[Defendant-Appellee]

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

January 27, 2012

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

On February 14, 2011, the Defendant revoked the decision not to grant medical care to the Plaintiff.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. At around December 28, 2010, the Plaintiff, who had worked as security guards at the ○○ apartment under the control of the ○○○ apartment management company, was faced with an accident that was getting out of the process of removing the snow at the children’s playground at the above apartment children’s playground on December 28, 2010, and applied for the first medical care benefits to the Defendant on January 24, 2011.

B. On February 14, 2011, the Defendant approved the medical care by recognizing the “sleep on the left side” as an occupational accident. However, the “sleep on the right side” was not suitable for the disease in the state where the right side was lost, and the “slick damage on the right side” was not granted medical care on the ground that the “slick damage on the right side” did not meet the standards for the provision of medical care (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, entry of Gap evidence Nos. 4 through 6 (including each number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The plaintiff's assertion

① A physician stated the name of the injury and disease on the application form of the Plaintiff’s medical care benefits as “the name of the injury and disease on the two sides.” However, the part of the right side “the two sides” refers to the part on the right side arising from the fact that the right side of the Plaintiff, which was lost by the right slot, is left by the right side, and thus, it is obvious that it is an occupational accident like the left side of the left side, and thus, the approval of the medical care exemption on the “the right side slot.”

② In 195, the Plaintiff was able to carry out a normal life as a security guard of the above apartment complex after cutting the bridge on the right side of the right side of the traffic accident. From the end of February 2009, the Plaintiff was able to carry out a normal life as a member of the security guard of the above apartment complex. Since the Plaintiff was able to carry out a required function as a part of the body and was in a situation where the Plaintiff was unable to carry out his/her duties due to the damage of his/her medical capacity, the damage constitutes an occupational injury under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act. The construction that included “damage of the medical institution or auxiliary equipment that actually performs a part of the body in combination with the body” in the occupational injury includes also “damage of the medical institution or auxiliary equipment that actually performs the function of the body” accords with the purpose of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act that promptly and fairly compensates workers for occupational accidents, facilitate the rehabilitation of workers and their return to society, and contribute to the protection of workers by carrying out the business to promote workers’ welfare. “Inwardly” is also unlawful.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Table related statutes.

C. Determination

(1) Judgment as to the Plaintiff’s assertion

Even if the part on the right side among the “slaterals on the right side” as stated in the slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s slater’s sl

(2) Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion

Article 5 subparag. 1 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act provides that "occupational accident" refers to an employee's injury, disease, disability or death due to an occupational reason, and Article 40 of the same Act provides that medical care benefits shall be paid to the employee when the employee is injured or affected by a disease due to an occupational reason. As to whether the Plaintiff's medical satisfaction falls under an occupational accident and is subject to medical care benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, it cannot be affirmed for the following reasons, and therefore, the Plaintiff's above assertion on a different premise cannot be accepted.

1) The term “injury of an employee” refers to the entry of a worker’s body into the body, and the satisfaction is not an element of human body, so it cannot be said that the injury is not an injury.

2) The Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act appears to have tried to recover the lost labor force by having a worker receive medical care at an industrial accident insurance-related medical institution or providing medical care expenses in lieu of medical care in the event a worker suffers an injury or suffers a bodily injury caused by a disease due to an occupational reason. Even if the Plaintiff suffered a bodily injury caused by an occupational reason, it is difficult to view that it constitutes not a personal injury such as an injury or disease, but a physical damage, which constitutes a medical care benefit.

3) According to Article 40(4)2 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, “the provision of artificial limbs or other auxiliary devices” as the scope of medical care benefits for occupational injury or disease includes “the provision of artificial limbs or other auxiliary devices,” but the provision of this Act merely provides auxiliary devices for the restoration or support of physical parts or functions that have been lost due to occupational injury or disease, and it cannot be a ground provision for medical care benefits in light of occupational injury or disease when the artificial limbs or other auxiliary devices attached to the worker’s body are damaged due to occupational injury or disease.

4) If an intentional damage caused by occupational reason is recognized as an occupational injury and the medical care therefor is paid as a satisfaction, it may be problematic whether the amount of the medical care benefits should be included in the scope of the medical care benefits if it is necessary to replace the injury with the life thereof (it is not clear whether the Plaintiff wishes to do so, but the scope of the medical care benefits includes additional installation and repair at a time exceeding the life of the satisfaction. Of the relevant statutes, the medical care benefits can easily arrive at the conclusion that granting additional installation is excessive compensation, given that the Plaintiff’s physical damage is merely physical damage, and thus, granting additional installation constitutes excessive compensation. Taking this into account, it can be seen that the purpose of restoring or assisting the bodily physiological function in the event of occupational injury or disease is to restore or assist the damage of the body’s physiological function in the event of an occupational injury or disease, and it is difficult to apply to the damage of a assistive device such as artificial satisfaction.

5) There may be room to view that an employee’s rehabilitation is consistent with the purport and contents of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, such as the injury to his/her human body, and that the employee’s physical condition is not only an essential function but also a physical condition attached to his/her body. However, it is difficult to deem that the Plaintiff’s medical capacity falls under such cases.

(3) Sub-determination

The defendant's disposition of this case is legitimate.

3. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit.

[Attachment Omission of Related Acts]

Justices Kim Don-do