Seoul Administrative Court 2015Guhap54704 ( October 02, 2015)

The extinctive prescription is not completed because it constitutes an acceptance of debt which has the effect of interrupting extinctive prescription.

(1) As indicated in the judgment of the court of first instance, the Plaintiff indicated that the obligor is aware of the obligation of the Plaintiff by taking over the instant obligation from the obligor, etc., and thus, constitutes “approval of the obligation,” and thus, the statute of limitations does not expire in the year 2012 due to the interruption of prescription in 2011.

Article 17-2 (Deduction of Bad Debt Tax Amount)

2015Nu64093 Revocation of Disposition of Imposition of Value-Added Tax

AA Corporation

Head of Yeongdeungpo Tax Office

Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2015Guhap54704 decided October 2, 2015

April 28, 2016

May 19, 2016

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant's imposition of value-added tax No. 200 on June 10, 2014 against the plaintiff on June 10, 2014 is revoked.

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The reasoning of this court's ruling is as follows, except for the addition of the judgment on the plaintiff's argument in the court of the first instance to the following 2.1. Thus, this court's ruling is cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure

2. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s assertion in the trial room

A. The plaintiff's assertion

Article 17-2(1) of the former Value-Added Tax Act (amended by Act No. 11608, Jan. 1, 2013); Article 63-2(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24359, Feb. 15, 2013); Article 163-2(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24359, Feb. 15, 2013); Article 17-2(1) of the former Value-Added Tax Act; Article 63-2(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24359, Feb. 15, 2013); Article 163-2(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 24537, Feb. 15, 2013); and Article 14-1(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act.

B. Determination

A debt approval as a ground for interruption of extinctive prescription is established by means of expressing that an obligor, who is a party to the extinctive prescription benefit, will lose his/her claim due to the completion of the extinctive prescription, or his/her agent is aware of the other party's right or its debt, and the method of indication is not an implied case without demanding any form. In addition, approval is not a unilateral act recognizing the existence of the other party's right, etc., and it is not necessary to confirm specific matters concerning the cause, content, scope, etc. of the right, but it is not necessary for the obligor to know of the legal nature of the right, etc. or specify the cause of the right, etc. In addition, whether such approval is granted shall be determined objectively and reasonably in accordance with logical and empirical rules, rules of experience, and common sense of society, so that the parties' purpose and genuine intent to achieve through the act, etc. are consistent with the ideology of social justice and equity (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da45666, Oct. 25, 2012).

In full view of the aforementioned evidence, the Plaintiff acquired the instant claim by transfer from CC on March 24, 201, which was earlier than October 1, 2012, when the extinctive prescription of the instant sales claim expires, and on August 26, 2011, the Plaintiff was recognized as having been granted the right to collateral security of KRW 00 million with the Plaintiff as the secured claim on the instant secured real estate owned by DaD as the secured claim. Thus, barring any special circumstance, this constitutes “approval of debt” with the effect of suspending the extinctive prescription, as it indicated that B, the obligor, was aware of the Plaintiff’s obligation to the instant sales claim.

Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit, which is premised on the completion of extinctive prescription in 2012 regarding the instant sales claim, since the effect of extinctive prescription has occurred in 2011.

3. Conclusion

If so, the judgment of the court of first instance is legitimate, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.