[1] Where the registration of the possessor's name is cancelled after the expiration of the period of prescription after the acquisition of the register, or the registration of ownership transfer is made in the name of another person without any legitimate reason, whether the possessor loses the ownership acquired (negative)

[2] The meaning and standard of determining the possession of an article, and in a case where registration is made as the owner of a site, whether the possession is recognized (affirmative)

[1] Article 245 (2) of the Civil Code provides that "When a person who has registered as an owner of a real estate possesses the real estate in good faith and with no negligence for ten years, he shall acquire the ownership of the real estate." The person who has acquired the ownership under the above provision does not necessarily have to be registered in his name for ten years, but shall be registered as an owner of the real estate at the same time during that period. The registration is a requirement for taking effect of a real right and is cancelled without any reason because it does not have any effect on the validity of a real right. Thus, even if the registration of the possessor of the real estate was cancelled after the expiration of the prescription period, or the registration of ownership transfer was made to another person without a legitimate reason, such possessor does not lose the ownership acquired by the completion of the prescription period.

[2] The possession of an object refers to the objective relationship that is considered to be in a person's factual control under the social concept, and to be in de facto control, it does not necessarily mean only physical and real control over an object, but should be determined in conformity with social norms by taking into account the time, space and principal relation with the object, possibility of excluding others from others' control, etc. In general, the person who registered the site as the owner of the building site shall be deemed to have obtained possession with the delivery of the site at the time of registration, and therefore, it cannot be determined that the fact of possession cannot be acknowledged without any special circumstances, even if recognizing the fact

[1] Articles 186 and 245(2) of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 192, 196, and 245 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 87Meu2431 Decided September 14, 1982 (Gong1982, 939) (Gong1989, 226), Supreme Court Decision 87Da2176 Decided December 26, 198 (Gong1990, 342), Supreme Court Decision 9Da25785 Decided December 10, 199 (Gong200, 1749) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 78Da19293, Nov. 14, 1978; Supreme Court Decision 91Da38266, Dec. 23, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 98Da3979, Dec. 39, 197; Supreme Court Decision 97Da39849, Jun. 29, 199; Supreme Court Decision 97Da29839, Jun. 23, 1992)

Cr. Cr. (Attorney Hwang-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Defendant (Law Firm Sami General Law Office, Attorneys Kim Jin-jin et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Supreme Court Decision 96Da46484 Delivered on April 25, 1997

Seoul High Court Decision 97Na19900 delivered on March 25, 1998

Of the judgment of the court below, the part on the religious site 2,235 square meters is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The defendant's remaining appeal is dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first and second grounds for appeal

The court below determined that, even if the non-party 1 did not own the land at the time of the death of the non-party 1, the non-party 1 was the deceased non-party 1, the non-party 1, and the non-party 1, who was in possession of the land at the time of the death of the non-party 1, had the non-party 1 purchase of the land at that time and the non-party 1, who was in possession of the land at that time, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 2, the non-party 2, the title of the non-party 5, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, and the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the title.

In light of the records, we affirm the above recognition and judgment of the court below as just, and there is no violation of law as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. The grounds of appeal on this issue are dismissed.

2. On the third ground for appeal

A. On October 25, 1982, the lower court determined that the Defendant’s defense, based on the premise that the Defendant’s final judgment was registered as the owner for 10 years was revoked by Seoul High Court Decision 85No5 Decided May 27, 1986, and that the Defendant’s acquisition of ownership in each of the instant land was confirmed to have been revoked without any cause, even if the registration was completed under the name of the Defendant and the Korea Non-Korean-Korean-Korean-Korean-Korean-Korean-Korean-Korean-Korean-Korean-U juristic person by the above new judgment and the registration form was revoked, as long as the registration was revoked by the method of public announcement of the right to real estate and the registration form was closed, and thus, the Defendant’s defense, based on the premise that the Defendant’s ownership was registered as the owner for 10 years was not reasonable.

B. First of all, as to the remaining land except the land No. 7 of the judgment of the court in this case, a person who acquires ownership pursuant to Article 245 (2) of the Civil Act and Article 245 (2) of the Civil Act does not necessarily have to be registered in his name for 10 years, but shall be registered as the owner of the real estate during that period. However, as to each of the above land, the period of registration and the period of possession shall be 10 years as long as the period of possession are the same. Thus, since the ownership transfer registration is cancelled on October 25, 1982 before the expiration of 10 years after the registration of ownership transfer was made, the requirements for the prescription for the acquisition of the register cannot be met. Accordingly, the judgment of the court below on this part is correct, and there is no error of law in the misapprehension of legal principles as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

C. However, it is difficult to accept the judgment of the court below on the land No. 7 in its holding for the following reasons.

According to the facts duly established by the court below and records, the non-party 1 was called the non-party 1's heir after the non-party 1 died and completed registration of ownership transfer on each of the land and the building on the ground of this case around 1964 and around 1965. The non-party 3 set up a right to collateral security against the non-party 4 and the non-party 4 as the non-party 5 agricultural cooperative on September 30, 197, and the non-party 4 was dismissed on the non-party 7 and the non-party 5's arbitrary auction procedure was completed on May 4, 1972 and completed registration of ownership transfer transfer on August 3, 1972 by the non-party 5's judgment on the non-party 1, the non-party 5 and the non-party 1's non-party 5's non-party 1's non-party 7 and the non-party 5's non-party 1's non-party 1's heir.

However, Article 245(2) of the Civil Act provides that “When a person who has registered as an owner of a real estate possesses such real estate in good faith and without negligence for ten years, he/she shall acquire ownership.” The person who acquires ownership pursuant to the above provision does not necessarily have to be registered in his/her name for ten years, but shall be registered as an owner of a real estate during that period (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 87Meu2176, Dec. 26, 1989). The registration is a requirement for taking effect of a real right and its validity is not a requirement for the invalidation of a real right, and it does not affect the validity of a real right if a registration is cancelled without any reason, and thus, it does not affect the validity of a real right (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 81Meu923, Sept. 14, 198; 87Meu2431, Dec. 27, 1988); and even if a possessor acquired by prescription after the acquisition was completed under another person’s ownership, 197.

Therefore, as seen above, the defendant completed the registration of ownership transfer on the 7th August 18, 1972, but completed the registration of ownership transfer on the 7th of March 25, 1976, and if he satisfies other requirements for the acquisition by prescription on the 10th of August 18, 1972, which was completed the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the defendant, he shall be deemed to have acquired the above land by prescription, and even if the name was cancelled on October 25, 1982, the ownership already acquired shall not be affected.

On the other hand, possession of an object refers to the objective relationship that appears to be in a person's factual control under the social concept, and to be in de facto control, it does not necessarily mean physical and real control over an object, but should be determined in conformity with social norms by taking into account the time, space and principal relation with the object, possibility of excluding others' control (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da38266, Jun. 23, 1992; 97Da4838, Apr. 25, 1997; 96Da8888, Feb. 24, 198; 96Da8888, Feb. 24, 1998; Inasmuch as a person who has registered an object as the owner of a building site shall be deemed to have obtained possession with the delivery of the building site at the time of registration, it cannot be determined that the possession cannot be recognized without any special circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 1978Da18297, Nov. 14, 1978).

As seen above, it is reasonable to view that the Defendant occupied the above land by acquiring the land and the above ground buildings and completing the registration of ownership transfer on August 18, 1972, barring any special circumstance, barring any special circumstance, the Defendant occupied the above land by acquiring them from that time (the witness Nonparty 8 of the first instance court also repaired the light-type building under the circumstance that the Defendant remains in front of the instant Bobagin after the purchase of the above real estate, and entered the light-type in spring around spring in 1973 after the completion of the repair, and thus, he testified to the effect that the possession and management of the Defendant began after the purchase of the above real estate. The record 799-800 pages).

If there are some circumstances, the court below should have judged the defendant's defense of the acquisition by prescription after further examination as to whether the land No. 7 in the judgment of the defendant satisfies the requirements for acquiring by prescription of the register.

Nevertheless, the court below's rejection of the defendant's defense of the statute of limitations for the acquisition of the defendant's registry on the ground that the defendant did not meet the requirements for holding the registration name for ten years, or committed an unlawful act that affected the conclusion of the judgment by misunderstanding the legal principles on the statute of limitations for the acquisition of the registry. The ground of appeal pointing this out

3. On the fourth ground for appeal

A. On August 18, 1972, the court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the defendant purchased the land of this case 1 through 6, 8, and 10 on the land of this case as decided by the non-party 5 on August 18, 1972, and operated the land of this case as the defendant's personal inspection while occupying at least the land of this case and the legal building on the land of this case 7 from around February 1973, and operated it as the defendant's personal inspection. On March 6, 1976, the court below rejected the plaintiff's defense against the non-party 1 of this case for the expiration of the statute of limitations acquisition period of limitations against the non-party 1 of this case's land of this case since the defendant occupied the land of this case as the non-party 1 of this case by establishing the non-party 2 of this case's legal entity with his own knowledge in Gangwon-do and newly constructing the current legal entity at his own expense. Therefore, the plaintiff's defense against the expiration of the statute acquisition period of prescription period of this case was expired.

B. However, we cannot accept the judgment of the court below for the following reasons as to the land No. 7 of the decision.

As seen above, the defendant shall be deemed to have occupied the above land from August 18, 1972 after completing the registration of ownership transfer in its name with respect to the land and the above above ground buildings, barring any special circumstances. Meanwhile, according to the facts and records duly established by the court below, the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the Korea-UBS on October 25, 1982 was cancelled by the Seoul High Court Decision 80Na1805, 1806 decided April 8, 1981, but the defendant revoked the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the Korea-UBS on May 27, 1986 and completed the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the Korea-UBSSY as of June 18, 197, and the plaintiff filed the registration of ownership transfer with respect to the land under the name of the Korea-UBSSSBS as of September 17, 191.

Therefore, even if the plaintiff's lawsuit against the above-mentioned party has an effect of interrupting prescription against the defendant, if the defendant commenced possession of the above land from August 18, 1972, if it is not confirmed whether or not the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the above-mentioned party before August 18, 1992, the period of prescription expires, the period of prescription for the acquisition of possession, or whether or not the above lawsuit was filed after the expiration of the period of prescription for the acquisition of possession, without confirming whether or not the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the above-mentioned party.

Nevertheless, the court below did not deliberate on the above circumstances, and accepted the plaintiff's re-appeal against the interruption of the prescription period, and rejected the defense of the acquisition by prescription against the land No. 7 of the defendant's decision, thereby failing to exhaust all the necessary deliberations, or by misunderstanding the legal principles on the prescription period for the acquisition by prescription, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. Accordingly, the ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, of the judgment of the court below, the part concerning the religious site of 2,235 square meters (No. 7 land) is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below. The defendant's remaining appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Seo-sung (Presiding Justice)