It shall be noted in the calculation of the blood alcohol concentration using a reverse acid method in the Badmark formula.

[1] Articles 41 and 107-2 of the Road Traffic Act, Article 307 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Supreme Court Decision 200Do3307 Decided October 24, 200 (Gong2000Ha, 2473) Supreme Court Decision 99Do5541 Decided November 10, 200 (Gong2001Sang, 75) Supreme Court Decision 2001Do1929 Decided July 13, 2001 (Gong2001Ha, 1904), Supreme Court Decision 2002Do6762 Decided April 25, 2003 (Gong2003Sang, 1383)

Defendant

Prosecutor

Incheon District Court Decision 2004No663 Delivered on June 16, 2004

The appeal is dismissed.

If a driver's blood or pulmonary sample is examined immediately after driving and measured the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving, it is possible to estimate the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving by using the so-called dicmark formula. However, if an empirical rule, such as scientific public awareness, is used to find out the existence of the constituent elements of the crime, it is necessary to provide strict proof of individual and specific facts premised on the application of such rule. Meanwhile, if the blood alcohol concentration measured after a certain time from a specific driving point of time, using the dicmark formula, is based on the blood alcohol concentration measured after a certain time from a specific driving point of time, and such concentration is calculated according to the reduced rate of 10 alcohol level after driving, it is not necessary to determine that the defendant's average blood content concentration at 0.1 billion won after driving is more than 0, and it is not necessary to determine that the above average blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving is more than 90, and thus, it is not necessary to determine that the defendant's average blood alcohol concentration is more than 0.1, reasonable and reasonable conviction in criminal trials.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below maintained the judgment of the court of first instance which acquitted the defendant on the grounds that the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving of this case exceeds 0.05%, and that this is supported by the statement of the court of first instance prior deliberation that the defendant was not identical to drinking at the time of driving of this case, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this. In light of the above legal principles and records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just and acceptable, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the facts or misunderstanding the legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Zwon-won (Presiding Justice)