[1] In a case where an administrative agency that received a final and conclusive decision to revoke the rejection disposition rendered a new rejection disposition as to the application for relocation on the ground of new grounds after the closing of argument at a fact-finding court, whether it constitutes a second disposition under Article 30 (2

[2] The case holding that the second disposition of rejection is a second disposition of Article 30 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act, since the second disposition of indirect compulsory enforcement is in progress due to the failure to make a second disposition in accordance with the final and conclusive judgment even though the revocation ruling of change of form and quality of land and the return disposition of the application for building permit became final and conclusive, the second disposition of refusal is a second disposition of

[1] Article 30 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act / [2] Article 12 (2) of the Building Act, Articles 30 (2) and 34 of the Administrative Litigation Act

[1] Supreme Court Order 96Du70 dated Feb. 4, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 670), Supreme Court Order 97Du22 dated Jan. 7, 1998 (Gong1998Sang, 532), Supreme Court Decision 98Du1895 Decided Dec. 28, 199 (Gong200Sang, 402) dated Dec. 11, 2002 (Gong2003Sang, 511)

Kim Il-soo (Law Firm Ampoon, Attorneys Soh-hyeong et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Head of the Busan Metropolitan Government Maritime Affairs Office

Busan High Court Order 2002Ra6 dated May 31, 2002

The reappeal is dismissed.

The grounds of reappeal are examined.

According to the provisions of Article 30 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act, in a case where a judgment revoking a rejection disposition by an administrative agency becomes final and conclusive, the administrative agency that issued the disposition is obligated to re-examine the application in accordance with the purport of the judgment. However, in this case, the administrative agency that was a party to the final and conclusive judgment may render a disposition rejecting the application again for a new reason that occurred after the closing of arguments at the fact-finding court, and such disposition also constitutes a re-disposition provided for in the above provisions (see Supreme Court Order 96Du70, Feb. 4, 1997; 98Du1895, Dec. 28, 199).

According to the records and facts duly established by the court below, 200.1. 31. Busan High Court 16-3m2, 16-4m2, and 986m2 (hereinafter referred to as "the land of this case"), the 2nd 2nd 2nd 4th m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m3rd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m2nd m3.

If facts are different, even if there exists a new restriction on building permission at the time of closing of argument in a lawsuit seeking revocation of the previous disposition under Article 12 (2) of the Building Act, which serves as the basis for the restriction on building permission, the head of Busan Metropolitan City is clear after July 27, 2001, which is the date of closing of argument in the lawsuit seeking revocation of the previous disposition, and thus, the ground for new disposition of rejection arises after the closing of argument. Furthermore, according to records, the subject of the above disposition of restriction on building permission is not the respondent but the head of Busan Metropolitan City, which is the superior administrative agency. In light of the fact that the subject of the above disposition is not the respondent but the head of Busan Metropolitan City, which is the head of the Busan Metropolitan City, the subject of the disposition of restriction on building permission is not an artificial ground for new disposition of rejection, and therefore, the new disposition of rejection

Therefore, Article 34 of the Administrative Litigation Act cannot be applied as a requirement when a disposition under Article 30 (2) of the same Act is not taken. Thus, the applicant's application of this case under the premise that Article 34 of the same Act can be applied as a requirement is without merit.

Although the reasoning of the judgment of the court below is somewhat inappropriate, the conclusion that the applicant dismissed the application for indirect compulsory performance of this case is just, and there is no error of law that affected the conclusion by misunderstanding of facts, incomplete deliberation, omission of judgment, mistake of statutory interpretation, or misapprehension of legal principles as to binding force due to a violation of the rules of evidence

Therefore, the reappeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Jae-sik (Presiding Justice)