instant case, they cannot be deemed an objective material to verify the authenticity of the contents

② Even if the travelers’ check was not issued more than 1,000 cubic 1,000 cubic cc c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c.

③ In relation to the investigation of non-party 4’s non-party 1’s non-party 2’s funds, the aforementioned announcement was limited to the fact that the prosecutor did not find suspicions such as Plaintiff 2’s raising of non-party 2’s non-party funds, reappointmenting expenses, offering of rebates, etc., and did not make a presentation to the effect that the prosecutor did not have to be reappointed after conducting a concentrated and dynamic investigation into Plaintiff 2’s non-party 2’s reappointments.

④ Even if the Defendant changed his argument regarding the satisfying of Plaintiff 2’s reappointment, it cannot be ruled out that there was a possibility that the Defendant changed his argument due to changes in circumstances, such as the appearance of the satisfy reporters and the acquisition of related materials.

C) Even if the instant statement may be judged as false based on the grounds cited by the Plaintiffs, the following circumstances revealed in full view of the facts cited earlier, namely, ① from around July 2010, Plaintiff 2, who was appointed by the representative director of the Plaintiff company, to the participating government, participated in the reappointment of the representative director after the change of the government, have consistently raised doubt about the possibility of having been continuously raised; ② Nonparty 2, who is a member of the East National Assembly, and Nonparty 2, who is a member of the Presidential Assembly, were likely to have been reappointed through the presidential vice versa; ③ Plaintiff 2 and Defendant 7, who was the male East East National Assembly Nonparty 7, who was aware of the fact that they had been pro-Japanese relationship, and Plaintiff 2 maintained pro-Japanese relationship with the deceased non-party 7, and from around July 2010, it was difficult to recognize the Defendant’s assertion that it was the most effective way to criticize the Plaintiff’s prosecutor’s office, in light of the empirical rule and the fact that Plaintiff 2 could not have been urged.

D) Meanwhile, the plaintiffs are asserting the burden of proof on the grounds of the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Do6138 Decided March 20, 2003 and the Supreme Court Decision 2005Do2627 Decided July 22, 2005. In other words, the person who actively asserts that there was no suspicion against a person who asserts that there was no suspicion, bears the burden of presenting supporting the existence of such a fact. The materials to be presented are insufficient to simply present a written answer, and at least have the composition to the extent that it is practically possible for the other party to prove. The defendant asserts that, even according to the statement in this case itself, the plaintiff 2 made a solicitation through the President permanent and unspecified person, and the defendant is liable for defamation due to a false fact since it did not submit separate supporting materials during the litigation process in this case, and the defendant asserts that there is no suspicion that the government's duty to investigate the facts beyond the limit of the National Assembly's exemption from liability. In light of the purport of the National Assembly's exemption from liability.

However, the above precedents cited by the Plaintiffs were determined as to the establishment of false information and the method of proving the falsity of the crime of publishing false information under the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Unlawful Election. The reason for imposing a certain burden of proof on the person who raised such doubt lies in the crime of publishing false information, not only the reputation of the candidate but also the grave result leading to the candidate’s choice in an imminent election, and rather, it is necessary to restrict the scope of solicitation for the candidate’s eligibility verification only if there are reasonable grounds to believe that such suspicion is true (see Supreme Court Decision 201Do6138, supra). On the other hand, even if the National Assembly member’s remarks on the part of the party to the crime of publishing false information, it is difficult to deem that there is a broad opportunity for the party to speak in the case where the party to the crime of publishing false information would be aware of the candidate’s right to know that there is no reason to believe that it would be a serious violation of the public interest.

Of course, it is true that if the scope of the privilege of a member of the National Assembly is widely recognized as above, there is a risk of misuse or abuse as a means of political cooperation in the National Assembly instead of the freedom and independence of the member of the National Assembly to reflect it. In this case, even though the defendant raised doubt that the National Bank was against the political authority in relation to the appointment of the representative director of an enterprise whose largest shareholder is the company, he did not provide any materials that he/she secured for investigation by the prosecution. In this case, it does not seem that there is no possibility of criticism as to the fact that the reason why the National Assembly raised such doubt in the course of the lawsuit in this case does not seem to have any possibility of criticism. However, the risk of misuse or abuse of the privilege should be reduced through the efforts of autonomous self-government through the mutual discussion within the National Assembly and the proper disciplinary procedure, and the political inquiry by the person who has the right in the next election should not be resolved by expanding the scope of the privilege that the Constitution does not recognize).

4) Sub-determination

Ultimately, although the Defendant’s remarks in this case constitute defamation expressions against the Plaintiffs, it is evident that the content itself does not have any relation to his duties, or it cannot be viewed as a case where he defames another person by pointing out false facts with the knowledge that it is obviously false, and thus, it is within the scope of the National Assembly member’s privileges of exemption, and therefore, the Defendant cannot be held liable for civil liability for the instant remarks.

4. Conclusion

If so, all of the plaintiffs' claims are without merit, they are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment] Stenographic Records of the National Assembly: omitted

Judges Hak Jin-Jon (Presiding Judge)

1) In this respect, the exception to the immunity in our Constitution should be more careful than in the case of Germany, which stipulates the exception to the immunity in the Constitution (Framework Act on Reading) itself with respect to the act of serious defamation.