A. The meaning of "when the victim is unable to receive compensation due to the death of the insured" under the terms of the automobile comprehensive insurance contract, which is an element of the victim's direct right.

(b) Where exceptions are acknowledged to the extinguishment of claims due to confusion;

(c) In cases where a claim for damages and a debt are reverted to the same person due to the death of the operator and his/her relatives accompanied by a traffic accident, whether the claim for damages against the operator cannot be extinguished due to confusion, in which the operator purchases a motor vehicle damage liability insurance policy.

D. Effect on the right of subrogation of the insurer where the insurer paid insurance money to the victim again and the joint tortfeasor has paid damages to the victim again.

A. According to the terms and conditions of the automobile comprehensive insurance, the phrase “when the victim is unable to receive damages due to the death of the insured”, which is the requirement of the victim’s direct right of action, does not include the time when the insured cannot receive damages due to the death of the insured, but does not include the time the inheritor cannot receive damages from the inheritor.

B. The purport of recognizing the extinction of a claim due to confusion under the main sentence of Article 507 of the Civil Act is to simplify the relationship of rights and obligations in cases where a claim and obligation primarily accrue to the same person. Thus, even if a claim and obligation belong to the same person, if there are special reasons to recognize the existence of the claim, the claim shall not be extinguished by confusion

C. In a case where a vehicle operator who caused a traffic accident under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act and his/her relatives died and becomes liable to the same person by inheritance, the case where the operator of the vehicle who caused the traffic accident is entitled to claim for the liability insurance for automobile damage, the fact that there is social need to protect the victim of the surviving traffic accident or his/her heir except in special cases such as becoming the victim's heir, etc. is different from other traffic accidents. On the other hand, the insurer of the liability insurance for automobile accident is a third party unrelated to the merger of claims and obligations by inheritance, and there is no reasonable ground to be exempted from his/her liability for compensation due to a sudden circumstance that causes confusion between the traffic accident offender and the victim of the accident by inheritance. Thus, if the so-called direct claim is accompanied by the right to claim for the payment of the insurance money directly to the insurance company under the terms and conditions of the liability insurance for automobile accident, the right to claim for damages against the victim under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act shall not be deemed to be extinguished by inheritance of the victim.

D. If a motor vehicle damage compensation liability insurer paid insurance money to the heir of the victim who died with compensation for all damages caused by the death of the victim, the insurer acquires the right to indemnity against the other joint tortfeasor pursuant to the insurer subrogation provision under Article 682 of the Commercial Act, and the heir loses the right to indemnity against the other joint tortfeasor. Thus, even if the heir of the victim who died with the agent of the joint tortfeasor paid the compensation for damages due to the death of the victim, it is null and void as repayment to a person who has no authority to receive the payment, and therefore, the insurer does not have any influence on the right acquired by the insurer subrogation provision under Article 682 of the Commercial Act.

(b)Article 507 of the Civil Code, Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, Article 12 of the Automobile Accident Compensation Act, Article 724 of the Commercial Code, Article 682 of the Commercial Code;

A. Supreme Court Decision 86Meu251 Decided January 20, 1987 (Gong1987, 361) (Gong198). Supreme Court Decision 93Da48373 Decided May 12, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 2091) D. Supreme Court Decision 87Da1012 Decided April 27, 198 (Gong1988, 904) (Gong194Ha, 2947) Decided October 7, 1994

Dongyang Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., Ltd., Law Firm Han-dong Law Office, Attorneys Yu Gyeong-hee et al.

Defendant Attorney Park Young-young, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 93Na47591 delivered on June 29, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the first and second grounds for appeal

The court below acknowledged the fact that Article 16 of the Automobile Comprehensive Insurance Clause of the Plaintiff Company stipulates that the victim may directly claim the Plaintiff Company for the payment of the insurance money when the victim is unable to receive the damages due to the death of the insured in the automobile liability insurance, and determined that the Plaintiff, the insured of the instant automobile insurance contract, died due to the instant accident, and thus, Nonparty 2, who succeeded to him as the maximum parent of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff, the insurer, can claim the direct insurance money.

According to the above terms and conditions, if the victim is unable to receive damages due to the death of the insured, etc., the time when the insured is unable to receive damages is the time when the insured is unable to receive damages due to the death of the insured, and it is not included in the time the deceased cannot receive damages even from his heir (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 86Meu251, Jan. 20, 1987). Therefore, the judgment below to the same purport is just and there is no reason to prosecute the judgment of the court below

In addition, in this case, the judgment of the court below that the victim's direct right is recognized pursuant to Article 724 (2) of the Commercial Act, which was enforced after the accident of this case, is nothing more than an additional judgment that does not affect the conclusion of this case, and the propriety of the judgment can not affect the conclusion of the judgment. The arguments are without merit.

2. On the third and fourth grounds

A. The court below held that the plaintiff company's obligation to pay the insurance proceeds was premised on the fact that the above highest and lowest non-exclusive penalty, which is the insured, is liable for damages against the above highest and lowest level of the insured, but the above highest and the defendant's obligation to compensate for damages against the above lowest level of the deceased's parent, which is the co-inheritors, extinguished due to confusion. Thus, the plaintiff company's claim that the above highest amount of the insurance proceeds cannot be subrogated because it was paid at will to the above highest amount of the deceased, etc. even though it was not liable for payment to the above highest amount of the insurance proceeds. However, the court below held that the plaintiff company's direct claim against the insurer is not the right to claim the insurance proceeds, but the insurer's obligation to compensate for damages against the victim jointly takes over the defendant company's obligation to compensate for damages against the victim. Thus, since the plaintiff company's obligation to compensate for damages is not extinguished due to confusion with the above highest amount of the defendant company's obligation to compensate for damages, the plaintiff company still becomes liable for damages against the plaintiff company's loss.

B. The purport of the main text of Article 507 of the Civil Act to acknowledge the extinction of a claim due to confusion is to simplify the relationship of rights and obligations in cases where a claim and obligation are reverted to the same person. Therefore, even if the claim and obligation are reverted to the same person, if there are special reasons to recognize the existence of the claim, such claim shall not be extinguished due to confusion. Therefore, in this case as in this case, in a case where the driver of a vehicle who caused a traffic accident and the liability for damages under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act are transferred to the same person by inheritance due to the death of one or both of the operators of the vehicle or their relatives, or their relatives, as well as the claim for damages under Article 3 of the Automobile Accident Compensation Act, if the operator of the vehicle who caused the traffic accident becomes a heir of the same person, it shall be deemed that there is social need to protect them by granting the benefit of insurance under the liability insurance policy to the victim or his heir of the victim who died, and on the other hand, the insurer of a vehicle shall not be deemed as having any reasonable reasons to directly confused the victim’s liability for damages under the so-called contract.

C. If so, it is inappropriate for the court below to dismiss the defendant's assertion, but its conclusion that the plaintiff can exercise the right of indemnity by subrogation against the defendant who is the highestest amount of defendant, is justifiable, and therefore, the argument about this issue is without merit.

3. On the fifth ground for appeal

According to the records of this case, it is clear that the plaintiff paid insurance money to the above highest-in, the Heak-in, the Heak-in, and the Heak-in were due to the plaintiff's succession to the status of the victim's lowest-in, the judgment of the court below is justifiable to the same purport. Since the part of the judgment of the court below against which the theory of the lawsuit is attack is nothing more than a constructive judgment, the legitimacy of the judgment does not affect the conclusion of this case.

4. On the seventh ground for appeal

The court below held that the traffic accident in this case is liable to compensate for damages caused by the death of the highest level of the above accident as well as the defendant's negligence of the highest level of the above highest level of the vehicle operated under the same conditions, because it is reasonable to view that the traffic accident in this case is concurrent with the defendant's negligence going beyond a speed of 60 kilometers a speed, even though the speed should be significantly reduced in proceeding on the road of the first line with the lowest level of the road. In light of the circumstances recognized above, the court below's above fact-finding and decision are acceptable in all, and there is no error of law in misunderstanding facts due to the violation of the rules of evidence such as theory of lawsuit, and there is no reasonable ground to conclude that the above highest level of the accident in this case is 20%, and the defendant is 80%. In light of the records, the court below's above fact-finding and decision can not be used differently in the case of this case.

5. Regarding ground of appeal No. 6

A. The lower court rejected the Defendant’s assertion on the following grounds as to the purport that the Defendant could claim reimbursement against the Plaintiff, since the Defendant agreed to pay KRW 70,000,00 as compensation for damages due to the death of the highest and lowest level of the Plaintiff, and thus, the amount equivalent to the above lowest ratio of negligence was alleged to the effect that the Defendant could claim reimbursement against the Plaintiff.

In other words, at around February 193, the fact that Nonparty 1, who represented the above maximum amount, received gold 70,000,000 won from Nonparty 2 on behalf of the defendant, prepared and delivered a written agreement containing the fact that he was paid damages due to the death of the maximum amount and the maximum amount, can be recognized. However, at the time of receiving the above money from Nonparty 2, at the time of receiving the damages from the above maximum amount, there was a problem with the so-called consolation money which is not the damages due to the death of the above maximum amount and the above maximum amount, not the damages due to the above highest amount, and as a result, the above money was paid to the above highest amount under the above highest amount of damages. However, in light of the above fact that Nonparty 2 received damages due to the death of the above highest amount of damages due to the death of the defendant, the above maximum amount of damages due to the death of the above highest amount, and there was no other evidence that the above defendant did not receive damages due to the above maximum amount of damages due to the death of the defendant immediately before receiving the above damages.

B. However, it is difficult to accept the above judgment of the court below. The evidence No. 2, which recognized the authenticity of the judgment of the court below, is a kind of disposition document that the court below recognized as a authenticity of its formation, and the court below recognized that the defendant paid damages for all damages from the defendant's side, since the maximum amount of the damage caused by the defendant's death as the defendant's wife on behalf of the defendant, the maximum amount of the damage, and the Heak-in, the Heak-in as the victim's wife, was paid from the defendant. Thus, the victim does not want any further punishment against the defendant, and the defendant should not file a civil criminal claim against the defendant due to the accident in the future, and it is evident that the above highest amount of the defendant and the lowest amount of the judgment are clearly stated as the victim. Thus, as long as it is acknowledged as a authenticity of its formation, the court below should have recognized that the defendant paid damages for the death of the Haak-in as stated in the above statement, unless there is any reflect evidence clearly and acceptable.

However, unlike the contents of the above agreement, when recognizing that the money paid at the time of the above agreement was paid only as compensation for damage caused by the death under the above highest level of the defendant, it is obvious in the judgment of the court below that it was based on the testimony of the non-party 1, who is the child of the above highest level of the defendant, and that the contents of the testimony were somewhat weak for the defendant's criminal punishment, and unlike the actual agreement, it is hard to believe easily in light of the empirical rule as it stated that the above highest level of the defendant's punishment and the waiver of rights under the highest level of the defendant's punishment. (According to the data submitted by the defendant's attorney at the above court, the non-party 1 was given a summary order of KRW 700,000 for perjury with testimony different from the above testimony, and the summary order became final and conclusive as it is).

Therefore, the judgment of the court below on this point shall be erroneous in the misconception of facts against the rules of evidence, as alleged in the theory of theory.

C. However, the above mistake of the court below cannot affect the conclusion of the judgment. In other words, as revealed in the facts and records acknowledged by the court below, if the plaintiff paid KRW 56,00,000 to the above lowest co-inheritors, who are the co-inheritors of the above highest level and the Humok in compensation for damages caused by the death of the above highest level of light, then the plaintiff acquired the right to indemnity against the defendant who is the insured, the joint tortfeasor, under Article 682 of the Commercial Act, under the subrogation provision of the insurer under Article 682 of the Commercial Act, and the plaintiff would lose the right to indemnity against the defendant due to the death of the above highest level of light, and the plaintiff would lose the right to indemnity for damages caused by the death of the above highest level of light.

Therefore, even if Nonparty 2, who was represented by the defendant around February 1993, paid the compensation for the damage caused by the death at the lowest and the Heak-in-style, which is the co-inheritors of the above highest level, it is null and void as repayment to a person who has no right to receive the payment, and therefore, the plaintiff cannot exercise the right to obtain a claim under the insurer subrogation provision under Article 682 of the Commercial Act (However, if Nonparty 2, who is the defendant's representative, paid the insurance money for the maximum death at the above time when he was unaware of the fact that he had acquired the right by subrogation of the insurer, and he was paid the compensation for the above maximum death to the above highest and the Heak-in-style, it is valid as repayment to the quasi-Possessor of the claim, but as in the theory of lawsuit, it is impossible to recognize the effect of the plaintiff's right to receive the above insurance money as repayment by the plaintiff's insurer (the plaintiff's right to receive the above insurance money) at the time when he paid the above compensation for damages on behalf of the defendant.

As such, the court below's erroneous determination of facts does not affect the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the argument about this issue is without merit.

6. Accordingly, the appeal shall be dismissed, and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)