The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. If the nature of the source of possessory right of real estate is not clear, the possessor is presumed to have occupied in good faith, peace, and public performance pursuant to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act. Such presumption is equally applied to cases of possession by the State or a local government, which is the managing body of the cadastral record, etc., and even in cases where the possessor asserts the source of right of possession, such as purchase and sale or donation, but the possessor does not have the burden of proving the source of possessory right, the presumption of possessory right cannot be deemed to have been reversed or to have been occupied by the nature of the source of possessory right.

(1) The State or a local government is not obliged to submit a document regarding the procedure for acquiring land for the completion of the prescriptive acquisition. Therefore, even if the State or a local government is unable to submit a document regarding the procedure for acquiring land for the completion of the prescriptive acquisition, considering the following: (a) the purpose and purpose of the occupancy; (b) whether a person registered in the cadastral record after the State, etc. commenced possession seeks to exercise the ownership; and (c) the use or disposal of divided land; and (d) the possibility that the State, etc. lawfully acquired the ownership by following the procedure for acquiring public property at the time of the commencement of possession cannot be ruled out, in a case where the State, etc. cannot be ruled out to have lawfully acquired the ownership

(2) On February 12, 2015, the lower court recognized that the Plaintiff changed the land category of each of the instant lands from “B” to “road” on June 13, 1963, and that each of the instant lands is currently being used as a road, but it is difficult to recognize that the Plaintiff began to occupy each of the instant lands by providing them for the general public’s passage from June 13, 1963, while recognizing that the land category was currently being used as a road. Furthermore, it is difficult to recognize that the Plaintiff began to occupy each of the instant lands by providing them to the general public.