logobeta
본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
텍스트 조절
arrow
arrow
(영문) 대법원 2017. 10. 31. 선고 2017도12534 판결
[직권남용권리행사방해][미간행]
Main Issues

The meaning of “the abuse of official authority” and standard for determining whether the crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights and obstructing another’s exercise of rights

[Reference Provisions]

Article 123 of the Criminal Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 2010Do13766 Decided February 10, 2011 (Gong2011Sang, 602) Supreme Court Decision 2010Do11884 Decided January 27, 2012 (Gong2012Sang, 403)

Escopics

Defendant

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendant and Prosecutor

Defense Counsel

Law Firm White et al.

Judgment of the lower court

Jeonju District Court Decision 2016No1139 decided July 14, 2017

Text

All appeals are dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed by the defendant).

1. Judgment on the Defendant’s grounds of appeal

A. As to the Defendant’s assertion that the instant order was not abuse of authority since it constitutes a legitimate ground for refusing to submit audit data as a legitimate exercise of authority.

In the crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights under Article 123 of the Criminal Act, “an abuse of authority” means that a public official unlawfully exercises matters falling under general official’s authority and authority. In other words, in a formal and external manner, a public official appears to have performed an act other than legitimate authority. The criteria for determining whether an abuse constitutes a public official ought to be determined by taking into account all the elements such as the specific public official’s act of performing his/her duties, necessity and reasonableness when considering the situation in which the act was committed, and whether the exercise of authority and obstructing another’s exercise of authority satisfies the statutory requirements. In addition, the term “when a public official makes another person perform an act without an obligation” refers to the time when a public official makes another person perform a non-obligatory act with regard to matters falling under his/her authority and authority, even if a public official acts to assist the performance of his/her duties, this would result in the performance of his/her duties. However, in principle, the standards and procedures for performing his/her duties are specifically stated in the statutes, and where a person has no authority and role in the procedure for performing his/her duties.

Based on the facts and circumstances stated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that: (a) the Defendant’s act of ordering public officials belonging to ○○○○○○ Office of Education and the principals of schools within its jurisdiction to refuse a request for submission of secondary audit data (hereinafter “instant instruction”) by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (wholly amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; hereinafter “Ministry”); (b) the Superintendent of the Office of Education, who is obligated to direct and supervise public officials belonging to the Office of Education and the principals, and the principals of schools, to refuse to submit audit data; and (c) the Defendant’s request for submission of audit data by having public officials belonging to the Office of Education and the principals of schools, who are obligated to cooperate in audit activities by the Director of Curriculum; and (d) the Defendant’s unlawful exercise of matters belonging to general duties and authority; and (d) the Defendant’s request for submission of administrative instruction and inspection data by Article 23(1) of the former Local Education Autonomy Act (amended by Act No. 130631, Mar. 23, 1690, 201).

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable, and there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine on justifiable grounds under Article 11(3) of the Administrative Audit Regulations, and the abuse of authority and obstructing another’s exercise

B. As to the Defendant’s assertion that there was no causation between the Defendant’s instant instruction and the refusal of submission of audit data by affiliated public officials

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court was justifiable in that the Defendant, who had the right to direct and supervise public officials under his jurisdiction and the principals of his school, refused to submit all audit data related to school violence in relation to the specific audit of the school department, and the public officials under his jurisdiction and the principals of his school refused to comply with the Defendant’s request for submission of audit data despite the statutory obligations regarding the submission of audit data. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the bounds of the lower judgment No. 1, No. 7, No. 1, No. 7, No. 1, No. 7, No. 1, No. 7, No. 1, No. 6, No. 7, No. 1, No. 7, No. 8, No. 1, and No. 1, No. 6, No. 7, No. 1, and No. 1, No. 3, No. 7, No. 1, and No. 1, No. 6, and No. 1, No. 1, No. 8 (Name omitted. 1, No. 1, 1, 1, 3).

C. As to the assertion that there was no intention to abuse or interfere with the exercise of rights

원심판결 이유를 적법하게 채택된 증거들에 비추어 살펴보면, 원심이 (1) 그 판시와 같은 사정을 들어 피고인은 이 사건 지시 당시 학교장의 학교생활기록의 작성에 관한 사무와 이에 대한 감독관청의 지도·감독 사무가 상급학교 진학자료로 활용되어 국민 전체의 이익을 위하여 통일적으로 처리되어야 할 성격의 사무로서 기관위임사무로 볼 여지가 있음을 충분히 인식하면서도 자의적으로 자치사무라고 판단하였다고 전제한 다음, (2) ① 구 지방자치법 제167조 , 제171조 , 제171조의2 에 따르면 교육부장관의 시·도교육청에 대한 감사는 기관위임사무에 대해서만 가능한 것이 아니라 자치사무의 법령위반 사항에 대해서도 가능한 점, ② 교과부장관은 ○○○○ 교육청에 ‘학교폭력대책자치위원회의 가해학생에 대한 조치사항과 같이 학교생활기록부에 반드시 입력해야 할 사항을 고의로 누락하는 경우 법령위반에 해당된다’는 취지의 공문을 수차례 보낸 점, ③ 피고인은 이 사건 지시 당시 ○○○○ 교육감의 지위에서 법제처나 교과부에 이 사건 훈령의 위헌여부를 질의하거나 공식적으로 법률전문가에게 법률자문을 구한 것이 아니고, 이 사건 훈령의 위헌성에 관해 교수들과 개인적으로 의견교환을 한 것일 뿐인 점, ④ 피고인이 이 사건 훈령이 위헌이라고 확신한 근거 중 하나로 삼고 있는 국회 입법조사처의 2012. 9. 18.자 질의회신자료(증 제23호증)에는 ‘당해 회답요구사항은 현재 대법원과 헌법재판소에 계류 중인 사건과 관련된 사항이므로, 입법조사요구 및 회답업무에 관한 내규 제5조 제1항 제4호에 따라 입법조사처는 입장을 표명하는 것이 아니며, 의원의 입법활동에 도움이 되는 범위에서 관련 주장과 논거를 조사한 것이므로, 본 회답서의 견해와 논거는 입법조사처의 견해나 논거가 아님을 밝힙니다’라고 기재되어 있는 점, ⑤ 이 사건 훈령이 당연 무효라고 볼 만한 중대·명백한 하자가 없는 한 법령을 준수해야 할 피고인으로서는 권한을 가진 법원 내지 헌법재판소에 의하여 이 사건 훈령의 효력 유무에 대한 판단이 있을 때까지 이를 준수해야 할 의무가 있는 점, ⑥ 이 사건 훈령에 대한 헌법소원심판청구 사건( 헌법재판소 2012헌마630 )에서 헌법재판소의 이 사건 훈령에 대한 위헌여부 결정이 내려지지 않은 상태에서 법령에 따라 교육행정을 총괄 집행해야 하는 지위에 있는 피고인이 이 사건 훈령을 위헌이라고 생각하고 이를 위반하더라도 법령위반이 없다고 자의적으로 판단하여 감사자료 제출을 거부하라는 위법한 지시를 한 점 등을 비롯하여 그 판시와 같은 사정을 들어, 적어도 피고인에게는 이 사건 지시 당시 미필적으로나마 자신의 직권을 남용하여 ○○○○ 교육청 소속 공무원 및 학교장들에게 의무 없는 일을 하게 한다는 점에 관한 고의가 있었다고 판단한 것은 정당하고, 거기에 필요한 심리를 다하지 아니한 채 논리와 경험의 법칙에 반하여 자유심증주의의 한계를 벗어나는 등의 잘못이 없다.

2. Judgment on the grounds of appeal by the prosecutor

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the records, including the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s determination was justifiable in that it was against the logical and empirical rules of the ○○○○○ Office of Education (name 23 omitted), other than Nonindicted 1, Nonindicted 20, Nonindicted 21, Nonindicted 22, Nonindicted 24, Nonindicted 24, and Nonindicted 25, school education and school inspector, and school inspector Nonindicted 26, and (name 20 omitted), Nonindicted 27, Nonindicted 28, and (title 22 omitted), the principal of the school (title 21 omitted), Nonindicted 28, and (title 22 omitted), the principal of the school (title 23 omitted), Nonindicted 30, principal of the school (title 24 omitted), principal of the school (title 25 omitted), Nonindicted 32, name 26, principal of the school, Nonindicted 333, and Nonindicted 41, Nonindicted 27, Nonindicted 27, and Nonindicted 47, Defendant’s rejection of the lower judgment.

On the other hand, although the prosecutor appealed to the entire judgment of the court below, the prosecutor did not state the grounds of objection in the petition of appeal or appellate brief concerning the guilty part.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)

arrow