1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On October 12, 2019, at around 09:54, the Plaintiff driven a D vehicle under the influence of alcohol concentration of 0.036% on the front of the road located in the Busan Sho-gu B.

(hereinafter referred to as “dacting driving of this case”). B.

On July 21, 2003, at around 21:48, the Plaintiff was found to have been subject to the disposition of the suspension of driver's license while driving at 0.053% of blood alcohol concentration.

C. On October 28, 2019, the Defendant issued a disposition to revoke the first-class ordinary driver’s license pursuant to Article 93(1)2 of the Road Traffic Act (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the ground that the Plaintiff constitutes a person who driven a second or higher drinking due to the instant drunk driving.

On November 11, 2019, the Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal seeking revocation of the instant disposition with the Central Administrative Appeals Commission, but the said claim was dismissed on December 20, 2019.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without any dispute, Gap's 1, 2, and Eul's 1 through 4 (including a number; hereinafter the same shall apply)

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion 1) The plaintiff did not have any ground for disposition. The plaintiff did not have the intention of driving under the influence of alcohol since there was no awareness that the plaintiff would drive under the influence of alcohol since 11 or more hours passed from the last drinking time of driving under the influence of alcohol.

B) The Plaintiff’s 2003 drinking driving power was pardoned and invalidated. (ii) Considering errors such as deviation and abuse of discretionary power, the Plaintiff’s 0.036% is a minor figure.

The previous drinking driving force is only once more than 16 years before 16 years, and it is nothing more than the previous amnesty.

The plaintiff has contributed to the nation and society as a variety of public activities in 79 years of age. It is impossible to perform various public activities by the disposition of this case.

Considering these circumstances, given that the Plaintiff’s private interest infringed on the public interest that would be achieved by the instant disposition is considerably large, the instant disposition was deviates from and abused discretion.

(b) relevant legislation;