In cases where the term of validity of the previous collective agreement expires before July 1, 2010, which is the date of application of Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act prohibiting full-time officers of a trade union, but the term of validity of the previous collective agreement expires as of July 1, 2010 pursuant to the automatic extension clause stipulated in the collective agreement, and there exists a collective agreement in force as of July 1, 2010, whether Article 3 of the Addenda of the same Act (affirmative) (affirmative) / Whether either of the parties to the collective agreement may terminate the previous collective agreement pursuant to the proviso to Article 32(3) of the same Act (affirmative)

Articles 24(2) and 32 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and Articles 3 and 8 of the Addenda ( January 1, 2010)

Supreme Court Decision 2012Da72063 Decided November 15, 2012 (Gong2012Ha, 2041)

Plaintiff (Law Firm Open, Attorneys Kim Jong-young et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Hanyang Bus Co., Ltd. (Law Firm LLC, Attorneys Jeong Jong-ho et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Cheongju District Court Decision 2012Na3556 decided March 26, 2013

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

Article 24(2) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter “Trade Union Act”) prohibits full-time officers of a trade union from paying benefits by providing that “any person who works for the affairs of the trade union shall not receive any benefit from the employer during the previous period.” However, the above provision was postponed and Article 8 of the Addenda of the Trade Union Act (amended by Act No. 930, Jan. 1, 2010) provides that “Article 24(2) shall not apply until June 30, 2010.” Meanwhile, Article 3 of the Addenda of the amended Trade Union Act (amended by Act No. 106, Jul. 1, 2010) provides that the term of validity of the collective agreement shall be deemed as valid until the expiration of the term of validity of Article 24(2) of the Act, even if all or some provisions of the collective agreement violate Article 27(1) and the term of validity of the Act. This provision shall be deemed as effective until the expiration of the term of validity of the Act.”

In addition, this legal doctrine also applies to cases where a separate agreement exists to the effect that, even after the expiration of the term of validity of a collective agreement, the validity of the previous collective agreement shall remain in force until a new collective agreement is concluded (so-called automatic extension clause). Therefore, Article 3 of the said Addenda shall also apply even in cases where the term of validity of the previous collective agreement expires before July 1, 2010 but the automatic extension clause as stipulated in the collective agreement is extended pursuant to the automatic extension clause, and there exists a valid collective agreement as of July 1, 2010. In such cases, one of the parties to the collective agreement may terminate the previous collective agreement pursuant to the proviso to Article 32(3) of the Trade Union Act.

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that the wage payment provision for full-time officers of the union of this case remains effective after July 1, 2010, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to Article 24(2) of the Trade Union Act and Article 3 of the Addenda of the amended Trade Union Act, as alleged in the ground of appeal.

Meanwhile, the Defendant also presented the grounds of appeal on the judgment of the court below that “the above provision on the payment of benefits constitutes an exemption from working hours as stipulated in Article 24(4) of the Trade Union Act and is valid.” However, the above judgment of the court below is merely an additional judgment, and even if there were errors as alleged in the grounds of appeal, it cannot affect the conclusion of the judgment, and therefore, this part of the grounds of appeal is without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed by the assent of all participating Justices, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Justices Kim Chang-suk (Presiding Justice)