Plaintiff (Law Firm Gyeong & Yang, Attorneys Kim Sung-sik et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Fair Trade Commission (Law Firm Hannuri, Attorney Jeon Young-young, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

March 20, 2008

1. On December 26, 2006, the Defendant’s order to pay a penalty surcharge under Paragraph 4 of the attached Table against the Plaintiff shall be revoked.

2. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

The same shall apply to the order.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. Eligibility and general status of the plaintiff, etc.

1) The Plaintiff, Nonparty 1 Co., Ltd., Nonparty 2, Nonparty 3 Co., Ltd., and Nonparty 4 Co., Ltd., 4) are entrepreneurs under Article 2 subparag. 1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, who produce and sell synthetic plastics, etc.

General conditions, such as capital and sales, of the above companies, are as shown in Table 1.

Table 1> The general status of tax 4 tax credit

As of December 31, 2005, units: 00 million won, names

Non-party 63402,8402,9753,02152,82806 Non-party 71,505,50524, 2004, the regular number of employees at ordinary times, 2004, the number of non-party 585,5719,670,6782,427 Non-party 63402,8402,840 2,9753,002 152 806 Non-party 3 Co., Ltd. (the date of incorporation), Non-party 71,505,0524,0525,4324,5991,823,669 (the date of September 204)

*Materials : Data published by tax 4 companies (Saless: Total sales of all products including exports, etc.)

(b) Market structure and actual status of business;

(1) Types of laundry and kitchen duty system

laundry and kitchen duty is used for the removal of pollutants attached to textile products, food, etc. and cleanliness as seen in the attached Table 2 â………………………§, according to its nature, for the laundry tax is classified into the laundry, disinfection, concentration, drum washing machines, and the laundry tax is classified into general use, laundry, and concentration.

Table 2> Types by laundry and Inundry Tax System

본문내 포함된 표 용도별 제품군 특성별 업체별 주요 브랜드 세탁용품 세탁세제 효소용 원고(수퍼타이)/소외 1 주식회사(스파크)/소외 3 주식회사(이코노)/소외 9(파워크린) 살균/표백용 원고(테크)/소외 1 주식회사(퍼펙트)/소외 3 주식회사(비트) 농축용 드럼세탁기용 원고(테크)/소외 1 주식회사(퍼펙트)/소외 3 주식회사(비트)/소외 10(액츠)/소외 9(파워크린) 주방용품 주방세제 일반용 원고(퐁퐁)/소외 1 주식회사(트리오)/소외 3 주식회사(이코노) 마일드용 원고(자연퐁)/소외 1 주식회사(순샘)/소외 3 주식회사(참그린) 농축용 원고(자연퐁파워)/소외 1 주식회사(순샘한방울)/소외 11(조이)

* A brand for each company is based on major products at the present market share of higher enterprises.

(2) The structure and current status of the market for laundry and gas supply

(a) the current status of domestic manufacturers and factories;

A major manufacturer in the domestic tax system is eight companies as seen in the attached Table 3 â……………………, and one factory owned by these companies is distributed in Daejeon, 3, Eastern, Cheongju, Ulsan, Incheon, etc. in each region.

Table 3> The current status of tax manufacturers and factories by region;

본문내 포함된 표 구분 동두천 청주 울산 인천 대전 진천 청양 김천 익산 합계 공장수 1개 1개 1개 1개 3개 1개 1개 1개 1개 11개 회사명 소외 12 원고 원고 소외 3 주식회사 소외 1 주식회사, 소외 13, 소외 14 소외 10 소외 1 주식회사 소외 13 소외 9 ？

(B) Sales and market share of laundry and weekly taxation

The share of the domestic market by the survey of the laund Tax System is as follows: 34.7% in the case of 2005, 27.1% in the case of non-party 1 corporation, and 20.5% in the case of non-party 4 corporation.

Table 4 â…………………………………))

(unit: million won)

(2) Non-party 18,378,8647,7532,702 17,8386,486,483 (36.5) (27.4) (21.6) (27.4) (21.6) (27.5) (2.0) (2.0) (108,0927.79,695 70,2298,87815,4788,467 (35.4) (25.6.1) (29.4)) (25.6) (28.4) (25.6) (19.4) (25.4)

* The Data Collection Agency: ACACAAB Data Criteria, the sales of Non-Party 12 and Non-Party 10, the sales of Non-Party 2 and Non-Party 4.

The market share of the domestic market by the survey of the Jeju Taxation is as follows: 40.5% in the case of 2005, the plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation 29.7%, and the non-party 4 corporation 15.3% in the case of the year 2005.

â…………………5) The domestic market share in the liquor tax system.

(unit: million won)

Plaintiff 1, 2,706 30,849 14,749 3,760 4,338 96,402 shares (4.3) (4.0) (15.3) (15.9) (4.5) (100) 38,282 28,988 15,092 42,024 shares (16.6.5) (16.7) 28,95 (16.7) 5,97) 205 (14.7) 45,975 (6.6.7) 29,974) 104 0,024 shares (16.6) 31.5 (16.5) 10,004) 36,404,4284,975 (6.75) 16.75)

* The ACAAAAAson Data Criteria, the sales of Non-Party 10 and Non-Party 11, and the sales of Non-Party 2, Note 2.

(C)Distribution structure

Tax system distribution is 65% in direct dealing form in which manufacturers make direct transactions with distributors and 35% in indirect trading form.In the case of each type of business store in direct dealing, 5% in discount store, 31% in enterprise type, and 15% in individual business type. For agents, it is divided into the form of supply to small stores, sale of food and food materials, etc., and the organization cost in the market is rapidly decline due to the growth of large discount store unlike in the past.In the past, the small and medium distributors or small stores have some existence of a market for non-data distribution, the negotiating power of manufacturers has been reduced, and the uy Per in large scale distribution is greatly expanding.

(D) Market situation

laundry-free taxation is relatively low compared to the market scale, and the unit price per item is low, and consumers have no discrimination against the performance of the product, and thus, the sales competition among manufacturers is high. Therefore, it is an industry that is highly likely to attract competition among manufacturers. The increase of large scale discount points and the price reduction for the products of manufacturers, which are the suppliers, is not a smooth improvement. In the case of laundry taxation, the demand for the supply of laundry season and the growth of the demand for the laundry season have been high, but it has been significantly growing since 2004. However, due to the increase of environmental interest and the advancement of consumption, the demand is maintained mainly focusing on low-polar eco-friendly products and high-concentrating products. In particular, in 203, the expansion of the supply of laundry for the laundry season and the increase in domestic demand for the products, and the increase in the supply and demand of laundry products has led to an annual increase in 2004.

Table 6> Tax supply and demand trend

(unit: MT, %)

본문내 포함된 표 구분 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006. 1.∼7. ？ 전년동기비(증가율) 생산 440,125 450,329 451,812 466,372 493,712 41,005 8.5 출하 444,060 452,901 452,045 467,716 489,693 41,215 10.8 내수 425,569 430,487 419,296 437,757 469,702 39,851 12.3 수출 18,491 22,414 32,749 29,959 32,749 15,337 -19.9

*Materials : Statistics Korea (U.S. Eastern Survey)

(c) Formation of unfair collaborative act 6)

As seen below, tax four companies agreed on the price of laundry and laundry for a total of eight times from 1997 to 2005 and implemented it. From 2000 to 2005, in selling laundry and laundry, a total of three times agreed on the terms and conditions of transactions, such as prohibition of provision of laundry products, prohibition of payment of free gifts, and prohibition of provision of sampling (However, there is no evidence that the conditions of transactions were transferred to the execution of collusion on December 2005).

(1) Note 7) An act of determining, maintaining, or changing a price

(A) Price collusions from October to November 1997

The plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation, and the non-party 3 corporation agreed to increase 10% of the price of the laundry and the laundry on October 197 to November 11, 1997. The tax price was increased as agreed on December 23, 1997 for the items of the first increase, and the second increase as agreed on January 21, 1998 for the items of the second increase.

(B) Price collusion around August 1998

On August 20, 1998, the plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation, and the non-party 3 corporation agreed to increase 10% of the price of the laundry tax and the laundry tax through the mid-term group on August 20, 1998, and raised the tax price according to the agreed content after September 198.

(C) Price collusion around February 200

As of February 15, 200, the Plaintiff, Nonparty 1, and Nonparty 3 agreed to raise the tax rate by 15% of the normal price in the case of “in concentration tax” by the meeting of the chief class on February 15, 2000, 25% of the base price in the case of “in concentration tax”; 30% of the base price in the case of the exercise; 10% of the base price in the case of “effective tax”; 20% of the base price in the case of the exercise; 20% of the base price in the case of the exercise; 20% of the base price in the case of the exercise; and 20% of the base price in the case of the discount rate. Since then, the three companies thereafter raised the tax price as of February 1, 200, and jointly inspected the market price in the tax system.

(D) Price collusion around September 200

On September 21, 200, the plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation, and the non-party 3 corporation discussed the pending issues, such as each price, official price, and promotion through the president hosting on September 21, 200, and agreed to raise about 10% of the official price of laundry and Jeju taxation since the police officer around October 200, and implemented it as it is.

(E) Price collusion around August 2001

On August 2, 2001, the plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation, and the non-party 3 corporation agreed on a rough increase in the price of laundry and laundry. On August 2001 and September 9 of the same year, the non-party 3 consulted on detailed matters, such as the price increase in laundry and laundry tax, through the director-general meeting on August 20 and September 19 of the same year, the director-general meeting was formed on September 19 of the same year, and on September 27 of the same year, the director-general, the director-general, and the director-general agreed on the price increase by holding a meeting on October 19 of the same year. On the other hand, on October 22 of the same year, the three companies' final meetings were discussed on the price increase by 10% to 10% of the price increase (the price increase by 10% of the same year) and the end of the same year (the price increase by 10% of the same year).

On November 2001, 2001, the three companies increased the tax price according to the terms of the agreement, and thereafter jointly inspected the tax market price.

(f) Price collusion around August 2002

On August 22, 2002, the plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation, and the non-party 3 corporation agreed on a rough increase in the market price of laundry and weekly taxation, such as price increase, increase, and time of increase. On August 24, 2002, the plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation and the non-party 3 corporation discussed a plan to increase and stabilize the market price at a reverse group on August 28, 2002. After the decision to increase the market price based on each company's first brand through consultation with the head of each headquarters, the head of each headquarters, the head of each division, and the head of each division, etc. on May 28 of the same year, the issue of establishing a person in charge of price management. The above three companies agreed on the selection of the three companies through the third working-level meeting of the head of the division, who attended the third working group on September 18, 202, most of the three companies agreed on the price increase based on the ex-factory price.

(G) Price collusion around February 2004

On February 20, 204, the plaintiff, non-party 1 corporation, and non-party 3 corporation agreed on a rough increase in the price of laundry and weekly taxation at a mid-term meeting on February 20, 204. On March 11, 2004, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy exchanged opinions on the necessity of price increase and the time of price increase, etc., and finally decided a price increase through the hosting of the head of the working division on March 17 of the same year. According to the final agreement, the price increase by 10%, respectively, on the price of laundry and weekly taxation, and on the price of laundry and weekly taxation at an agency and direct trade distribution store, the price increase by two times, including April 1, 2004 and April 5, 2004, the remainder increase by the first brand which is the market share, and on the price increase by 20 to 30 January 4, 2004.

(h) Price collusion around February 2005

On February 11, 2005, the plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation, and the non-party 4 corporation agreed to the general contents of the increase in the tax rate by holding a meeting around February 11, 2005 and raising 10% of the official price for laundry and Jeju taxation. The above three companies subsequently held meetings or documents, and exchanged e-mails several times to draw the final agreement, and first, they continued a working-level meeting for price increase through hosting of the head of the working team on February 14, 2005. In particular, the plaintiff 1 corporation and the non-party 1 corporation, which were leading in the price collusion, agreed to play a leading role as the plaintiff, and the discounted price at 10 to 20% of the price increase in the final rate of 10 to 4.0% of the price increase on March 10 and March 25, 2005, respectively, and agreed to the price increase at 10 to 4.5% of the price increase in the final rate of e-mail and 15.

(2) Establishment of transaction terms and conditions

(A) The compliance with the terms and conditions of transaction around December 2000

The plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation, and the non-party 3 corporation had a meeting on December 6, 200 (the head of the business planning division of the non-party 1 corporation and the head of each marketing division of the plaintiff and the non-party 3 corporation were present) agreed to refrain from promotional activities in selling laundry and gas as part of the market price stabilization. Specifically, as the prohibition of "the suspension of increased amount of products, the prohibition of the provision of other products at the time of sales of goods, the suspension of the provision of free gifts and Cmpphones, the provision of free gifts at the time of holding a commemorative event", and "the provision of free gifts through the offering of unsealed products and media advertising" was determined as the date of application on January 1, 200, and the above three companies reduced the promotional activities as of January 2 through 2001.

(B) The compliance with the terms and conditions of transaction around July 2005.

The plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation and the non-party 4 corporation had a meeting on July 5, 2005 and agreed on the prohibition of production of planned products, the prohibition of sampling, the prohibition of distribution of promotional products, and the prohibition of events from August 1, 2005. Since August 1, 2005, the promotional exercise of the host taxation was reduced as agreed.

(C) The compliance with the terms and conditions of transaction around December 2005.

On December 27, 2005, the Plaintiff, Nonparty 1, and Nonparty 4 agreed to suspend the supply of a planning set, prohibit additional sales in the store, prohibit additional sales in the store, and prohibit the price reduction by more than 10%, etc. from February 1, 2006.

D. The defendant's disposition

(1) As seen above, the Defendant’s act of raising tax rates or sales prices by tax 4 companies, including the Plaintiff, constitutes “an agreement with other enterprisers to jointly determine, maintain, or change prices that unfairly restrict competition,” under Article 19(1)1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, and the act of having the Plaintiff discontinue the provision of planning sets, additional premium increase, 1+1 events, etc. in the sale of laundry and weekly taxation constitutes “an agreement to jointly determine the terms and conditions of transaction of goods or services that unfairly restrict competition with other enterprisers” under Article 19(1)2 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, and thus, issued a corrective order and a disposition of penalty surcharge payment order, etc. (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

(2) The Defendant calculated the penalty surcharge for four copies including the Plaintiff on the following basis:

(A) Relevant sales

1) Period of violation

In the case of the plaintiff, the non-party 1 corporation and the non-party 3 corporation, the price increase under the agreement shall be deemed to have commenced on December 23, 1997. In the case of the non-party 4 corporation, the commencement of the business in Korea shall be deemed to have commenced on January 1, 2005.

In the case of the non-party 4 corporation: The non-party 4 corporation shall conduct business activities according to its own criteria, and shall not participate in meetings among competitors, and shall be notified to other companies of the fact that it was taken measures to withdraw from the unfair collaborative act of this case, such as changing the agreed base price, etc. The plaintiff shall be deemed to be April 14, 2006. In the case of the plaintiff, the non-party 4 corporation has already withdrawn from the agreement of this case and the non-party 3 already sold the tax system to the non-party 10,00 among the participants in the collaborative act of this case, it is reasonable to view that the collaborative act of this case has been reversed, and therefore, in the case of the non-party 1 corporation, the termination date of the act of this case shall be deemed to be April 30, 2006, since the non-party 3 corporation has sold its own daily products business sector and had engaged in the business sector of this case until December 31, 2004.

(ii) the scope of the product concerned;

Considering the transactional relationship and market situation of laundry and weekly taxation, consumer damage caused by collaborative acts, anti-competitive effect, etc., all laundry and weekly taxation produced by tax4 companies have been directly affected by the instant unfair collaborative act. Accordingly, related goods are items of laundry and weekly taxation.

(iii)the computation of relevant sales;

In light of the fact that the relevant sales cannot be calculated accurately as the time of the violation of the Plaintiff and the non-party 1 corporation’s act was insufficient due to the lapse of a considerable period of time from December 23, 1997, the sales amount shall be calculated as the relevant sales amount during the period from January 1, 1998 to April 30, 2006. In the case of the non-party 3 corporation, the sales amount in the items before cleaning and in the main items during the period from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2004, and in the case of the non-party 4 corporation, the sales amount in the items before cleaning and in the main items during the period from January 1 to April 14, 2005 to the non-party 4 corporation shall be calculated as the relevant sales amount. The relevant sales amount during the period of the non-party 4 corporation’s unfair collaborative act in this case shall be calculated as the relevant sales amount.

Table 7> The relevant sales during the period of violation of the tax 4 company

(unit:,000 won)

Plaintiff 1,050,988,296 84,783,659 523,497,986 93,459,823 2,5523,729,764 in total, Non-Party 1, Non-Party 3, Non-Party 4, Co., Ltd. in the main sentence

(b) Calculation of basic penalty surcharges;

1) Determination and imposition rate of the gravity of the violation

In the instant unfair collaborative act, 4 companies, which have a market share of 75% or more in the laundry and weekly taxation market, have determined the price of taxation that significantly affects people's lives, and the contents of the act are very serious, as well as where the effect of restricting competition is apparent and efficiency is unlikely to increase, and the impact of the act is nationwide, and the direct damage to the national economy is extensive, it constitutes "an act of significant concern". Therefore, according to the former Public Notice of Imposition of Penalty Surcharges (amended by the Fair Trade Commission Notice No. 2005-3, Apr. 1, 2005; hereinafter "Public Notice of 2004") the standard rate of imposition of 3.5% or 5.0% shall be applied. However, the price of the Myeondo active agents, which are the main raw materials of the taxation system, has been caused by the cost increase, which is the largest width during the period of violation, and the actual transaction price has been formed through an agreement between 30% or more prior to its implementation.

The basic penalty surcharge for each tax 4 company shall be as the attached Table 8>

[Attachment 8] Basic Penalty Surcharge

(unit: %) %,00 won

Plaintiff 1,050,98, 2963.5, 36, 784, 590 Non-party 1,30,993.5, 967, 428 Non-party 3, 523,49, 422, 429 Non-party 4, 93,459, 823, 823.53, 271,093, non-party 4, 523,459, 823.53, 271, 093

(C) Calculation of a mandatory adjustment penalty

In the case of the non-party 3 corporation, the review report of this case received corrective measures more than four times during the last three years from the date of submission of the plenary session (including corrective measures, penalty surcharges, and accusations), thereby increasing 10% of the basic penalty surcharge. In addition, for the plaintiff, non-party 1 corporation, and non-party 4 corporation, the mandatory adjustment penalty surcharge shall be the same amount as the basic penalty surcharge.

The obligatory adjustment penalty surcharge for each tax4 company shall be the same as the attached Table 9>

Mandatory Adjustment Penalties

(unit: %) %,00 won

The votes contained in the main sentence of the plaintiff non-party 1 corporation, non-party 3 corporation, non-party 4 corporation - 10 - 36,784,590, 590, 30,967, 428, 20,154, 671 3,271,093

(d) Calculation of voluntary adjustment penalty surcharges

Since it is recognized that high-ranking executives of at least four directors are directly involved in the collaborative act, the compulsory adjustment penalty surcharge shall be increased, but 5%, not the highest ratio (10%) shall be applied.

In the case of the non-party 3 corporation, it is recognized that cooperation was made in the investigation by recognizing the fact that the non-party 3 engaged in the unfair collaborative act of this case through statement on April 2006, and therefore, 20% of the mandatory adjustment penalty surcharge shall be reduced. Since the violation was discontinued on December 31, 2004 after the sale of the business, 20% of the mandatory adjustment penalty surcharge shall be reduced.

In the case of a non-party 4 corporation, it is recognized that cooperation was made in the investigation, such as recognizing the fact that it had engaged in the unfair collaborative act of this case through the statement on April 2006, and thus, it is recognized that 20% of the mandatory adjustment penalty surcharge is reduced. Since the violation was discontinued on April 14, 2006 prior to the commencement report of the examination of this case and voluntarily corrected it, 20% of the compulsory adjustment penalty surcharge is reduced, and since the net profit during the year 2005 was less than 50 million won (40 million won), the compulsory adjustment penalty surcharge shall be mitigated, but since the hostile width is relatively little, 5% of the compulsory adjustment penalty surcharge shall be mitigated.

In the case of the plaintiff, since July 1, 2006, it is recognized that it was possible to determine the contents of suspicion for which the review report is indicated by cooperation without denying the facts of suspicion between them, and then late, 20% of the mandatory adjustment penalty surcharge shall be reduced. Since it is recognized that the act of violation was discontinued on April 30, 2006, the day before the commencement report of the review of this case, and the fact of voluntary correction was recognized, 20% of the mandatory adjustment penalty surcharge shall be reduced. On July 1, 2006, it is recognized that evidence necessary to prove the unfair collaborative act between manufacturers of other products besides the instant collaborative act is provided. Thus, 10% of the mandatory adjustment penalty surcharge shall be reduced.

In full view of the above aggravated and mitigated facts, the non-party 1 corporation shall increase 5% of the mandatory adjustment penalty surcharge. The plaintiff shall reduce 45% of the compulsory adjustment penalty surcharge, the non-party 3 corporation shall reduce 35% of the compulsory adjustment penalty surcharge, and the non-party 4 corporation shall reduce 40% of the compulsory adjustment penalty surcharge.

Voluntary adjustment penalty surcharge for each tax 4 company shall be the attached Table 10>

Voluntary Adjustment Penalty Surcharge

(unit: %) %,00 won

In the table classification contained in the main sentence, plaintiffs non-party 1 corporation, non-party 3 corporation, non-party 4 corporation -45 -45 -35 -40 voluntary mediation penalty surcharges of 20,231,524 -32,515,79 13,100,536 1,962,655

(e) Determination of a penalty surcharge;

In common, 25% of the voluntary adjustment penalty surcharge shall be reduced in consideration of the detailed economic situation of the tax market, the structure of the tax market or objective conditions, such as the increase rate of the market price of the tax system during the period of collusion, the degree of inflation, and the business feasibility of the tax market due to deterioration of the business environment of the tax market (the sale of the tax business sector of the non-party 3 stock company, the operating profit rate of 3 to

In the case of the non-party 4 corporation, 10% of the voluntary mediation penalty surcharge shall be additionally reduced considering the fact that the period during which the non-party 4 was involved in the illegal act was shorter than that of other companies in that it participated in three times after January 2005.

Pursuant to Article 22 of the former Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (amended by Act No. 7315 of Dec. 31, 2004), and Article 9 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 18768 of Mar. 31, 2005; hereinafter “former Enforcement Decree”), a penalty surcharge imposed shall not exceed the amount calculated by multiplying the average sales for the three preceding business years as of the end of the violation by 5/100, and thus, the penalty surcharge imposed as shown in Table 11 shall be determined within the scope not exceeding the statutory limit.

Title 11> Imposition of Penalty Surcharge

(unit: %; million won)

Plaintiff 20,231, 524 25, 866 15,173 Non-Party 1 Co. 32,515, 7925 14,697, 697 Non-Party 3 Co. 13, 100,536 25 15,809,825 9,8255 36,930 9,825 35, 9301,275 401,275 40,970

* The Note 1 Imposition Penalties shall be calculated by cutting down the amount of less than one million won.

(e) Objections;

The Plaintiff filed an objection against the instant disposition, but the Defendant rendered a decision to dismiss it on May 28, 2007.

[Evidence] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 and 2, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Related statutes;

The entry in the attached Form is as specified in the relevant statutes.

3. Whether the order to pay penalty surcharges is legitimate among the dispositions of this case

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The plaintiff itself acknowledged the fact that there was a price collusion act and three-time transactional compliance act as seen earlier, and did not dispute the part of the corrective order of this case. However, the part of the penalty surcharge payment order of this case is argued to the following purport.

(1) The instant act of collusion is not a single continuous act but a separate act, and its related assertion (a disposition by prescription, the scope of relevant sales, applicable provisions, etc.)

Tax4 Co., Ltd. shall be deemed to have committed a series of collaborative acts under the agreement on basic principles, not individually agreed to respond to the market environment at the time. Thus, even if the period and termination date of each collaborative act shall be determined individually on the basis of the time of agreement and the time of collapse of such agreement, and the sales during which no agreement has been reached between the respective periods shall be excluded from the relevant sales. In addition, even if the agreement was reached on the four occasions prior to August 201, 201, the price collusion (each price collusion on or before August 11, 1997, around August 1998, around February 200, around September 200, around September 200, after five years have elapsed, it shall not be subject to the imposition of a penalty surcharge as well as the comprehensive imposition period of a penalty surcharge on or before April 1, 200 (amended by the Fair Trade Commission No. 2040, Apr. 28, 2004).

(2) argument on the scope of the product concerned

The scope of related goods shall be limited to the items that are included in the subject of agreement, not to the items prior to laundry and the taxation system.

(3) Claim on the division of company

The plaintiff is a company established by dividing it from the non-party 2 corporation on April 1, 2001. Thus, the plaintiff cannot impose a penalty surcharge on the previous act.

(4) As to the illegality of an officer’s heavy director

The provisions on the aggravation of executive officers are limited to cases in which a registered director is involved under the Commercial Act, and since the non-party 15 and 16 are not the plaintiff's registered director but the regular director, the provisions on the aggravation of executive officers cannot be applied even if they were involved in the collaborative act.

(5) argument on the application of reduction

In addition to the instant collaborative act, since the Plaintiff voluntarily filed a report on other unfair collaborative acts (four items, such as breach of contract, etc.) in which the Plaintiff participated, the penalty surcharge shall be exempted or mitigated pursuant to Article 35(1)5 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 18768, Mar. 31, 2005; hereinafter “amended Enforcement Decree”).

In addition, since the plaintiff provided evidence necessary for the proof of unfair collaborative acts after the defendant started an investigation into the collaborative act of this case, the penalty surcharge shall be exempted pursuant to Article 35 (1) 3 of the revised Enforcement Decree or the penalty surcharge shall be mitigated by 30% pursuant to Article 35 (1) 4 of the revised Enforcement Decree.

(6) The assertion that it cannot be seen as “a serious violation”

Since the duration of each price collusion agreement was short time and the competition-restricting effect in the market has not been reached, it can not be said to be a "serious violation".

B. Determination

(1) As to the assertion that the instant act of collusion is not a single continuous act, but a separate act, and the related assertion (a disposition by prescription, the scope of relevant sales, applicable provisions, etc.)

(A) In the event that business entities jointly decide to jointly determine, maintain, or change prices in the future for the purpose of restricting competition, and they continue to reach an agreement on basic principles, such as setting a certain standard on the subject of the decision, method of decision, etc., and holding a continuous meeting to implement the agreement in the future, and accordingly, they continue to reach an agreement on specific price determination, etc. at several times in the process of implementing the agreement, it is reasonable to deem that the agreement as a whole is a single unfair collaborative act even if there is any change in the specific contents or members of the meeting or agreement and some of the members thereof (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du11275, Mar. 24, 2006). In the instant case, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the tax4 company continued to reach an agreement on the basic principle of price determination, etc. every year in the process of implementing the agreement.

In relation to this point, the Defendant asserts that, in light of the fact that: (a) tax four companies have reached an agreement on price increase each year, almost periodically and repeatedly; (b) have continuously checked whether they have reached an agreement on price increase; (c) have repeated the process of urging implementation; and (d) having reached a new agreement on price increase based on the price adjusted in the immediately preceding agreement while reaching an agreement on price increase, tax four companies have to be deemed to have reached an agreement on the basic principles within the above meaning. However, it cannot be readily concluded that there was an agreement on the basic principles solely on the ground that the type and process of the act of collusion was similar to each other or a new agreement was reached based on the price adjusted in the immediately preceding agreement (or there is no evidence to acknowledge that a new agreement was reached based on the price adjusted in the Gu or the immediately preceding agreement was from the date of price collusion on August 201; and (c) have conducted price collusion in

Therefore, it is reasonable to view each of the instant collaborative acts as an individual act, not a single continuous act.

(B) The main text of Article 49(4) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act provides that "the Fair Trade Commission shall not issue an order to take corrective measures or impose penalty surcharges, etc. against the relevant violation where five years have elapsed since the date of termination of the act in violation of this Act." The date on which an unfair collaborative act was terminated, not the date on which the agreement such as price determination was made and the date on which the act in violation was terminated (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du11275, Mar. 24, 2006). In this case, it is not easy to clearly specify the date on which each act in violation of price collusion was terminated, but it is reasonable to deem that the previous act in violation of this agreement was terminated until the date on which a new agreement was made. Accordingly, price collusion around October 11, 1998; price collusion around August 20, 1998; price collusion around August 20, 2009; price collusion around 200.

(C) For the same reason, it is reasonable to view that the price collusion around August 2001 around August 2002, and the price collusion around August 2002 around February 2004, respectively, had terminated. Accordingly, the imposition rate of penalty surcharges as set forth in the public notice of 2002, not in the public notice of 2004, should be applied.

(2) As to the assertion on the scope of related goods

The scope of goods or services related to an unfair collaborative act, which serves as the basis for the calculation of a penalty surcharge, shall be determined individually and specifically in consideration of the type and nature of the goods or services included in the agreement between the enterpriser who has conducted the unfair collaborative act and the type of transaction area, transaction counterpart, transaction stage, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Du10387, Jan. 10, 2003).

원고가 생산하였거나 생산하고 있는 세제제품은 세탁세제 11개 브랜드(한스푼, 테크, 수퍼타이, 마이티, 테크드럼, 한스푼 탭스, 테크 탭스, 하이타이, 울센스, 마망, 알뜨랑)와 주방세제 7개 브랜드(자연퐁, 자연퐁 싹, 퐁퐁, 세이프, 에디, 야채랑 과일이랑, 하이퐁) 등 총 18개 브랜드이다. 원고는 그 중 세탁세제 3개 브랜드(한스푼, 테크, 수퍼타이)와 주방세제 3개 브랜드(자연퐁, 자연퐁 싹, 퐁퐁)에 대하여는 이 사건 담합행위의 대상이 되었음을 인정하면서, 나머지 12개 브랜드에 대하여는 담합행위를 한 사실이 전혀 없다고 주장하고 있다. 위 12개 브랜드들이 관련상품의 범위에 포함되려면, 세제4사가 이들 품목들에 대하여도 가격 등에 관한 합의를 하였다는 점이 인정되거나, 다른 브랜드들에 대한 합의에 따라 위 12개 브랜드들의 가격이 영향을 받았다는 점이 인정되어야 할 것이다.

First, the Defendant asserts that the above 12 brands were included in the subject of the agreement on price increase and increase, etc. based on these grounds, the Defendant stated that, in multiple documents related to the collusion (e.g., evidence 6-5, 6, etc., the above 12 brands used the name referring to the whole laundry and the whole laundry as not the name of a specific product, such as “in concentration tax”, “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz., “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inp. 5”, “inz., “inz.,” “inz.,” “inz.,” “inp. 7-2 and 8-6”, it is difficult to conclude that the Plaintiff was subject to collusion.

In addition, the defendant asserts that laundry and laundry have homogeneitys, and if the base price is set for brands representing each other, it would be affected by other brands and should be included in the scope of related products. However, there is no evidence to prove that the price of the above 12 brands was affected by the increase in the price of the above 12 brands due to the increase in the six brands subject to collusion, and rather, according to the testimony of the non-party 17, the above 12 brands are deemed to be difficult to be affected by each other on the grounds that the above 12 brands are different from the above 6 brands, and there are no competing products or competing products. According to each of the above statements in subparagraphs 1 and 2 of the evidence No. 9-1 and 2 of the evidence No. 9, the above 12 brands and the above 6 brands are different.

Therefore, since the above 12 brands cannot be included in the scope of related products, the sales amount should be excluded from the calculation of related sales amount.

(3) As to the assertion on corporate division

Succession to a newly incorporated company or a surviving company in a company division is the right and duty of the divided company. Thus, only a simple fact act exists before a penalty surcharge is imposed on the grounds of a violation of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prior to the division, and it cannot be said that there is any obligation to succeed to the divided company in relation to the penalty surcharge, and it is not allowed to impose a penalty surcharge on the newly incorporated company on the grounds of a violation of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prior to the division (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Du18928, Nov. 29, 2007).

As seen earlier, the Plaintiff was newly established on April 1, 2001 by dividing only the household goods sector from the non-party 2 corporation. If so, it was unlawful to impose a penalty surcharge on the Plaintiff, which is a newly incorporated company, on the ground of the violation of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prior to the division of the non-party 2 corporation, on the grounds of the violation period, which served as the basis for the calculation of the penalty surcharge in this case.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, among the disposition of this case, the payment order of penalty surcharge is unlawful without examining the remainder of the plaintiff's remaining arguments. Thus, the plaintiff's claim seeking revocation is with merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment Omission of Disposition]

Judges Lee Sung-sung (Presiding Judge)

1) On April 1, 2001, only the household goods sector was newly established by Nonparty 2 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiffs”) by dividing them into two separate accounts, except as otherwise required.

Note 2) hereinafter referred to as “Non-Party 1 corporation” is only deemed to be “Non-Party 1 corporation.”

3) On December 1, 2004, Nonparty 3, a corporation, engaged in business by December 31, 2004 after selling the tax business sector to ○○○○○○○○○ by means of investment in kind. From January 1, 2005, Nonparty 4, a domestic corporation, a corporation of ○○○○○○○○, is operating business. hereinafter “Nonindicted 3”) and “Nonindicted 4 corporation”.

Note 4) hereinafter referred to as “tax 4 company”) in general.

Note 5) The discount point is also expressed as “new distribution” or “direct trade”.

Note 6) The instant collaborative act was agreed upon by the end of December 2004 between the Plaintiff, Nonparty 1, and Nonparty 3, and after January 2005, the agreement was reached between the Plaintiff, Nonparty 1, and Nonparty 4.

Note 7) The concept of price prevailing in the tax industry can be classified as follows. The collusion with the tax-related four companies is the “market price” or “public price” among them. ① The manufacturer’s presentation of the distribution store, such as a discount store, refers to the standard consumer price, and is expressed as “general selling price,” “standard selling price,” “sale price,” and “sale price,” etc.

Note 8) The price increase work by agreement repeats the order of “Agreements on Industry ? Price ? Price ? Price ? Price ? Price ?.” The price increase for new distribution stores, such as usual discount points, is completed.

9) Specifically, the manufacturer has selected a method of reducing D/C rates (20% ? 10%). In this case, the price increase in the supply store by the manufacturer is effective, which is ultimately linked to the increase in the consumer price in the tax market.

Note 10) Whether the Defendant’s review of the instant case had commenced on January 10, 2006, and whether the above agreed terms were transferred to the enforcement was not revealed clearly.

Note 11) This constitutes approximately 9% of the total tax revenue produced and sold by the Plaintiff (written evidence No. 6 of the evidence No. 2, and evidence No. 8 of the evidence No. 6).