Any registration of land substitution, the effect of which continues to exist as a registration of land substitution, shall be limited to the registration on the previous land at the time of public announcement of a land substitution disposition, and any registration made for the previous land after the public announcement thereof shall have no effect as a

Any registration of land substitution, the effect of which continues to exist as a registration of land substitution, shall be limited to the registration on the previous land at the time when a land substitution disposition is publicly announced, and any registration made for the previous land after such public announcement shall have no effect as a registration

Article 62 of the Land Readjustment Projects Act, Article 37 of the amended Urban Planning Act

Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant)

Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff)

Daejeon District Court Decision 70Na123, 70Na124 delivered on October 7, 1970

The plaintiff's appeal and the defendant's appeal are all dismissed.

Each appellant shall be assessed against each appellant.

First, we examine the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal.

As stated in the judgment of remand in this case, the registration of land substitution which remains effective as a registration of land substitution is limited to the registration on the previous land at the time of the public announcement of land substitution disposition, and the registration of the previous land after the public announcement is made with respect to the previous land shall not be effective as a registration of land substitution even if it was made before the land substitution registration (see Article 37 of the previous Urban Planning Act, Article 62 of the Land Readjustment and Rearrangement Project Act). Under the same judgment, the decision of the court below is justified in the decision that the registration of land substitution as a problem in this case was made after July 15, 1963, which was the date of the public announcement of land substitution disposition after the public announcement of land substitution disposition as a problem in this case, as of the original land, from the non-party hot Spring Co., Ltd. on the previous land as of December 29, 1963, which was made by the court below as of December 5, 1963.

In addition, the above invalid registration cannot be converted to an effective registration according to the intention of the interested person. However, the theory of the lawsuit that there was an error in the incomplete hearing or in the failure to exercise the right to ask for a seat, on the premise of the opposing opinion, cannot be adopted. The arguments are groundless.

Next, we examine the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff)’s ground of appeal.

In light of the record, the defendant's counterclaim claim in this case is obvious that the defendant's claim for the counterclaim in this case is a claim to exercise the above company's right by exercising the above company's right as the preserved claim against the non-party genetic hot spring company. Thus, the court below did not err in holding the above counterclaim as a claim to exercise the above company's right in subrogation. The court below did not err in the measures that did not regard the counterclaim in this case as the exercise of other rights except

In the original judgment, there is no error in understanding the possession of the counterclaim. No debate shall be employed.

Therefore, this appeal is dismissed on the grounds that all of these appeals are without merit. The costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

The presiding judge of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge)