1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The ground for appeal by the plaintiff citing the judgment of the court of first instance is not significantly different from the argument in the court of first instance, and even if the evidence additionally submitted in the court of first instance was examined in the evidence admitted in the court of first instance, the fact-finding and judgment of the court of first instance

Therefore, this court's reasoning is the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the cases of using or adding some parts as follows. Thus, it is citing it as it is by the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure

An abbreviationd name established in the judgment of the first instance is also used below the same.

[Supplementary or additional parts] Part 8 of the judgment of the court of first instance, "4,125,00,000 won and damages for delay, which are equivalent to the construction cost of the instant first construction contract, shall be calculated as "within the limit of 4,125,00,000 won for the instant first construction contract and damages for delay," and "3,402,40,000 won for the instant first construction contract and damages for delay."

The respective " Q division" in Chapters 7 and 12 of the judgment of the first instance shall be classified into "M", and the " Q" in Chapter 3 shall be classified into "M".

Part 9 of the judgment of the first instance, the following is added to the phrase "a waiver of full amount" in Part 11 of the judgment.

“In relation to this, the Plaintiff asserts that: (a) the instant secondary construction contract document and the instant certificate No. 7 are not between the Plaintiff and M; and (b) M did not use the evidence No. 7; (c) the content stated in the evidence No. 7 cannot be deemed as the content of the instant secondary construction contract; and (d) the instant first construction contract cannot be deemed as null and void based on the evidence No. 7, and that the instant certificate No. 7 should not be deemed as the content of the instant secondary construction contract. However, as the Plaintiff and M respectively affixed the seals, barring any special circumstance, the authenticity of the seal imprint is actually presumed to have been formed; and (e) once the authenticity of the seal imprint is presumed to have been established, the authenticity of the entire document is presumed to have been established. In addition, taking full account of the overall purport of the arguments written in the evidence No. 24 and No. 25, the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff,