[1] Where a lessee repairs or alters the leased object, whether the leased object should be removed and used at the time of lease when returning the leased object (affirmative in principle), and the method of determining the contents and scope of restitution (affirmative in principle)

[2] The case affirming the judgment below holding that in case where Gap corporation: (a) performed the installation work of facilities necessary for the coffee store business by leasing its store; (b) acquired the above coffee store business from the previous lessee; and (c) operated the coffee specialty store by leasing the store from Byung corporation; and (d) deducted the cost of removal from the deposit deposit to be returned to Byung corporation, which did not remove Eul's interior facilities, etc. upon the termination of the lease; and (b) deducted the cost of removal from Byung corporation's expense, the case affirming the judgment below holding that Byung company's removal of the facilities at the expense should be deducted from Byung's deposit to Eul, on the ground that Byung company's removal of the facilities at the expense was made by the former lessee of Eul, even if Eul,

[1] If a lessee returns a leased object to a lessor (Article 654 and Article 615 of the Civil Act). In principle, if a lessee accepts or alters the leased object, the lessee shall remove the leased object and make it available at the time of lease. However, the details and scope of the duty to restore should be determined specifically and individually by taking into account the details and contents of the lease contract, the state of the object at the time of lease, the details and contents of the leased object, the lessee’s repair or alteration.

[2] In a case where Gap corporation: (a) performed the construction of facilities necessary for the operation of the coffee specialty store by leasing a store; (b) took over the above coffee specialty store from the previous lessee; and (c) operated the coffee specialty store by leasing the said coffee specialty store from Byung corporation; and (d) Byung corporation deducted the cost of removal from the deposit deposit to be removed and returned from Eul corporation, the case affirming the judgment below that Byung corporation's obligation to restore Byung corporation's removed facilities to Byung by taking into account the cost of removal upon the termination of the lease; (c) it is hard to view that Byung company's duty to restore Eul upon the termination of the lease agreement is not required even if the removed facilities conform to the store; and (d) Byung corporation's removed facilities are installed for the operation of the coffee specialty specialty store and installed for other purposes, and it is unnecessary to use the store for the other purposes; and (e) it is difficult to view Eul's waiver of the right to claim reimbursement of the cost as above, and it is difficult to view Byung's duty to reimburse Byung corporation's removed the facilities only for the limited purpose.

[1] Articles 654 and 615 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 256, 615, 626, and 654 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff (Law Firm Shin & Lee, Attorneys Oi-de et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Maio Co., Ltd.

Seoul High Court Decision 2017Na2007444 decided September 7, 2017

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Claims as to whether duty of restoration exists or not;

A. If a lessee returns a leased object to a lessor (see Articles 654 and 615 of the Civil Act). In principle, the duty to restore the leased object ought to be determined by taking into account the details and content of the lease contract, the status of the leased object at the time of the lease, the details and scope of the lease, and the details of the lessee’s repair or alteration, etc.

B. For the following reasons, the lower court deducted the cost of removing interior facilities, etc. from the deposit to be returned by the Defendant.

On February 2010, helicopters Co., Ltd.: (a) leased a store on and around February 2, 2010, built facilities necessary for the business of coffee stores; and (b) operated a coffee specialty store from that time on the trade name “○○○○○○”. The Plaintiff acquired from the previous lessee the business of coffee stores, and leased a store from the Defendant and operated the store. In the lease agreement, the Plaintiff’s duty to restore the Plaintiff upon the termination of the lease, and the Plaintiff removed the facility as the Plaintiff did not remove the interior, etc. upon the termination of the lease. The facilities removed by the Defendant are the facilities installed by the lessee prior to the termination of the lease. Comprehensively taking into account these circumstances, the Plaintiff is obligated to remove and restore the removed facilities from the cost to the former lessee.

Even if the removed facilities conform to the store, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff does not bear the duty to restore the leased facilities. Moreover, it is unnecessary to use the removed facilities for the operation of the franchise store called “○○○○○○,” which is established for the operation of the coffee store. In addition, it is difficult to deem that the Plaintiff waived the right to claim reimbursement of expenses, and that the Defendant exempted the Plaintiff from the duty to restore facilities that can be used only for limited purposes as above.

Therefore, from the deposit to be returned to the Plaintiff by the Defendant, the cost of removing the facilities paid by the Defendant should be deducted.

C. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the scope of the duty to restore the lessee’s duty to restore, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal. Supreme Court Decision 90Meu12035 Decided October 30, 1990 cited in the grounds of appeal is different from the instant case

2. Claim for damages corresponding to the borrower;

A. The lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that the damages equivalent to the interest of the loan should be compensated for on the following grounds.

The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant should compensate for damages equivalent to the interest on the loan because the Defendant delayed the return of the deposit and received the loan of the deposit, but as long as the interest rate of the loan is 2.5% per annum, and damages for delay calculated at the rate of 6% per annum exceeding the loan interest rate or 15% per annum due to the nonperformance of the obligation to return the deposit are acknowledged, the Plaintiff’s

B. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the record, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the scope of application under the main sentence of Article 397(1) of the Civil Act

3. Conclusion

The Plaintiff’s appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Dong-won (Presiding Justice)