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(영문) 대법원 2016.02.20 2014다229870
유치권부존재확인의소
Text

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Changwon District Court Panel Division.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. A confession binding under Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act is limited to a confession in court. A confession in court refers to a confession in court, and a confession in court refers to a statement of facts unfavorable to himself/herself, consistent with the allegations of the other party alleged in the date for pleading or the date for preparatory pleading (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 95Da37988, Dec. 20, 1996). Even in cases where the contents corresponding to the confession in the reply or the briefs submitted to the court and served on the other party, are written, the confession in court shall be established when

2. The lower court acknowledged, based on the relevant employment evidence, the fact that the registration of the entry in the decision on commencing auction was completed on November 8, 201 with respect to the instant real estate 1, and deemed that the Defendant launched possession of the instant real estate 1 on November 14, 201, following the entry registration, and that the Defendant led to a confession at the first instance court date for pleading.

Furthermore, based on its stated reasoning, the lower court erred by misapprehending the truth of the confession.

After determining that it is difficult to view it as having been due to mistake or mistake, the possessor, who commenced possession after the entry of the decision to commence auction, cited the Plaintiff’s claim for the confirmation of existence of lien on real estate 1 in the auction procedure on the ground that he could not oppose the buyer in the auction procedure.

3. However, the above determination by the court below is not acceptable. A.

First, according to the records, the Defendant’s written reply submitted on November 13, 2012 states that “the Defendant commenced possession of the instant real estate 1 on or around November 14, 201.” On the other hand, the written reply submitted on June 5, 2013 states that “the possession of the instant real estate 1 was wrong and that the possession was commenced on or around November 14, 201,” and the Defendant began possession on or around March 30, 201.” On the other hand, the first instance court on June 7, 2013.

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