2014du3839 The revocation of provisional revocation

The Seoul Special Metropolitan City riding Association

The Seoul Metropolitan Government Director of Sports Facilities Management Business

Seoul High Court Decision 2013Nu10559 Decided January 17, 2014

January 29, 2015

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. In light of the purport of the entire pleadings and the outcome of the examination of evidence, the court shall render a judgment of fact free of charge in accordance with logical and empirical rules based on the principle of free evaluation of evidence, so long as it does not exceed the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, determination of value of evidence and fact-finding belong to the discretion of the fact-finding court, and the fact-finding that the fact-finding court has legally established is binding on the court of final appeal (Articles 202 and

B. The court below rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that: (a) it is recognized that (b) the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor permitted the Plaintiff to use the instant horse free of charge until January 31, 1990 in accordance with the instant agreement after allowing the Plaintiff to use it free of charge; and (c) the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have occupied the instant horse free of charge after obtaining permission for use and profit-making after around June 1991; (b) it is difficult to deem the Defendant to have entrusted the Plaintiff with the management of the instant horse club; and even if the Plaintiff was entrusted with the management of the instant horse, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff did not have the Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the user fee or exempted the Plaintiff from the Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the Plaintiff’s user fee solely on the grounds that the Plaintiff asserted that the Plaintiff did not have any obligation to pay the Plaintiff’s usage fee or exempted from the Plaintiff’s use and profit-making of the instant horse.

The part of the ground of appeal disputing the court below's fact-finding is nothing more than an error of the judgment on the selection and value of steam, which belongs to free will of the court below. In addition, even when examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, etc. as stated in the judgment below and the evidence duly admitted, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on permission to use and benefit from administrative property, exemption from usage fees therefrom, and exemption from usage fees, or by exceeding the limit of free evaluation of evidence, which affected the conclusion of the judgment,

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that it was unlawful to calculate the fee rate for the use of the instant riding club by applying the usage fee rate for general property stipulated in the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Ordinance on Public Property and Commodity Management, which is a cultural facility, and it is difficult to view the instant riding club as a mere sports facility, and it does not constitute a cultural and sports center, which is a cultural facility stipulated in the Culture and Arts Promotion Act, and for the use of public or public use.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant statutes and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the calculation of usage fees of administrative property, the principle of equality, and the principle of self-regulation in administration, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation

3. As to the third ground for appeal

A. In general, in administrative legal relations, in order to apply the principle of the protection of trust to an act of an administrative agency, first, the administrative agency should name a public opinion that is the subject of trust to an individual, second, the administrative agency should not be responsible to the individual for the trust that the above statement of opinion is justifiable, third, the individual should have trusted the above statement of opinion and engaged in any act corresponding thereto, third, the administrative agency should have made a disposition contrary to the above statement of opinion, and fourth, the administrative agency should have made a disposition contrary to the above statement of opinion so that the interests of the individual who trusted the above statement of opinion may be infringed, and last, the administrative disposition pursuant to the above statement of opinion should not be likely to seriously undermine the public interest or legitimate interests of a third party (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Du46, Jun. 9, 206)

In addition, the principle of trust protection is a principle that is applied on the premise that an administrative agency maintains the conditions at the time of expressing a public opinion as it is. Thus, in a case where such circumstances are changed later, barring any special circumstance, even if an administrative agency takes a disposition contrary to its statement of opinion, barring special circumstances, it cannot be said that such disposition goes against the principle of trust protection (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Du19659, May 13, 201).

B. The court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that, in light of the facts stated in the court below's decision as to the nature of the document in the judgment of the court of first instance prepared by the defendant around October 201 (hereinafter referred to as "documents in this case") and the contents of the statement and the progress of consultation on the usage fees that took place around October 201, the defendant's demand for correction as to how to operate the membership system of the riding club in this case, the plaintiff's attitude as to the plaintiff's demand for correction, and the contents of consultation on the usage fees, etc. that took place around December 2005 after the agreement in this case, it is difficult to recognize that consultation about the use fees that the defendant proposed in the course of consultation at around December 205 or around December 2005 constitutes the defendant's public opinion or that it cannot be said that there was no reason for the plaintiff's trust formation. On other premise, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the disposition of the use fees in this case violates the principle of trust protection against the defendant's public opinion

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s reasoning is somewhat insufficient; however, the lower court’s determination is based on the legal doctrine as seen earlier, on the premise that it is difficult to view the Plaintiff’s assertion that the imposition of usage fee of this case, which was made after a considerable period of time after the instant agreement was not contrary to the Defendant’s previous statement of opinion at the time of the instant agreement, or that its public opinion is no longer possible due to changes in the circumstance after the statement of opinion, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there is no error of law

4. As to the fourth ground for appeal

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that: (a) the Defendant’s imposition of the instant usage fee was made in compliance with lawful requirements, and that there was no illegality of deviation from or abuse of the scope of discretion, not contrary to the principle of proportionality; and (b) the Defendant imposed the full amount of the usage fee under the relevant statutes; and (c) the Defendant’s imposition of

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the principle of proportionality and the legal doctrine on deviation and abuse of discretionary power, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Jae-young