Main Issues
A. Whether a judge who participated in the judgment of the court of first instance falls under Article 394(1)2 of the Civil Procedure Act in cases where the judge was involved only in the judgment of the court of second instance
B. Acknowledgement of any content different from the grounds of appeal
Summary of Judgment
The compliance with the provisions concerning the method of pleading shall not be proven as evidence other than the protocol.
[Reference Provisions]
Articles 394(1)2, 395, 396(2), and 368 of the Civil Procedure Act
Plaintiff-Appellant
Bosap
Defendant-Appellee
Edive interest
original decision
Daegu High Court Decision 4294No849 delivered on February 28, 1963
Text
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.
Reasons
The plaintiff's grounds of appeal are subsequent to the statement in the grounds of appeal.
(1) We examine the grounds of appeal No. 1. The summary of the judgment of the court of first instance is clear that the judge's suspended scrap, who participated in the decision of the court of first instance, was involved in the decision of the court below as to the rejection of an application for resumption of pleading at the court of first instance after remand, and thus, it is in violation of Article 394 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act. However, the compliance with the provisions on the method of pleading can be proved only by the protocol and cannot be proved as any other evidence. According to the records, it is obvious that the judge's suspended scrap, who participated in the decision of the court of first instance, was not involved in the decision of the court of first instance after remand and was not involved in the decision of the court of first instance, and is not involved in the decision of the court below,
(2) Although the testimony as to the grounds of appeal No. 4 was invoked as the grounds of appeal on this case, it is not possible to invoke the contents of another document which need to be stated in the petition of appeal or written statement of the grounds of appeal No. 1 as an independent statement of the grounds of appeal No. 4. Therefore, it is groundless
(3) As to the ground of appeal No. 2.3
According to the judgment of remand at the Supreme Court, since the original court recognized the fact that the defendant had had the business of using the trade name of the third-party warehouse for the second-party friendship, it was obvious that the plaintiff issued a false certificate of custody to use the trade name of the third-party friendship's trade name, and therefore, it did not apply to the decision whether the plaintiff misleads the defendant as the business owner or whether the debt incurred from the transaction of this case was performed or not," the court below reversed the original judgment and remanded the case to the court below. According to the original judgment after remand, it is not sufficient to find the fact that the defendant stored this case by the plaintiff's whole evidence, and the court below found that the non-party Lee Jong-woo who operated the third-party warehouse by using the evidence of this case in collusion with the non-party Lee Jong-ok's own Ba, even though he did not keep this case's goods, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of the legal reasoning or the judgment of the court below as to the plaintiff's claim based on the premise that the above court below's judgment was remanded to the court below's judgment.
Therefore, this case's ground of appeal is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating judges.
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