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The judgment below
The part against the defendant is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Central District Court.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. If the nature of the source of possessory right of real estate is not clear, the possessor is presumed to have occupied in good faith, peace, and public performance by his/her own will pursuant to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act, and such presumption shall also apply in cases where the State or a local government, which is a managing
In addition, even if the possessor asserts the right of possession, such as the purchase and sale or donation, but this is not recognized, the presumption of possession with the sole reason that the possessor is not recognized as the possessor, can not be reversed or that the possessor is in possession with the nature of the possessor, unless the burden of proof of the right of possession with respect to the title of the possession is originally not recognized.
(1) The State or a local government is not obliged to submit a document regarding the acquisition of land for which the completion of the prescriptive acquisition is claimed. Therefore, even if the State or a local government is unable to submit a document regarding the acquisition of land for which the prescriptive acquisition is claimed, considering the following: (a) the purpose and purpose of the possession; (b) whether a person registered in the cadastral record after the State, etc. commenced possession, seeks to exercise the ownership; and (c) the use or disposal of divided land; and (d) the possibility that the State, etc. lawfully acquired the ownership by following the procedure for the acquisition of public property at the time of the commencement of possession cannot be ruled out; and (b) the presumption of possession by the State, etc.
(See Supreme Court Decision 2010Da94731, 94748 Decided March 27, 2014; Supreme Court Decision 2014Da2222329, 2223336 Decided February 12, 2015, etc.). 2. The lower court recognized that the land and G land in Gyeyang-gu, Taeyang-gu was assigned to the sections for the construction of national highways (National Road No. 39) and used as part of the national highways as of March 1972, the Defendant could have lawfully incorporated the said J land into the roads.