The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

The summary of the grounds for appeal (e.g., 5,00,000 won of fine, and 40 hours of completing sexual assault treatment programs) of the lower court is deemed to be too uneasible and unfair.

Judgment

It is reasonable to respect the sentencing of the first instance court in cases where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court solely on the ground that the sentencing of the first instance court falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, although the sentence of the first instance court falls within the scope of discretion.

(Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In full view of the reasons for sentencing revealed in the proceedings of the instant case, there is no particular change in the sentencing conditions compared to the first instance court, the lower court’s sentencing cannot be deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion because the sentencing of the lower court is too uneasible.

Therefore, the prosecutor's above assertion is without merit.

Article 59-3 of the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities, which was enforced on June 12, 2019, exempted from the employment restriction order, applies to a person who has committed a sex offense before the said Act enters into force, and has not been finally and conclusively determined (Article 2 of the Addenda to the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities (amended by December 11, 2018). The instant crime constitutes a sex offense to which the said provision applies, and thus, this Court should decide whether to issue or exempt

In light of the Defendant’s age, criminal record, family environment, social relationship, details and motive of the crime, method of the crime, and consequence of the crime, the degree and expected side effects of the Defendant’s disadvantage due to the employment restriction order, the effect of preventing sex crimes that may be achieved therefrom, the effect of the victim protection, the possibility of recidivism, etc., the employment restriction order against the Defendant pursuant to the proviso to Article 59-3(1) of the Welfare of Disabled Persons Act.