1. The Defendants are jointly and severally liable to the Plaintiff for 53,103,000 won and each year from November 4, 2004 to May 9, 2005.

1. According to the statements in Gap's evidence Nos. 1 through 12 (including paper numbers), it can be acknowledged that the facts of the reasons for the claim in the annexed sheet are stated, and the defendant A and the defendant B did not dispute the plaintiff's assertion.

2. As to Defendant C’s assertion, Defendant C did not know at all the defective matters concerning the performance guarantee insurance concluded with the Plaintiff, and the Gwangju District Court did not know that the lawsuit for indemnity amount claim was filed (hereinafter “the first instance case”). Defendant C asserted that Defendant C’s deception and claimed insurance money on the ground of the defect not occurred in the Gelim Construction Co., Ltd., the insured.

Even in cases where a new suit is allowed based on the same subject matter as a final and conclusive judgment which has become final and conclusive exceptionally due to special circumstances, such as cases where the judgment in a new suit does not conflict with the final and conclusive judgment in favor of the previous suit, and thus, the court in the subsequent suit cannot re-examine whether the requirements for claiming the established right have been satisfied. In order to dispute the legal relationship of the final and conclusive judgment in the prior suit, the defendant first filed a lawful appeal against the final and conclusive judgment in favor of the previous suit, which should extinguish the res judicata effect by filing a lawful appeal. This does not change on the ground that the service of the copy and original copy of the written complaint in the prior suit by service by public notice and the original copy of the judgment cannot be deemed otherwise.

(2) In light of the aforementioned legal principles, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the interruption of extinctive prescription against the judgment of the preceding case. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the interruption of extinctive prescription against the judgment of the preceding case. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the interruption of extinctive prescription against the preceding case, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.