Whether a judicial police officer who consented to the defendant as evidence on the date of the first instance trial and each protocol of examination of suspect Gap prepared by the prosecutor are admissible as evidence in case the defendant reversed it on the date of the second instance trial (affirmative)

Each protocol of interrogation of judicial police officers and prosecutor Gap, if the defendant consented to the admissibility of evidence on the date of the first instance trial, even if the defendant reversed it on the date of the second instance trial and consented to the rejection of evidence, the admissibility of evidence of the above protocol which has already been lawfully granted shall not be lost.

Articles 312 and 318(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Dong-young et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant-appellee)

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney-at-law conciliation system

Seoul Criminal Court Decision 89No2689 delivered on October 17, 1990

The appeal is dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

(1) According to the timely evidence in the judgment of the court of first instance maintained by the court below, the court below's finding the facts constituting the crime of this case is justified, and it cannot be found that there is any error in violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, and

(2) Since each suspect interrogation protocol against the non-indicted person who is a Japanese judicial police officer or prosecutor prepared in the court of first instance consented to the defendant's admission as evidence on the date of the trial of the court of first instance, even if the defendant reversed it on the date of the trial of the court of second instance and consented to the rejection as evidence, the admissibility of the above protocol which has already been lawfully granted is not lost (see Supreme Court Decision 65Do346 delivered on June 29, 1965, Supreme Court Decision 88Do1628 delivered on November 8, 198), the prosecutor's office and the court of first instance cannot be said to have no credibility in light of the contents of his statement. All arguments are without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Yong-dong (Presiding Justice)