The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The gist of the grounds for appeal is that the lower court’s punishment (4 months of imprisonment and 40 hours of order to complete a sexual assault treatment program) is too unreasonable.

2. The Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the direct principle, ought to respect the determination of sentencing in cases where there exists a unique area of the first instance court, and there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). There is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the original judgment as the new sentencing materials have not been submitted at the trial court. In full view of all the reasons for sentencing indicated in the record of the instant case, the lower court’s sentencing is too remote, and thus, cannot be deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

3. The defendant's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the conclusion is groundless.

[However, Article 2 of the Addenda to Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities (Act No. 15904, Dec. 11, 2018) and Article 59-3(1) of the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities should determine whether to issue an employment restriction order pursuant to Article 59-3(1) of the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities. Since there are special circumstances under which the lower court exempted the Defendant from the employment restriction order and should not issue an employment restriction order pursuant to the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities,