The case holding that the defendant was in a condition of mental disorder at the time of committing the crime, in case where he had killed the victim in mind of "shot" due to a mental fission and believed that he could die only.

It cannot be readily concluded that the defendant, who had been in a mental disorder due to mental fission at the time of committing the crime, was aware that he had a clear sense of killing the victim at the time of committing the crime, and the process of committing the crime was sufficiently memoryed, and that there was no other motive to kill the victim, and that there was no other motive to believe that the defendant was in a weak state, and that there was a death of the victim only when he believed that he could kill the victim, and that there was a death of the victim. If the defendant kills the victim under the belief that he could do so, it is difficult to view that the defendant was in a state of lacking judgment ability to distinguish between the bad faith of things and time by mental fission at the time of committing the crime.

Articles 10(1) and 250 of the Criminal Act

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Lee Jung-soo

Busan High Court Decision 90No314 delivered on May 30, 1990

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan High Court.

The grounds of appeal by the defendant and his defense counsel are also examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court determined that the Defendant had no capacity to kill the victim from around 198 to the Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Busan, and that he was unable to marry by hearing the view of the above church pastors (e.g., 83 years old), which is the victim, and that he was unable to marry. From around 01:30 on August 27, 1989, 200, the Defendant did not know about the fact that he did not have capacity to kill the victim at the time of the crime, and that he did not have capacity to kill the victim at the time of the crime, and that he did not have capacity to kill the victim at the time of the crime, and that he did not have capacity to kill the victim at the time of the crime, and that he did not have capacity to kill the victim at the time of the death of his body, and that he did not have capacity to kill the victim at the time of the death of his body. It is obvious that the Defendant did not have capacity to kill the victim at the time of his body.

2. However, the mentally defective person under Article 10(1) of the Criminal Act refers to a person who lacks the ability to distinguish things from the person's ability to distinguish things from the person's wrong judgment, that is, the person's ability to make a decision, or who has the ability to control his act, that is, the person's ability to distinguish things from the person's wrong judgment. The person's mental or physical disability under Article 10(1) of the Criminal Act refers to a person who lacks the ability to distinguish things from the person's wrong judgment or decision-making ability, and the person's ability to distinguish things or decision-making ability is related to the person's ability or decision-making ability and is not necessarily consistent with the person's ability

Therefore, as decided by the court below, even if the defendant, who had been in a state of mental disorder due to mental division at the time of committing the crime of this case, was aware of murdering the victim, and the process of committing the crime has the awareness of such fact or memory ability, it cannot be readily concluded that the defendant was in a state of weakness not lacking the ability to discern things or make decisions at the time of committing the crime.

Examining the appraisal by the court below in light of the records, the court below held that the defendant, as a mentally divided patient, shows considerable restrictions on apprehensions, tensions, prudents, self-defluences, the completion of the accident process, the details of the non-defluent and unrealistic accident and the real ability to verify the reality, and at the time of committing the crime, the symptoms of mental fission are presumed to have been considerably restricted by the real judgment or the ability to verify the reality. Thus, there is no other motive for murdering the victim, and there is no other motive for murdering the victim, as recognized by the court below, and there is only the defendant who died of the victim. If the defendant kills with belief that he could go to the party, it is difficult to view that the defendant was in a situation where he was in the absence of judgment ability to distinguish between the malicious and scarfs by the mental fission at the time of committing the crime, and there is no room to deem that there was a lack of judgment ability.

If such person is recognized as a person with mental disability, such person's social isolation and church should be subject to medical treatment and custody disposition under the Social Protection Act.

Even though the court below should have examined the above points closely and tried to determine whether or not the mental disorder, the crime of this case was committed in the state of mental disability only because the defendant had the awareness of murdering the victim at the time of the crime without the name and memorys the process of the crime. The court below determined that the crime of this case was not only qualified. The judgment was erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to mental disorder and incomplete deliberation, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the argument on this point is justified.

3. Therefore, we reverse and remand the judgment of the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice) Lee Jong-won (Presiding Justice)