(영문) 서울서부지방법원 2018. 2. 7. 선고 2017가합30699 제12민사부 판결

A. As to the share 13,543 42.54 of each of the 13,543 square meters in Mapo-gu Seoul N 13,543 square meters to Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff), E, F, G, and H:

B. As to each share of 13,543 21.27 square meters among the 13,543 square meters in Mapo-gu Seoul N, 13,543 square meters to Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) and D:

On March 10, 2010, the procedures for the registration of ownership transfer based on the acquisition of the section for exclusive use of each of the relevant real estate stated in the separate sheet No. 1 shall be implemented

3. The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant)'s respective primary and conjunctive main claims against the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff), defendant I, and J, and each conjunctive claim against defendant K, L, and M are dismissed.

4. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff (a counterclaim defendant) by aggregating the principal lawsuit and counterclaim.

Purport of claim

【Main Office】

1. The plaintiff primaryly:

A. The Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter “Defendant”) B, C, D, E, F, G, and Defendant I undertake the procedure for registration of cancellation of each corresponding transfer of ownership recorded in the same list with respect to each of the pertinent real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1;

B. Defendant H implements the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer on the pertinent real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1 for the restoration of real name;

C. Defendant B, C, D, E, F, G, and J Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “stock company”) are omitted, and H transfer of each of the relevant real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1.

2. Preliminaryly, the Defendants shall pay to the Plaintiff 18% interest per annum from the corresponding date to the date of full payment as stated in [Attachment 2]’s note, column, each of the corresponding money as stated in [Attachment 2’s] statement, and the corresponding money in [Attachment 2’s] statement, respectively, to the Plaintiff.

[Counterclaim]

Text

Paragraph (1) shall apply.

Reasons

A principal lawsuit and counterclaim shall also be deemed a principal lawsuit and counterclaim.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. On October 25, 2002, the Plaintiff was a regional housing association that obtained authorization for the establishment of a collective housing in the Mapo-gu Seoul Mapo-gu Seoul O Group, and the Plaintiff constructed 299 households on the ground of the above land after obtaining approval for the project plan as a contractor and a joint project proprietor.

B. The Plaintiff’s head of the partnership from September 27, 2002 to March 7, 2008 is Q. The head of the partnership from June 13, 2008 to September 26, 2009 is R, and S is the representative director of T& who vicariously performed the Plaintiff’s business from September 27, 2002 to September 26, 2009.

C. The Plaintiff and Defendant B, C, D, E, F, I, G, and J (hereinafter referred to as “U, etc.”) enter into a contract to sell each of the pertinent real estate listed in the attached Table 1 (hereinafter referred to as “each of the instant real estate”) in a voluntary way as shown in the attached Table 1 as follows (hereinafter referred to as “each of the instant sales contracts”). Since then, the Plaintiff entered into a general meeting of members and entered into a contract to sell each of the instant sales contracts with U, etc. around October 18, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as “each of the instant real estate”). Since then, around 2009, the Plaintiff signed and delivered each of the instant sales contracts with U, etc. with the Plaintiff’s seal and the Plaintiff’s joint seller did not affix the seals of U, etc., and the sales price is stated to be deposited into the national bank account in the name of the South Korean company (hereinafter referred to as “designated account”).

[Attachment 1]

[Attachment 1] The real estate stated in paragraph (2) of the attached Table 1 list 367,427,827,8202 defendant 1, B204-05-26 of the purchase price of real estate (won) and paragraph (1) of the attached Table 1 list around 367,427,8203 defendant E204-06-26 of the real estate listed in paragraph (3) of the attached Table 1 list around 367,427,8204 defendant F207-10-22, F205 defendant I209-10-10-05, around 414,427,427,8205 defendant I205, around 209-10-05, and around 2009-105, G2009-9-16, G2009-16, and 4047, 208207-407,

D. When U et al. pays money to the plaintiff as stated in the table 2 of the "payment" as shown below, the plaintiff delivered a certificate of full payment of the sale price to U et al. on each corresponding day stated in the "date of issuance of the "certificate of full payment" as shown in the table 2, and around that time, the plaintiff notified Gyeongnam company about the full payment of the sale price to U et al. and let Gyeongnam company deliver the key of each item of the real estate listed in the table 2 in the "date of issuance of the certificate of full payment" as stated in the table 2 to U et al. on each corresponding day, and issued a certificate of occupancy on which the plaintiff and Gyeongnam company affixed their seals affixed their seals to U et al.

The plaintiff paid and received the above money without objection.

[Attachment 2]

Serial 198,00,376,40-206-20-30-12, 209-1209-2, 209-1209-2, 209-207, 1970-40-2, 209-2, 207, 209-2, 207-40-2, 209-2, 209-2, 209-2, 207-4, 207, 209-2, 207, 209-4, 70-2, 207, 209-2, 207, 209-4, 207, 209-2, 207, 307, 209-4, 207, 209-2, 207, 300-4, 207, 307

7. From 183,122,9722,97209-09-0209-209-09-022 evidence transfer to the designated account from 2006-04-15 to 2007-12-08, the Defendant Jin, 2007, 2007-122, 9728 U.S. 2007-11-30 to 2009-9-14 designated account from 2009-28, 185, 628, 6209-209-25, 2009-208-25, 2007-08-31, 2009-209-27, 2509, 2004-27, 20504, 25028, 25268,265

E. However, the Plaintiff’s president, changed on October 9, 2009, investigated the details of the sale price payment for all of the buyers including U et al., and filed a criminal complaint against Q, R, and S. On January 25, 2010, Q, R, and S were issued a summary order of KRW 3 million as a voluntary selling of multi-family housing to U et al. by unlawful means (violation of the Housing Act). The above summary order was finalized as it is (this Court Decision 2009Da23850).

After completing registration of preservation of ownership on each of the instant real estate on February 26, 2010, the Plaintiff was affiliated with U and Defendant B, C, D, E, F, I, and G on each of the relevant real estate listed in the attached Table 1 list and completed each of the relevant registration of ownership transfer as stated in the same list. However, the registration of ownership transfer on each of the instant real estate was not made.

G. The Plaintiff asserted that Q, R, and S embezzled the proceeds of sale into a designated account by way of law that did not receive the proceeds of sale from the buyers, and filed a complaint for such charges as occupational embezzlement. However, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking compensation on the premise that Q, R, and S rendered a non-prosecution disposition on the charge of the above embezzlement [ Q: the suspension of prosecution (not missing materials), R, and S: the suspension of reference], and that they filed a lawsuit seeking compensation on the premise of the above assertion

Seoul High Court Decision 2010Da1524, Seoul High Court 2010Na109529, Supreme Court Decision 2012Da44921, R: this Court Decision 2010Da5854, Seoul High Court 201Na3376, Seoul High Court 2010Gahap2329, Seoul High Court 201Na52047, Supreme Court Decision 2013Na9543).

H. Meanwhile, U died in around 2012, and as his inheritor, U had the wife Defendant H, Defendant K, L, and M. Defendant H completed the registration of ownership transfer on August 14, 2012 with respect to the real estate listed in [Attachment 1 List No. 8 (U.S.’s relevant real estate indicated in the same List) on September 7, 2012.

【Unsatisfied facts】 A-1 through 2, 3-2 through 3-5, 3-7 through 7, 8-2 through 8-5, 8-7 through 8-10, 9-2 through 9-5, 9-7 through 11-2, 12-2, 13, 18-4, 19-1, 19-2, 27 and Eul, or 1-1 through 13, 15-1 through 15-6, 26, 28-1 through 29, 33, 34, 37-1 through 37-6, 37-1 through 37-6, 12-1 through 12-4, 13, 1-1 through 2-2, 4, 1-1 or 2 of the entire pleadings

2. Judgment on the main claim

A. Determination on this safety defense

Defendant B, C, D, E, F, G, and H (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant B, etc.”) did not have received special authorization from partners in order to file a lawsuit for the implementation of the registration procedure concerning each of the instant real estate and for the filing of a claim for extradition. Therefore, the main claim in the instant lawsuit is unlawful.

However, comprehensively taking account of the respective descriptions and arguments in Gap 2 and 22-3, the plaintiff's articles of incorporation provides that "matters concerning the acquisition or disposal of fixed assets" at an executive meeting may be resolved at an executive meeting (Article 15 (2) (c) of the articles of incorporation); the plaintiff's executive meeting on June 30, 2016 shall apply for mediation to the court on voluntary sales contract and payment of proceeds, but the mediation is not completed.

It is recognized that the plaintiff has received special authorization for the execution of the registration procedure and the request for extradition regarding each real estate of this case, which constitutes the management and disposal of fixed assets. Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the plaintiff received special authorization for the claim. Therefore, the defense prior to the main claim of this case against Defendant B, etc. among the main claim of this case is without merit.

B. Determination as to the claim against Defendant J

1) The plaintiff's assertion

Defendant J occupies the real estate stated in [Attachment 1] List 7, which is owned by the Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant J is obligated to deliver the said real estate to the Plaintiff.

2) Determination

As to whether Defendant J possessed the real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 7 of the attached list No. 1, it is recognized that AA occupied the said real estate, but only such factual basis is insufficient to recognize that Defendant J possessed the said real estate, and there is no other evidence to recognize it (the Plaintiff asserts that AA is a parent of Defendant J’s representative director, but no evidence to recognize it exists). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s request for extradition against Defendant J is without merit, without further examination.

Even if Defendant J possessed the real estate listed in [Attachment 1] List 7, Defendant J has the right to possess the said real estate under the contract for sale in lots with the Plaintiff, and Defendant J has the right to purchase the said real estate from the Plaintiff and received it as seen earlier, so the above defense by Defendant J is well-grounded (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da43953, Jan. 15, 1999). The Plaintiff asserted that the above contract for sale in lots was null and void or cancelled, but the above assertion by the Plaintiff cannot be accepted on the ground that it is the same as that by the following sub-paragraph (c).

Defendant

J’s request for extradition is still groundless.

C. Determination as to the remaining Defendants6)

The Plaintiff asserts that each of the instant sales contracts is null and void for the reasons as set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) and that even if not, the contract was rescinded for the reasons as set forth in paragraph (3) below, and that each of the pertinent real estate listed in the separate sheet as shown in the separate sheet No. 1 as to Defendant B, C, D, E, F, I, G, and G are sought against Defendant H for the implementation of the procedure for registration of cancellation of ownership transfer as described in the separate sheet No. 1, and for the implementation of the procedure for registration of ownership transfer as to the pertinent real estate as described in the separate sheet No. 1, and for the delivery of each of the pertinent real estate as described in the separate sheet No. 1, Defendant B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, respectively

(1) Invalidity by anti-social action

A) The plaintiff's assertion

According to Article 38 of the Housing Act, Article 3 of the Rules on Housing Supply, etc., which was in force around the time of the conclusion of each contract for the sale of this case, when a project proprietor intends to invite occupants, an open recruitment shall be conducted, and only when the remaining housing after supplying to the association members is less than 20 or 20 households, the sale by a voluntary sale method shall be allowed. The apartment unit sold by the Plaintiff is not allowed by a voluntary sale method exceeding 20 households, but even though the remaining housing after supplying to the association members is not allowed by a voluntary sale method exceeding 20 households, U.S., who is not qualified as an association member, conspired to violate Article 38 of the former Housing Act with the Plaintiff’s head of the association and Article 38 of the former Housing Act. Accordingly, each sale contract of this case

B) Determination

Articles 38 and 39 of the former Housing Act concerning the supply, etc. of multi-family housing constructed by a project proprietor, including a housing association, is merely a simple regulation, and cannot be deemed an effective regulation, and thus, the agreement between the parties is in violation of such an agreement cannot be deemed null and void as a matter of course (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Da55351, Jul. 26, 1996; 201Da5547, Dec. 8, 201). However, only when the parties conspired to perform a legal act in violation of the above control regulations and thus, it constitutes a legal act with a content that violates good morals and other social order (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Da2926, Jul. 27, 1993).

I examine whether U et al. have conspired with the former president of the association on the violation of the relevant provisions, such as the former Housing Act.

Although U et al. intended to join the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff’s members, the fact that the sales contract of this case was concluded in the form of voluntary sale does not have any particular dispute between the parties, and that U et al. paid part of the purchase price in the form of a designated account, although U et al. stated the sales contract of this case in the form of a designated account, U et al. paid it in a different way as shown in the table 2, and the seal of Gyeongnam company was not affixed to the parties to the contract column, but the seal of Gyeongnam company was not affixed. The fact that the president of the Plaintiff was issued a summary order

However, such factual basis alone is insufficient to recognize that U et al. had conspired with U et al. with U et al. on the violation of relevant provisions, including the former Housing Act, beyond recognizing that U et al. had concluded a voluntary sale contract with the Plaintiff, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge such violation (other circumstances cited by the Plaintiff).

We do not seem to have any ground. The plaintiff's assertion on this part is without merit.

2) As to the assertion of invalidation due to the absence of a resolution at a general meeting

A) The plaintiff's assertion

Each sales contract of this case is about the disposal of the property belonging to the collective ownership of the association members, and it is null and void since a resolution was made at a general meeting of the association members.

B) Determination as to whether to comply with resolution procedures

The portion of a building newly built and completed by a housing association, which belongs to the general public other than its members, belongs to the collective ownership of all its members, and the articles of association or regulations of the housing association concerning the management and disposition of collective property shall govern, if any, and a resolution of a general meeting of its members shall be adopted unless the articles of association or regulations exist, and any act without following such procedures shall be null and void (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Da5214, Dec. 13, 2007).

The fact that the resolution of the general meeting of the Plaintiff’s union members at the time of entering into each of the instant sales contracts is not a dispute between the parties, but it is acknowledged that the Plaintiff’s board of directors at each of the instant sales contracts was a comprehensive resolution for all voluntary sales that will proceed in the future as set forth in the table 3 (including the branch number). ( although Defendant B, etc. asserted that the resolution of the No. 3 of the table was a comprehensive resolution for all voluntary sales that will proceed in the future, it is insufficient to acknowledge this only with the entries in the No. 19 of the table 3,

[Attachment 3]

On September 27, 1202, the 17 households vacant among the members of the cooperative on September 27, 1202 shall voluntarily sell to an unqualified prop under the same conditions as the members of the cooperative.

Voluntary sale of vacancies occurring on October 6, 2006 shall be decided to be made to be made on the same condition as partners: Provided, That it shall be made to be voluntarily sold to an unqualified prop on the same condition as partners: Provided, That it shall be made to the 14 households extended due to a change in design on October 105, 2008 and to the persons of certain conditions, such as members, etc., who have been expelled and disposed of after being identified from the examination of qualification for the association members before moving into the area.

However, comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the statements and arguments by Gap 2, 28, and 31, the plaintiff's articles of incorporation before March 8, 2008 did not provide that "any matters concerning the disposal of the general property may be resolved at the board of directors". Each of the real property in this case is not included in "105 Dong 14 households extended by the No. 3 Resolution", and U.S. does not correspond to "the member dismissed by the same resolution". Thus, each resolution in attached Table 3 cannot be viewed as legitimate resolution on each of the contracts for sale in this case. Thus, each of the contracts for sale in this case shall be null and void unless there are special circumstances.

C) Determination as to whether the good faith principle is violated

As to this, Defendant B, etc. and Defendant I asserted that the Plaintiff’s assertion of invalidity of the instant contract is not permissible against the principle of good faith, even though the Plaintiff received the entire sale price, etc. from U, etc., and completed the registration of ownership transfer.

The facts revealed from the above facts and circumstances, i.e., the Plaintiff received all the sale price, etc. from U, etc. on the premise of the validity of each of the instant sales contracts, and delivered a certificate of full payment and a certificate of occupancy to them. Even after the change to Z, the Plaintiff completed the registration of ownership transfer of each of the instant real estate to U, B, C, D, E, E, F, I, and G as a pre-sale system, and the Plaintiff investigated the ownership transfer of each of the instant sales contracts against voluntary buyers, including U, etc. after the change to Z and the president of the partnership completed the registration of ownership transfer. Furthermore, as seen above, U, etc. filed a criminal complaint against the former president and completed the registration of ownership transfer of each of the instant sales contracts with the Plaintiff’s former president as well as U, etc.

In addition, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff offered to U, etc. a new belief that each of the instant sales contracts is valid, or that U, etc. objectively regarded such belief, and that the Plaintiff’s assertion that each of the instant sales contracts is invalid against U, etc. goes against such belief by U, etc. constitutes an unrecognizable degree in terms of justice. Accordingly, the Defendants’ assertion of violation of the good faith principle as to this point is reasonable, and the Plaintiff’s assertion of invalidity due to the Plaintiff’s absence of a resolution at the general meeting is groundless

3) Claim for cancellation due to unpaid sales price, etc.

A) The plaintiff's assertion

U et al. is obligated to pay to the plaintiff the corresponding amount 7) as stated in the separate sheet of "amount to be paid" in the separate sheet of "amount to be paid" according to each contract for sale in this case. However, since the same statement of "amount to be paid" did not deposit the corresponding amount 8) into the designated account, the plaintiff does not cancel each contract for sale in this case on the grounds of the unpaid amount of the sale in this case.

B) Determination on whether the sale price, etc. is unpaid

In full view of the purport of partial entries and arguments in Gap 9-2 through 9-5, 9-7 through 9-10, and 19-1, it is recognized that the amount of sale price to be paid by U, etc. to the plaintiff according to each of the sales contracts in this case is the amount corresponding to the "recognition of the amount to be paid" in the attached Table 2, and on the other hand, U, etc. paid each corresponding amount in the attached Table 2 in the name of the plaintiff under the name of the sale price, etc., as seen earlier, since the fact that U, etc. paid each corresponding amount in the attached Table 2 under the pretext of the sale price, etc., barring special circumstances

C) Determination as to the validity of performance

For this reason, the Plaintiff asserts that the payment of the sale price, etc. by other means than deposit to the designated account is not a repayment method stipulated in each of the instant sales contracts, or that taking over the status of a third party as a partner or a right to sell shares is prohibited by the former Housing Act, etc. Therefore, it is not permissible to succeed to the payment of the third party by taking over the status of a member or a right to sell shares from a third party (Defendant C, D, I) on the ground that it is not a legitimate repayment.

As seen earlier, each of the sales contracts of this case provides that the Plaintiff and U.S. shall pay the sales price to the designated account. However, each of the sales contracts of this case was concluded on the corresponding day before the preparation of each of the above sales contracts, and each of the above sales contracts was made ex post facto, and the Plaintiff notified U, etc. of the amount of the refund of the sales price of this case under the premise that the corresponding amount of the "Evidence 2" was legally paid. The Plaintiff paid additional money to U, etc. according to these notification, and the Plaintiff received the money without objection. Furthermore, it cannot be seen that the Plaintiff completed the ownership transfer registration of each of the real estate of this case after the delivery of the purchase price and the purchase price transfer registration to U, etc., and it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff's former president, etc. was appropriated for the above sales price received from the Defendant. In light of the following points, it is difficult to recognize that the Plaintiff's payment of the sale price of this case was made by 2 U.S. as the joint project proprietor from each of this case to each of this case.

The plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

D) Claim for cancellation

As long as unpaid facts are not recognized, the Plaintiff’s allegation of cancellation is without merit.

D. Sub-determination

Therefore, without any need to examine the plaintiff's primary claims against the defendant B, etc. and the defendant I.

3. Judgment on the main claim

A. Determination on this safety defense

1) Defendant B, etc., Defendant K, L, and M did not have received special authorization from its members to file a lawsuit for claim for the payment of sale price, etc. in accordance with each of the instant sales contracts. Thus, the conjunctive claim part of the instant principal lawsuit is unlawful.

However, the articles of incorporation of the Plaintiff stipulates that "matters concerning the acquisition or disposal of fixed assets" may be decided at the board of directors (Article 15 (2) Item (c) of the Articles of incorporation), and the board of directors of the Plaintiff decided on June 30, 2016 that "the Plaintiff shall apply for mediation to the court on the sales contract and the default of the price of voluntary buyers, but file a lawsuit where mediation is not completed," as mentioned above, the right to claim the payment of the sale price, etc. for each real estate of this case is "limited to the disposal of fixed assets." Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff received special authorization for the claim for the payment of the sale price, etc. for each of the sale contracts of this case. There is no reason to believe that the defense on the merits of this part is without merit.

2) Payment of the sales price, etc. under each of the instant sales contracts by Defendant B, etc., Defendant K, L, and M

Since a claim falls under the property of an association consisting of the Plaintiff and Gyeongnam-si and the lawsuit about its payment constitutes a very indispensable co-litigation, the conjunctive claim portion among the principal claim in this case raised only by the Plaintiff is unlawful.

However, even if the Plaintiff and Gyeongnam-si were joint project undertakers for the construction and sale of the instant apartment, and consisting of a partnership body, any claim, such as the sale price, may accrue pursuant to the internal agreement, and in such cases, either of them may independently file a lawsuit claiming the payment, such as the sale price (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da44471, Nov. 29, 2012). In full view of the overall purport of each entry and pleading in Articles 33 and 45, the Plaintiff may independently file a lawsuit against the Defendants, such as a lawsuit claiming the payment of the sale price, on November 6, 2015, since it is recognized that the Plaintiff agreed to vest in the Plaintiff the remaining company and the claim for the sale price, etc. due to each of the instant sales contracts with the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Plaintiff may independently file a lawsuit against the Defendants for the payment of the sale price, etc.

B. Judgment on the merits

1) The plaintiff's assertion

U et al., according to each of the sales contracts in this case, is obligated to pay each corresponding amount in the column of "the amount to be paid" of the attached Table 2 to the plaintiff. However, since the amount corresponding to the "amount to be paid" column of the "amount to be paid" column of the same Table was not paid, the defendants are obligated to pay each of the above amounts to the plaintiff and the damages for delay.

2) Determination

As seen earlier, U et al. fully paid the sale price under each of the instant sales contracts, the Plaintiff’s conjunctive claim against the Defendants is without merit.

4. Judgment on the counterclaim

A purchaser who purchased a section of exclusive ownership from a constructor of an aggregate building with a site ownership and completed a registration of transfer of the ownership thereof shall acquire the ownership of a share in the site even if he/she did not complete the registration of transfer of the land and public land equivalent to the right to use the site of exclusive ownership (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da10325, Nov. 28, 2013).

U and Defendants B, C, D, E, F, and G purchased each of the pertinent real estate (the leased portion) listed in the separate sheet No. 1 from the Plaintiff holding the ownership of the instant apartment site from the Plaintiff, and completed the registration of ownership transfer corresponding to those listed in the same list. Defendant H completed the registration of ownership transfer based on the division of inherited property on August 14, 2012 as to the real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1 listed in the separate sheet No. 1 (Us. 8) on September 7, 2012 by Defendant H on August 14, 2012. In the case of Defendant B, E, F, G, and H, the share of land falling under the right to use the site of each of the above real estate is without dispute between the parties.

According to the above facts, Defendant B, E, F, G, and H acquired the ownership of each portion of 13,543 42.54 m2 from among the 13,543m2 of the 13,543m2 of the 13,543m2 in Mapo-gu Seoul NN on each of the pertinent real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1, and Defendant C and D acquired the ownership of each share of 13,543-27m27m2 of the 13,543m2 of the 13,543m2 of the 13,543m2 of the 201m2, which is the right to use the site of the pertinent real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1. Therefore, the Plaintiff is obligated to implement each of the above shares to Defendant B, etc.

5. Conclusion

Thus, each counterclaim against the plaintiff by defendant B, etc. is justified, and the plaintiff's defendant is justified.

B, each of the primary and conjunctive main claims against Defendant I, and J, and each of the preliminary main claims against Defendant K, L, and M is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges

Judges Lee Jae-chul

Judge Maximum Constitution

Judges Cho Gyeong-soo

Note tin

1) The Plaintiff asserts that each of the instant sales contracts constitutes a real estate sales contract rather than a real estate sales contract, but if the objective meaning of the text is clear in the disposal document, barring any special circumstance, the existence of the expression of intent and its content should be recognized (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Da31308, Sept. 10, 2015), and each of the instant sales contracts is clearly the meaning that “the sales contract of each of the instant real estate” is “the sales contract of each of the instant real estate” under its language, and it is insufficient to recognize otherwise even if it is based on all of the Plaintiff’s proof. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion

2) The Plaintiff directly notified or notified via T as an agent.

3) In the case of Defendant C and D, V appears to have been notified. The same applies to the same.

4) The Plaintiff asserted that V is not a member of the Plaintiff but a person who is not aware of it at all, but in full view of the entries and the whole purport of the arguments in Eul 15-2, the Plaintiff seems to have recognized V as a purchaser at least.

5) The expulsion was made on September 3, 2009.

6) Defendant B, C, D, E.F, I, G, and H. On the other hand, Defendant K, L, and M are preliminary Defendant.

7) Specific details are as shown in the column for detailed statement of Attached Table 2.

8) The amount corresponding to each of the corresponding amounts stated in the Schedule 2’s Schedule - the “amount paid” stated in the Schedule 2’s Schedule - the amount paid.

A person shall be appointed.