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(영문) 서울행정법원 2017.12.13 2017구단50105
영업정지처분취소
Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. From March 2016, the Plaintiff is a person running an entertainment drinking club (hereinafter “instant entertainment drinking club”) with the trade name (mutual change to D”) “C” on the 1st, 1, and 2nd, Gangnam-gu Seoul underground level (hereinafter “C”) from around August 2016.

B. At around 00:55 on March 24, 2016, the Plaintiff: (a) received KRW 400,000 from the customer F (police officers) who was working for the instant entertainment drinking club as “business business” in the instant entertainment drinking club; (b) and (c) had his female employees G (e.g., H) of the said entertainment drinking club conducted sexual intercourse in the “Jel” located in Gangnam-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government I (hereinafter “instant entertainment drinking club”).

C. On December 29, 2016, the Defendant rendered a disposition to suspend the Plaintiff’s business for three months on the ground of the instant arrangement of sexual traffic (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

[Ground of recognition] The fact that there is no dispute, Gap evidence 2-1, Gap evidence 11-9, 16, 21, Eul evidence 1-2 and 3-3, witness E, G, F, and K's testimony and the purport of whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The Plaintiff’s assertion 1) did not want to engage in arranging sexual traffic on the date of crackdown. Since the Plaintiff sent G to the conference by force of police officers, including F, etc., this constitutes an illegal naval investigation. All materials that the Defendant is based on the instant disposition are based on an illegal naval investigation, and thus cannot be deemed a ground for disposition. Therefore, there is no ground for disposition in the instant case. Accordingly, there is no ground for disposition. 2) The Plaintiff’s instruction and supervision over employees in order to prevent the act of arranging sexual traffic, such as giving direction and supervision to the business of ordinary E, etc., to prevent the act of arranging sexual traffic. Therefore, there is justifiable reason for preventing the act of arranging sexual traffic in this case.

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