1. The contract of donation concluded on April 22, 2014 between the defendant and B concerning each real estate listed in the separate sheet shall be revoked.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. The Plaintiff issued a credit card to B on January 29, 2007, and B began to pay the credit card price from April 16, 2014 while using the said credit card.

B. As of July 24, 2015, the principal and interest of the credit card arrears amounted to KRW 5,347,687.

C. B completed the registration of ownership transfer with respect to each real estate listed in the separate sheet on April 3, 2000 (hereinafter “instant real estate”). On April 22, 2014, as to the instant real estate, which is the only real estate between the Defendant and the spouse, as of April 22, 2014, the gift contract was concluded (hereinafter “instant gift contract”). The Defendant completed the registration of ownership transfer with respect to the instant real estate as described in paragraph (2) of this case.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence (the same shall apply to Eul evidence 1), Gap evidence 2, Gap evidence 3-1, 2 (the same shall apply to Eul evidence 4-1, 2), Eul evidence 3, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination as to the cause of claim

A. The debtor's act of selling real estate, which is the only property of the debtor, and replacing it with money easily consumed or transferring it to another person without compensation, becomes a fraudulent act against the creditor, barring special circumstances. Therefore, the debtor's intention of prejudice is presumed, and the burden of proof that the purchaser or the transferor did not have bad faith is the beneficiary.

B. (Supreme Court Decision 2000Da41875 Delivered on April 24, 2001).

In light of the above legal principles, B, as seen earlier, donated the instant real estate, the only real estate, which was the real estate in arrears with the Plaintiff, to the Defendant. As such, the instant donation contract constitutes a fraudulent act with the knowledge that B, a debtor, would prejudice creditors, such as the Plaintiff, etc., and as long as such intention is presumed to exist, the Defendant, a beneficiary, is presumed to have entered into the instant donation contract with the knowledge that B would prejudice the obligees.