Whether or not a housing association may determine requirements other than those prescribed by Acts and subordinate statutes in its bylaws as qualifications for association members.

In light of the provisions of Article 44(1) and (2) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992), and Article 42(1) and (4) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13850 of Feb. 20, 1993), a housing association can provide for the requirements of members other than the requirements required by the Acts and subordinate statutes in its bylaws to be submitted at the time of application for authorization of establishment, and the provisions of these bylaws of an association shall be effective for the association and its members, unless they violate the Acts and subordinate statutes.

Article 44(1) and (2) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992); Article 42(1) and (4) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13850 of Feb. 20, 1993)

[Defendant-Appellee] Defendant 1 and 3 others

The Staff Housing Association of the Heung Bank;

Busan High Court Decision 92Na1138 delivered on November 19, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

On the first ground for appeal

(1) Article 44 (1) of the Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530, Dec. 8, 1992; hereinafter the same) which was in force at the time the Plaintiff joined the Defendant Cooperative provides that "in case where the Plaintiff wishes to build the housing of its members, it shall obtain authorization to establish the housing association from the head of the competent Si/Gun." Article 44 (2) of the same Act provides that "the necessary matters concerning the method, procedure, authorization standards, etc. of the housing association under paragraph (1) shall be prescribed by the Presidential Decree." Article 42 (1) of the same Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 13850, Feb. 20, 1993; hereinafter the same) provides that "where the Plaintiff intends to obtain authorization to establish the housing association pursuant to the provisions of Article 44 (1) of the same Act, all the persons who are to be the members of the association jointly signed and sealed shall submit the association's bylaws and business plan to the head of the competent Si/Gun," in addition to the above provisions of the association's bylaws.

(2) Article 6 of the Rules of the Defendant Union (No. 2) provides that "a partner shall be a person who is a head of a household with his/her domicile in Busan Metropolitan City and without a house for at least one year as of the date of establishment of the Housing Association" as the title of the member's qualification. Under the above provisions of the Act and subordinate statutes, the above provision provides that the qualification of a member of the association established and attached at the time of application for establishment authorization shall have effect on the Plaintiff as to the qualification of a member of the association. Meanwhile, Article 2 subparagraph 6 of the Rules of the Housing Supply which was enforced at the time of establishment authorization of the Defendant Union (No. 401 of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation of December 31, 1986) of the Housing Construction Promotion Act provides that "the head of a household with his/her spouse or lineal ascendant or descendant on the resident registration card of each household, or the head of a household with no house for at least one year," and subparagraph 7 of the above provision provides that the head of a household shall be a person who has no house for at least one year prior to establish the association.

(3) According to the records of this case, the date of establishment of the defendant association is December 2, 198, and the time when the plaintiff is separated from the non-party 1's household, his father, and becomes an independent householder on September 22, 198, the time when the plaintiff becomes an independent householder. Thus, the plaintiff cannot be deemed as the "person who has no house for more than one year as of the date of establishment" of the defendant association, and therefore, the plaintiff cannot be deemed as a member of the defendant association, who did not meet the qualification requirements as stipulated in the

(4) In the same purport, the lower court’s determination that the Plaintiff cannot be deemed as a person with no house for more than one year as of the date of establishment of the Defendant Union is justifiable, and the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the validity of the Enforcement Decree of the Housing Construction Promotion Act and the regulations on housing supply or by misapprehending the legal principles on the validity of the regulations of the association, or by interpreting the regulations of the association. We do not

On the second ground for appeal

The above non-party 1, the father of the plaintiff who was temporarily registered as the plaintiff's member under the resident registration card, as the plaintiff's father, could not be viewed as the plaintiff's member, and the court below erred in finding that the above non-party 1 was the plaintiff's member and the non-party 1 was the non-party 1, and therefore the plaintiff cannot become the non-resident. However, as seen above, the plaintiff did not meet the requirement of "the non-resident who has no house for more than one year as of the date of establishment of the association," which is a member of the defendant association under the rules of association, and this alone does not constitute a member of the defendant association. Therefore, the court below's

On the third ground for appeal

As long as the Plaintiff does not meet the requirements for qualification as a member under the rules of the Defendant Union, the Plaintiff’s qualification as a member of the Defendant Union should be denied. Therefore, even if the Plaintiff paid most of the apartment sales price to the Defendant Union or the Plaintiff was at a disadvantage like the theory of lawsuit when the Plaintiff was denied, denying the Plaintiff’s qualification as a member of the Defendant Union cannot be deemed to constitute an abuse of rights.

In addition, even if the first instance court, by taking different opinions from a party member, recognized the qualification of a union member with respect to the non-party 2 of the first instance court, it cannot be recognized that the plaintiff who failed to meet the qualification requirements for a union member is a union member. The arguments are without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Song Man-man (Presiding Justice)