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(영문) 대구고등법원 2018.12.14 2018누4183
유족급여 및 장의비부지급처분취소
Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the court’s explanation concerning this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, except for the addition of the judgment of the first instance as follows, and thus, it shall be cited as it is in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. In addition, the Plaintiff asserts that the instant accident constitutes occupational accidents under Article 37(1)1(c) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 14933, Oct. 24, 2017) (hereinafter “instant provision”) due to an accident that occurred during work at the network B.

In order to become an occupational accident as prescribed in the provision of this case, if an employee uses the means of transportation provided by the employer or a business owner allows the employee to use a similar means of transportation, the method of commuting to and from work and the selection of the route seems to have been entrusted to the employee, but the employee was on duty during commuting to and from work.

A worker’s commuting process should be deemed to be under the control and management of the employer, such as: (a) there is no room for choice on the method of commuting to and from work due to an urgent work related to his/her ordinary time to and from work or due to the characteristics of his/her workplace or the characteristics of his/her workplace; and (b) there is no room for choice on the method of commuting to and from work; and (c) it is deemed that

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Du17817, Feb. 27, 2014). In light of the foregoing legal doctrine, the reason behind the judgment of the first instance court was appropriately indicated in the instant case. ① The Deceased, at the time of the instant accident, was driving (whether he/she is his/her own, or his/her own, and whether he/she is his/her own, or his/her company), and was married to and from his/her place of work. As such, the method and the selection of the method and route of commuting was solely left to the

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