(a) Presumption of the ownership transfer registration entered in the land cadastre at the time of May 29, 1942;

B. In a case where a claim for the cancellation, etc. of registration of real estate, which is inherited property, is filed against some co-inheritors or a third party who acquired the inherited property from a certain co-inheritors who asserted the ownership of property due to inheritance on the premise that he/she is a true inheritor, regardless of the reason for the claim, whether the claim is a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance under Article 999 of the former Civil Act (amended by Act No. 4199 of Jan. 13, 190) (affirmative)

C. Whether the period of exclusion against a claim for recovery of inheritance is subject to ex officio investigation by the court (affirmative), and the court’s action against a subsequent suit (=Dismissal of a suit)

A. If the ownership transfer registration was made on May 29, 1942, which was at the time of enforcement of the former Land cadastre Regulation (No. 45 of April 25, 1914), the ownership transfer registration was completed in the name of the title holder at the time of enforcement, and thus, the ownership was acquired at that time.

B. In a case where a claim for the cancellation, etc. of registration of real estate, which is inherited property, is filed against some co-inheritors or a third party who acquired the inherited property from a named heir, on the premise that he/she is a true inheritor with respect to the inheritance of property, it is reasonable to interpret the claim as a lawsuit for the recovery of inheritance under Article 999 of the former Civil Act (amended by Act No. 4199 of Jan. 13, 1990), regardless of the cause of the claim, unless the claim that the ownership or the right of ownership belongs to the inheritance.

C. The limitation period is set to file a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance within three years from the date of becoming aware of the infringement of inheritance rights and within ten years from the date of commencement of inheritance. Thus, in a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance, this limitation period shall be deemed to be the period of filing a lawsuit. Thus, in a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance, the court's ex officio examination of whether the limitation period is complied with, and the lawsuit brought after the limitation

A. Article 2(b) of the former Land Conservation Rule (Ordinance No. 45, Apr. 25, 1914); Article 99 of the Civil Act (amended by Act No. 4199, Jan. 13, 199); Article 124 of the Civil Procedure Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 89Ma389 delivered on March 20, 1990 (Gong1990, 942) 89Meu26601 delivered on March 27, 1990 (Gong1990, 964) 92Da12216 delivered on June 26, 192 (Gong1992, 2275) 2. Supreme Court en banc Decision 90Da5740 delivered on December 24, 1991 (Gong192, 635) 92Da2923 delivered on September 1, 1992 (Gong192, 2762), 92Da1046 delivered on October 9, 192 (Gong1992, 3108), 198Da187489 delivered on April 18, 197 (Gong197, Apr. 198, 1997)

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant 1 and one other Defendants, Defendant 1 and 3 others, Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee)

Changwon District Court Decision 90Na2905 delivered on December 10, 1991

The judgment of the court of first instance is reversed and the judgment is revoked.

The plaintiff's lawsuit of this case is dismissed.

All costs of a lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

According to the records, between the plaintiff and the defendants, the facts that the non-party 1 died on December 18, 1970 as stated in the 11th day for pleading (Evidence A) of the court below (No. 5, 1991) were not disputed. Thus, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the violation of the principle of pleading, the binding power of confession, or the presumption power of the entry in the family register on December 18, 1970 as the time when the death of the above deceased was recognized as December 18, 1970. The argument is without merit.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

The plaintiff asserted that the above non-party 1 purchased the land of this case from the non-party 2 on May 19, 1942 and occupied, managed, and died on December 18, 1970, and thus, the plaintiff jointly inherited the property of the Dong and the non-party 3 (the original co-defendant) and the non-party 4 were co-owners of the land of this case, and thus, it reached the claim of this case as a preservation act of the land of this case. The court below accepted the plaintiff's above claim and accepted part of the plaintiff's claim.

However, if Nonparty 1 purchased the instant land from Nonparty 2, but did not complete the registration of ownership transfer by December 31, 1965, in light of the provisions of Article 10(1) of the Addenda of the Civil Act (Act No. 471 of Feb. 22, 1958) before the amendment, he cannot acquire ownership, and therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be a co-owner of the instant land. Therefore, without examining whether the above non-party 1 had been registered for the transfer of ownership, the court below acknowledged that the Plaintiff and the non-party 3 and the non-party 4 were co-owner of the instant land without examining and determining whether the above non-party 1 had been registered for the transfer of ownership, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the requirements for establishing the change of real right. However, according to the entry of evidence No. 1-1 (the copy of the old land register) adopted by the court below, it did not affect the ownership transfer registration under the non-party 2's name at the time of enforcement of the former Rules No. 1 (No. 297. Ga. 1945 of the instant land.

3. As to the third ground for appeal

If one of the co-inheritors or a third party who acquired inherited property from his/her title heir claims cancellation of the registration of real estate, which is inherited property, on the premise that he/she is the true heir with respect to the inheritance, the ownership or the right to share belongs to the property shall be interpreted as a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance under Article 999 of the Civil Act, regardless of the cause of the claim, so long as the assertion that the ownership or the right to share belongs to the property, regardless of the cause of the claim is the cause of inheritance. As a cause of the claim, the plaintiff and the plaintiff, the above non-party 3 and the non-party 4 et al. were jointly succeeded to the land of this case, on the basis of a false letter of guarantee and confirmation that the above non-party 3 received the inheritance, and thus, the preservation registration and its basis are to seek cancellation of the registration in accordance with the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership, etc. of Real Estate, by asserting that the remainder except the share of the above non-party 3 among the registration of ownership in the name of the defendants is invalid.

Meanwhile, Article 982(2) of the Civil Act, which applies mutatis mutandis under the above Act, provides that the limitation period shall be three years from the date on which the inheritance right is infringed, and ten years from the date on which the inheritance is commenced. Thus, in a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance, the limitation period shall be deemed to be the period for filing the lawsuit. Thus, in a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance, a lawsuit filed after the lapse of the limitation period after the court ex officio examined whether the above limitation period is complied with, and thus, it shall be dismissed.

In this case, since the commencement date of inheritance by the plaintiff et al. was December 18, 1970, the lawsuit of this case which was clearly filed on April 25, 1990 shall be dismissed as it was filed after the expiration of the exclusion period of 10 years from the commencement date of inheritance. However, the court of first instance or the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the lawsuit for recovery of inheritance and the exclusion period, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, in which the plaintiff et al. partly accepted the plaintiff's claim, while the lawsuit of this case constitutes a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance and the lawsuit of this case was filed after the expiration of the exclusion period.

4. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below and the judgment of the court of first instance cannot be maintained as they are. Thus, the party members reverse the judgment of the court of first instance, revoke the judgment of the court of first instance, and directly decide on the instant case at the party members pursuant to Article 407 subparagraph 1 of the Civil Procedure Act. As seen earlier, the Plaintiff’s lawsuit of this case is unlawful and thus, it is dismissed and the total costs of the lawsuit are