Main Issues
(a) Scope of and criteria for determining acts subject to the National Assembly immunity;
(b) Where the act that a member of the National Assembly distributes the manuscript to be asked questions at the plenary session of the National Assembly constitutes an act beyond his/her duties entitled to immunity;
(c) Measures by a court where a public prosecution is instituted for any act falling under the privilege of National Assembly members;
Summary of Judgment
A. An act subject to a National Assembly member’s exemption privilege is not limited to an act of expression, such as official speaking and voting, but includes an act ordinarily incidental thereto, and whether an act is an act incidental thereto should be determined individually by taking into account the purpose, place, mode, etc. of a specific act.
B. Where the contents of the Plaintiff’s statement to be made at an open meeting (public nature of the meeting), the Plaintiff’s distribution time is close to 30 minutes prior to the beginning of the meeting scheduled to make the first speech (recogncy of time), and the place and object of the Plaintiff’s distribution are limited to only the reporters of the National Assembly at the press room located within the National Assembly, and the purpose of the Plaintiff’s distribution is for the convenience of the report (grounded in legitimacy), it constitutes an act of distributing the Plaintiff to the National Assembly member in advance to ask questions at the plenary session of the National Assembly.
C. A public prosecution cannot be instituted against an act that belongs to the privilege of a member of the National Assembly, and a public prosecution is instituted against this, and a public prosecution is instituted in spite of the absence of the right to institute a public prosecution, which constitutes “when the procedure for instituting a public prosecution is null and void in violation of the provisions of law” under Article 327 Subparag.
[Reference Provisions]
(b)Article 45(c) of the Constitution; Article 327(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act;
Escopics
A
upper and high-ranking persons
Prosecutor
Defense Counsel
Attorney B and one other
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul High Court Decision 87No1386 delivered on November 14, 1991
Text
The appeal is dismissed.
Reasons
We examine the grounds of appeal.
On the first ground for appeal
Article 45 (Article 81 of the former Constitution) of the Constitution recognizes the privilege of a member of the National Assembly by stipulating that a member of the National Assembly shall not be held responsible for any speech and vote held by the National Assembly outside of the National Assembly, and thus, it is a device prepared to guarantee that a member of the National Assembly can freely perform his/her duties as a representative of the people. Thus, an act subject to the privilege of exemption is not limited to an act of expression of opinion, such as a speech and voting in the course of performing his/her duties, but also includes an act ordinarily incidental thereto. The issue of whether it is an incidental act should be determined individually by taking into account
According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, when the defendant as a member of the 12th National Assembly belonging to C political party and as a member of the 131st regular session of the National Assembly at around July 1986, prepares the plaintiff's question as a member of the 130th regular session of the National Assembly, the court below held that the defendant's act of distributing 30 of the 30th regular members of the 130th regular session of the National Assembly through the above D constitutes legitimate activities of anti-government organizations and thus, the defendant's act of distributing the 30th regular members of the National Assembly constitutes an act of distributing the plaintiff's speech within the scope of its original purpose of distributing the plaintiff's speech to the 30th regular session of the National Assembly, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence that the defendant's act of distributing the 30th regular members of the National Assembly constitutes an act of distributing the plaintiff's speech to the 19th regular members of the National Assembly (the contents of the plaintiff's speech to the 30th regular meeting).
In addition, the argument that the defendant knew that the contents of his statement would not be effective in the minutes of the National Assembly, or that it was not acknowledged that the plaintiff could not have promulgated the contents of his statement at the plenary session because it is not possible to make the contents of the plaintiff's statement as it is, cannot be accepted.
The argument is without merit.
On the second ground for appeal
A public prosecution cannot be instituted against an act that belongs to the privilege of a member of the National Assembly, and a public prosecution is instituted against this, which eventually leads to an institution of a public prosecution even though there is no authority to institute a public prosecution, thereby falling under “when the procedure for instituting a public prosecution is null and void in violation of the provisions of Acts” under Article 327 Subparag. 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act. In such
Although the court below judged that the defendant's act constitutes an act of failure to perform duties, which is the object of the privilege, but in such a case, deemed that the defendant's act constitutes "when there is no jurisdiction over the defendant" under Article 327 subparagraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and dismissed the public prosecution of this case on the ground that it constitutes "when there is no jurisdiction over the defendant," such opinion is based on the premise that the part of jurisdiction is understood as belonging to the legislative department, and it cannot be employed under the current law
In conclusion, the judgment of the court below is erroneous, but the conclusion of dismissing the prosecution of this case is legitimate, and the above error does not affect the conclusion of the judgment.
In addition, the remaining arguments are nothing more than misunderstanding the judgment of the court below in different opinions.
Ultimately, all arguments are without merit.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.
Justices Kim Yong-ju (Presiding Justice)