1. As to each real estate listed in the separate sheet to the Plaintiff, the Defendant: (a) on April 201, 201, such as the Jeonju District Court’s Branch Branch Branch Branch

1. On April 11, 2013, without permission from the competent authority, the Plaintiff, a medical corporation prescribed in the Medical Service Act, concluded a mortgage agreement between the Defendant and the Plaintiff regarding each of the real estate listed in the separate sheet, which is the basic property of the Plaintiff (hereinafter “instant real estate”), with the maximum debt amount of KRW 360 million, and the debtor and the Defendant as the Defendant (hereinafter “instant agreement”). On April 11, 201, the Plaintiff completed the registration of establishment of a mortgage in the vicinity of the Defendant’s name (hereinafter “registration of establishment of a mortgage”) under the title of the former District Court No. 8533, Apr. 11, 2013, as to the instant real estate (hereinafter “instant real estate”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, entry of Gap evidence 1 and 2 (including each number; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination as to the cause of action

A. The real estate of this case asserted by the plaintiff cannot be disposed of without obtaining permission from the competent authority as the basic property of the plaintiff.

Therefore, the instant contract concluded without permission from the competent authority is null and void, and the registration of establishment of a mortgage of this case must be cancelled.

B. Paragraph 1 of Article 48 of the Medical Service Act provides that a medical corporation shall obtain permission from the competent Mayor/Do Governor in order to dispose of property or amend its articles of incorporation (Article 48(3) of the Medical Service Act). This purpose is to ensure the proper development of medical care and to protect and promote national health by preventing a medical corporation from unfairly reducing its property at all times by securing the sound development of the medical corporation. Thus, in a case where a medical corporation violates the above provision, which is a mandatory provision, refuses to assert invalidation on the ground that it is an exercise of the right against the principle of good faith, if a person who violates the above provision, who voluntarily claims invalidation, would be deprived of the legislative intent as above, and barring any special circumstance, such assertion cannot be deemed to violate the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Da63937, Sept. 30,