1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. On November 22, 2013, the Defendant issued a disposition to revoke the Plaintiff’s driver’s license (E) on December 21, 2013, on the ground that “Around November 22:3, 2013, the Defendant driven Dsch Rexton vehicles in the state of blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.105% in the front of the restaurant located in Daejeon Pream-gu B at least three times” (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, entry of evidence Nos. 2, 12, and 15, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff asserted that the plaintiff was a substitute driver, and deducted the difference from a narrow parking space at the request of the substitute driver, so there was no intention of drinking driving.

In the same situation as the plaintiff, it is difficult for the borrower to refuse a simple request of a proxy driver.

The plaintiff was driving 1m degree and was not under the influence of alcohol to the extent that there was a risk of an accident.

The plaintiff is supporting his/her family by driving large cargo vehicles, and he/she has a total of KRW 169 million.

Since the instant disposition is likely to cause enormous damage to the Plaintiff, there is an error of deviation or abuse of discretionary power.

B. Determination 1) The argument that the driver had no intention to drive under the influence of alcohol is without merit. The argument that the borrower did not have a possibility of expectation for the avoidance of driving under the influence of alcohol on the ground that it is difficult for the borrower to refuse a simple request of a driver on his behalf. 2) The argument that the borrower did not have a possibility of expectation for the avoidance of driving under the influence of alcohol on April 29, 2005 can be acknowledged as follows: (a) the plaintiff conducted a drunk driving with the blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% on April 29, 2005; and (b) the blood alcohol concentration of 0.095% on December 30, 2005; and (c) the disposition of this case against the plaintiff, who conducted the third drunk driving under the proviso of Article 93(1) and subparagraph 2 of the Road Traffic Act, constitutes a binding act.

Therefore, the assertion of deviation and abuse of discretionary power is without merit.