The case which reversed the judgment of the court below on the ground that the rejection of the written claim for the revocation of confession was against the rules of evidence and affected the judgment.

The case reversing the judgment of the court below on the ground that the rejection of the confession claim violates the rules of evidence and misjudgments the facts against the rules of evidence.

Articles 187 and 261 of the Civil Procedure Act

Plaintiff

Sung Jjin Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellee

Seoul High Court Decision 89Na49593 delivered on July 18, 1990

The part of the judgment below against the defendant shall be reversed and the case shall be remanded to Seoul High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, since the plaintiff lent 15,00,00 won to the above defendant company on March 14, 1984 to the above defendant company as the fact that there is no dispute between the parties, the confession at the date of the first instance trial after the fact that the confession is contrary to the truth and due to mistake, it is insufficient to recognize that the confession at the above 1, 2, 12-1, and 12-2 of the above confessions is contrary to the truth and due to mistake, and there is no evidence to recognize that the above confessions at the above 13-4, 14-4, 10-11 (a copy of the company's statement), and the above 10-4, 10-7, 10-11 of the above company's 10-1, 190-1, 200-1, the defendant's representative director of the court below's 3-1, 300-1, who was established the defendant company's 10-1, as an executive officer.

However, according to the records, the defendant, at the date of the first instance trial of December 16, 198, led to a confession of 15,000,000 won as of the date of the first instance trial of the court of first instance, and at the date of the first instance trial of April 21, 1989, the defendant made a statement that the confession was cancelled because the confession was made by mistake. According to the defendant's reply of the defendant on December 13, 1988, which was stated on the date of the first instance trial of December 16, 1988, the plaintiff argued that the plaintiff altered the certificate of borrowed money and voluntarily made the completion of the settlement as if it was the borrowed money of the defendant company, and even at the third day of the first instance trial of February 17, 1989, the defendant stated that it is the same as the defendant by confusion with the defendant company and the individual's disease as of January 26, 1989.

In addition, each of the entries in Gap evidence 14-7,8,11 (each of the statements) cited by the court below that the plaintiff borrowed the money of this case from the plaintiff is the defendant company is limited to the statement of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's husband non-party 1. The testimony of Lee Jae-in in the court below's witness cannot be said to lack credibility because the plaintiff is a creditor in the same position as the plaintiff and is in the same interest with the plaintiff. In addition, each of the entries in Gap evidence 13 (the register of the company), Gap evidence 14-4,9,10 (each of the statements) are that the plaintiff was appointed as a director of the defendant company or that the loan of this case was used as the purchase fund of the factory site of the defendant company, so it cannot be proven that the loan of this case is the defendant's obligation.

In addition, according to the records, the borrower (the borrower) of the loan certificate (the certificate No. 1) written at the time of borrowing the instant money was written only as the initial "YA," but thereafter, the non-party 1, the husband of the Plaintiff, voluntarily stated the name of the defendant company, as the trade name before the change of the defendant company, on the name of the above "YA," and the non-party 1 can be found to have been convicted of the fact that the non-party 1 was thereby convicted of the alteration of the private document. Thus, the person who borrowed the instant money from the plaintiff, unless there is any clear and acceptable ground to deny the contents of the evidence No. 1 prior to the alteration, shall be deemed to be the non-party 1's disease rule.

In full view of the above facts, the confession by the defendant seems to have been made by confusion with the qualification of the representative director of the defendant company and the qualification of the individual to be Park Byung-hee in the course of the lawsuit directly by Park Byung-hee, who is the representative director of the defendant company. Therefore, the confession is contrary to the truth, and it

Therefore, the court below's rejection of the defendant's letter of revocation of confession by recognizing that the person who borrowed the money of this case from the plaintiff from the plaintiff based on the macroscopic evidence was the defendant company has influenced the judgment by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence. Therefore, the argument that points this out is reasonable

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of

Justices Yoon So-young (Presiding Justice)