1. The plaintiff's appeal against the defendants is dismissed in entirety.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

purport, purport, and.

The reasoning of this Court concerning the instant case cited in the judgment of the court of first instance is that the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for partial dismissal as follows. Thus, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of

From 4th to 15th to 4th to 15th to the judgment of the first instance.

f. On April 11, 2013, the Defendant Union sent a notice of termination of the agency service contract with the Defendant Company to the Defendant Company, and around that time, the above notice was issued to the Defendant Company. The Defendant Union submitted an application for authorization of implementation plan to the Chungcheong City Mayor prior to the expiration date of the application period for authorization of implementation plan, but failed to submit legal documents, such as environmental impact assessment, and ultimately, failed to file an application for authorization of implementation plan by not later than three years from the date on which the development plan for urban development zones was formulated and announced pursuant to Article 10(2)2 of the Urban Development Act, and the designation of the J Tourism Zone was cancelled. Article 18 of the first instance judgment of the Defendant Company is as follows.

“2. The Defendant Company’s judgment on the defense prior to the merits of the Defendant Company was based on the premise that the Defendant Company was in the position of the business agent of the instant business. Since the instant subrogation agreement was terminated on or around April 11, 2013, the Plaintiff’s lawsuit against the Defendant Company was filed against a non-qualified person. However, in the performance suit, the Defendant’s standing to stand in place on the Plaintiff’s own claim and the determination was absorption of the judgment on the propriety of the claim, and thus, the Defendant Company is the lawful defendant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 95Da18451, Nov. 28, 1995). Accordingly, the Defendant Company’s defense prior to the merits cannot be accepted.