Korea Electric Power Corporation (Bae & Yang LLC, Attorneys Kim Nam-nam et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Han Cable Co., Ltd. (Law Firm, Attorneys Han-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Daeil Electric Co., Ltd. (Attorney Choi Su-hee, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

December 12, 2014

1. The application for intervention of an independent party intervenor shall be rejected;

2. The Defendants shall pay to each Plaintiff 19,401,631,00 won with 5% interest per annum from February 15, 2012 to January 23, 2015, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

3. Of the costs of lawsuit, 90% of the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff, the remainder shall be borne by the Defendants, and the cost of application for intervention by an independent party shall be borne by the independent party intervenor.

4. Paragraph 2 can be provisionally executed.

In this lawsuit: The defendants shall pay to each plaintiff 198,84,039,200 won with 5% per annum from February 15, 2012 to the date of final delivery of the copy of the application for amendment of the claim of this case, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of complete payment.

An independent party participation: An independent party intervenor (hereinafter referred to as the “participating”) confirms that there is no liability for compensation for damages arising from unfair collaborative acts with respect to the purchase tender by the power line of the annual unit price contract items ordered by the Plaintiff from August 24, 1998 to September 11, 2008. The intervenor confirmed that from August 24, 1998 to September 11, 2008, the Defendants did not bear a liability for compensation with respect to the damage liability owed to the Plaintiff following unfair collaborative acts with respect to the purchase tender by the power line of the annual unit price contract items ordered by the Plaintiff.

1. Basic facts

A. Status of the parties

The Plaintiff is a public corporation established for the purpose of the development, transmission, distribution, and related business of electric resources. The Plaintiff is the Korea Electric Cable Co., Ltd., the Defendant LSS Co., Ltd. (the change from the Korea Electric Cable Co., Ltd. to the ELS Electric Co., Ltd. on March 11, 2005, to the present trade name on July 1, 2008), the Defendant Gaon Electric Co., Ltd. (the change from the scar Cable Co., Ltd. to the scar on August 20, 2004), the Defendant Il Jjin Holdings Holdings Co., Ltd. (the Japanese Electric Co., Ltd. to the Hanjin Electric Co., Ltd. on March 15, 2002, and the change to the ju 2).

Defendant Este Cable Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant Este Cable Co., Ltd.”) (hereinafter “Defendant Este Cable Co., Ltd.” from the career stest Co., Ltd. to the career industry Co., Ltd. on March 19, 199, and the trade name on March 30, 2007), Defendant Nstes Korea Co., Ltd. (the trade name change on April 26, 2001 from Daesung Cable Co., Ltd.), Defendant Kuste Cable Co., Ltd. (the change from Daewon Cable Co., Ltd. to the United Nations Co., Ltd. on February 1997, 199), Defendant Kuk Cable Co., Ltd. (34 weeks including the Defendant Han Kste Cable Co., Ltd., Ltd., the company’s “Co., Ltd.,” omitted from its trade name, and the company’s division or merger with another company or the change of its trade name is one of the joint owners’ association under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, etc. (hereinafter “Defendant Es Co.”).

(b) Market structure and characteristics of the electric wire industry;

(i)the characteristics of the electric wire industry;

Electric wires refer to the line performing the function of transmitting electric signal or electric energy between certain points, and consisting of two parts, namely, body and clothes. The electric cable industry is an industry producing and selling electric power lines and telecommunications lines, which is a national key industry that grow together with the growth of the electric power industry, electrical industry, computer industry, and other electronic equipment industry. In order to manufacture electric wires, various processes should be continuously linked to new lines and clothes, and products that have many common manufacturing processes should be used as intermediate materials. Accordingly, electric wires manufacturing can produce diverse kinds of varieties only by changing the process without any additional equipment, and it is very important to secure the quantity of water as a manufacture.

The electric cable industry is one of the capital-intensive industries that require a large number of facilities and the market competitiveness is determined by the efficiency of facilities, and thus large enterprises are tendencying to monopoly the production of facilities. ② The industry that produces multi-type and multi-standard products is the industry that produces multi-type and multi-standard products, as many kinds of electric wires can be subdivided into approximately KRW 25,00,00 based on variety and size, the concentration of industry centered on large enterprises with outstanding capacity to develop products is deepening, but it is possible to produce specific products by item, and currently small and medium enterprises are currently participating in the market through the technology development. ③ The demand for electric wires of the public sector, such as domestic power and communication, is low in the view of the competition, but the demand for the private sector sector is considerably affected by the trend of competition, such as construction and facility investment.

(ii)market structure of the electric wire industry;

The electric wires produced in the Republic of Korea are exported, but they are mainly consumed in the Republic of Korea. As the proportion of the public sector, such as the Plaintiff and KT (KT) is high, the sales performance of electric wires companies are considerably affected by the Plaintiff and KT facility investment.In the case of electric power lines, the demand has increased due to the expansion of the Plaintiff’s transmission and distribution outlook in 2006, and in the case of radio lines, the demand for the optical cables has increased as the super-high speed Internet service has increased.

Although 300 companies participate in the domestic cable market, the upper 5 company's market share at 60.4% (Defendant LSS 26.7%, Defendant Electric Cable 17.6%, Defendant Iljin Holdings 6.5%, Defendant Aion Cable 6.5%, and Defendant Aion Electric Cable 3.1%) based on the sales at the end of 2007.

(iii) the current status of the power line market;

In general, in the case of items with low added value, such as general electric wires, balk power lines, etc. for household use, the number of manufacturers is more than 100-200, and the manufacturer is more likely to compete between manufacturers. On the other hand, in the case of items with high added value, such as high voltage lines, the number of manufacturers is less than 4-5, and the competition between manufacturers is relatively high.

The main demand point of power lines can be divided into the government supply and the market, and the other party of the government supply can be divided into the plaintiff, the Public Procurement Service, the Coleday, the Seoul Matro, etc., and the other party of the market is the construction company, the general consumer and the agency.

4) The Plaintiff’s purchase of electric power lines

A) Electric power lines to be purchased;

For the formation of power supply network, power distribution lines purchased by the Plaintiff are largely divided into medium voltage lines (public power lines and underground power lines) and low voltage lines (sing power lines). From around 1998 to around 2012, power lines purchased by the Plaintiff and companies including the Defendant are divided into 12 types as listed below, and if this is subdivided into 52 types.

In the table contained in the main sentence, aCSR/AW robot line for public power towers used in ACSR/AW robot poles for the strengthening of combustion of public power lines for utility poles ACSR/AW-OC underground power lines, which are contained in the table contained in the main sentence, TR CN/CV-W-based underground power line for the strengthening of combustion of underground power lines used in CN/CV-W-based underground power pumps for the strengthening of combustion of cN/CV-W-based underground power lines for the reduction of low voltage of clothes power lines, fR-CN/W-W low voltage line for fire-fighting underground power lines fR-CN-W-based underground power lines for the reduction of low voltage of low voltage power lines, 600 V exhaust electric wires 600V cVbbbric power lines.

1. A public power line is a power line used for the installation of a steel tower outside the city or a utility pole in the city and sending electricity to the general public. ACSR/AW, and a public power line for utility poles (ACSR/AW-OC) as an item. A public power line for utility poles (ACSR/AW) is installed on a steel tower and used for long-distance transmission, while a public power line for utility poles for utility poles (ACSR/AW-C) is installed on a steel tower, but is used for long-distance transmission.

② Underground power lines are mainly used to install underground power lines in urban areas and send electricity. An underground power line is an underground power line for water supply (CN/CV-W), an underground power line for water saving (TR CN/CV-W), an underground power line for water saving (FR-CN/CO-W), and an underground power line for fire-fighting (FR-CN/CO-W). An underground power line for water saving (TR CN/CV-W) is a new product developed by the improvement of technical capabilities, and is used to replace an underground power line for water supply (CN/CV-W), which is an existing product, to increase the demand of the former, while the latter reduces the demand of the latter. On the other hand, an underground power line for fire-fighting (FR-CN/CO-W) is used to prevent fire from being easily destroyed when a fire occurs.

③ Low voltage electric power lines are used to transmit electricity from the secondary transformation stations to the confinement price. Items include a sOL-PDC (SOL-C), a double-business plastic wire (DV), a 600V calculous electric wire (600V).

(4) A bridge line shall be an electric cable with no clothes and shall be bridged with a bridge line. A bridge line shall be mainly used as the most simple type of electric power line made with a bridge line of no clothes, and shall be used as a bridge line of electric power, and shall be installed with a bridge line of a bridged lead, and shall be used for an electric tool or contact.

B) The purchase procedure and bidding method of the Plaintiff

In principle, the plaintiff shall enter into a purchase contract (annual unit price contract) with respect to electric power vessels to be used for one year of the relevant year, but shall enter into a purchase contract (total purchase contract) individually for any size or emergency quantity other than those contracted under the annual unit price contract, whenever necessary.

The Plaintiff calculated the “assessment price” based on the production cost that the Plaintiff estimated on its own for the purchase of the product, and based on the circumstances and market conditions, the “pre-determined price” is determined based on the “pre-determined price.” Based on the circumstances, the “pre-determined price” is determined based on the “pre-determined price.” If the person having the right to determine the estimated price determines one preliminary price within a certain range of the assessment price based on the pre-determined price, multiple “pre-determined price” would be determined by the electronic bid system within a specific scope against the basic reserve price. If the tender participants draw a part of the multiple pre-determined price, the “pre-determined price” is determined by the average pre-determined price by stating multiple

The method of the plaintiff's determination of successful bidder in the bidding shall include the minimum price method, the method of the successful bid, the method of the qualification examination, the minimum price of desired quantity, etc.

C. Unfair collaborative acts by the Defendants

(i) the agreement and implementation of the 1998;

From August 18, 1998, in order to prevent price decline due to competition, the defendant et al. agreed on the basic allocation ratio of the small and medium enterprises of large enterprises to underground power lines (CN/CV and CN/CV-W) 55%: 45%, with respect to the plaintiff's electrical power purchase bid in August 24, 1998 through several meetings at the conference room of the defendant Electric Cable Association. The defendant et al. agreed on the basic allocation ratio of large enterprises to underground power lines (CN/CV and CN/CV-W): 45%; the remaining products did not change the existing basic allocation ratio; the basic allocation ratio of large enterprises to total bidding quantity was 49.6%: 50.4%; in the case of underground power lines; 55.98%: 44.02%; the remaining products agreed on the delegation ratio to the defendant Electric Cable Association; and the defendant Electric Cable Association again agreed on the scheduled allocation ratio to each product.

The defendant et al. participated in the bidding of underground power lines (CN/CV and CN/CV-W) conducted on August 25, 1998 and the air power lines for utility poles, steel tower lines, 600 V air exhausters, 600V air exhausters, bridges, bridges, and bridges tender conducted from August 26, 1998 to August 28, 199 and implemented the above agreement. After that, the small and medium enterprises awarded the successful bid among the defendant et al., the small and medium enterprises, et al. ordered the successful bid of the underground power line to re-distribution it by ordering OEM (original consignment production) according to the shares of the defendant Cable Association.

(ii) attempt to reach an agreement in 1999.

On October 1, 1999, the Defendant et al. agreed to re-distribution according to the shares of the Defendant Electric Cable Association as in 1998 with respect to the underground power lines (CN/CV-W and FR CN/CO-W) first publicly announced in bidding among the items of the Plaintiff’s power line purchase bid in 1999, 55%:45%, and the volume allocated to the large enterprise group and the small and medium enterprise group as in 198, the Defendant et al. selected the scheduled amount of partial items of CN/CV-W and FR CN/CO-W.

However, there was no agreement on the actual distribution ratio of the remaining power lines, such as scheduled owners and public power lines of some products in CN/CV-W.

Thus, according to the "Annual Unit Price Contract Details of the Electric Cable in 1999" prepared by the Plaintiff as an average of 74.8% since all items of the Plaintiff's electric power line purchase bid made around October 199 among the Defendant and other companies, the bid price ratio was remarkably lower than 9.4%, which is the successful bid price ratio of 1998.

(iii) the agreement and implementation of the year 200.

From August 30, 200 to September 27, 200, the defendant et al. agreed to the basic distribution ratio of the large enterprises to the total tender volume by bidding of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises, with respect to the purchase bid by the small and medium conference room of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the defendant et al. from August 30, 200 to several meetings, and agreed to the distribution ratio of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the underground power industry: 5%: 45% of the small and medium enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the electric power industry, 100% of the small and medium enterprises of the small enterprises

On the other hand, the defendant et al. agreed that the projected price of underground power lines and public power lines should be inspected from August 18, 200 to September 27, 200, by several meetings at the conference room of the defendant Electric Power Association from August 18, 200 to September 27, 200. However, the defendant et al. failed to bid at a high price or a high price in the public power line bidding from August 25 to September 28, 200, and as a result, the plaintiff increased the estimated price of underground power lines and public power lines.

From September 29, 200 to October 31, 200, the Defendant et al. conducted an agreement by bidding in accordance with the bidding scenario agreed in the Plaintiff’s bid for the purchase of electric power vessels, and thereafter, the small and medium enterprises that received the successful bid among the Defendant et al. ordered OEM by ordering OEM according to the shares of the Defendant Electric Cable Association.

(iv) agreements and implementation in 2001.

From September 19, 2001 to September 25, 2001, the defendant et al. agreed to the basic distribution ratio of the large enterprise to the total bidding volume by bidding of the small and medium enterprise to the small and medium enterprise 50%: 50%. From September 19, 2001, the defendant et al. agreed to the distribution ratio of the large enterprise to the large enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small enterprise of the small enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the small enterprise of the small enterprise of the small enterprise of the enterprise of the small and medium enterprise, 45.1% of the small and medium enterprise of the small and medium enterprise of the electric enterprise of the small enterprise of the small enterprise.

From October 6, 2001 to October 25, 2001, the Defendant et al. conducted an agreement by bidding in accordance with the bidding scenario agreed in the Plaintiff’s bid for the purchase of electric power vessels, and thereafter, the small and medium enterprises that received the successful bid among the Defendant et al. ordered OEM by ordering OEM according to the shares of the Defendant Electric Cable Association.

(v) the agreement and implementation of the year 2002.

On September 28, 2002, the defendant et al. agreed on several meetings at the conference room, etc. of the defendant Electric Cable Association (the small and medium enterprises delegated negotiating authority to the defendant Electric Cable Association and attended the meeting of the defendant Electric Cable Association): 50.7% of the basic distribution ratio of the large enterprises to the total bidding quantity by bidding of the small and medium enterprises for each item of the plaintiff Electric Cable Association in 2002: 49.3%: 56.1% of the large enterprises of the underground electric power line: 40.5%; 59.5% for the electric power line for the electric poles: 78.4%; 605%; 21.4%; 21.9% for the electric power line for the steel poles; 21.9%; 700% for the electric power line to the small and medium enterprises for each item of the contract: 10% of the scheduled distribution ratio to the small and medium enterprises; 49.1% of the total bidding quantity for each item of the defendant Electric Cable.

From September 30, 2002 to October 4, 2002, the Defendant et al. conducted an agreement by bidding according to the investment scenario agreed in the Plaintiff’s bid for the purchase of electric power vessels, and the small and medium enterprises that received the successful bid thereafter among the Defendant et al. ordered OEM by ordering OEM according to the shares of the Defendant Electric Cable Association.

(vi) the agreement and implementation of the year 2003.

On September 9 through 10, 2002, the defendant et al. had several meetings at the conference room, etc. (as in 2002, small and medium enterprises delegated negotiating power to the defendant Electric Cable Association), in relation to the plaintiff's purchase bid in 2003, the ratio of 2002 to the basic allocation ratio of large enterprises for each purchase of the plaintiff electric power vessels by tender of the 2003 mobile enterprises, and in relation to the distribution ratio of the 56.1% of the large enterprises of underground power lines: 43.9%, in relation to the distribution ratio of the 55.9% of the large enterprises of the small and medium enterprises of the electric power lines, in the case of the electric power lines for electric poles: 10%, in 64.1%, in the case of the 55.9% electric power lines for the electric poles and 100%: 100%, in the case of the low-tension electric power lines for each item of the contract, the defendant Mutual Association again agreed to allocate the shares.

From October 1, 2003 to December 4, 2003, the Defendant et al. conducted an agreement by bidding in accordance with the bidding scenario agreed in the Plaintiff’s bid for the purchase of electric power vessels, and the small and medium enterprises that received the successful bid thereafter among the Defendant et al., ordered OEM by ordering OEM according to the shares of the Defendant Electric Cable Association.

(vii) the agreement and implementation of 2004.

From June 22, 2004 to September 13, 2004, 12 companies of the Defendant et al. agreed to the basic distribution ratio of the large enterprise-sized companies (TR-CN/CV-W) with respect to underground power lines (TR-CN/CV-W) for the strengthening of smoke in 2004 through several meetings at the conference room of the Defendant Electric Cable Association, 55%:45%, and agreed to re-distribution the successful bid amount according to the shares of the Defendant Electric Cable Association.

On September 14, 2004, 12 companies, among the defendant et al., conducted an agreement by bidding in accordance with the bidding scenario agreed in a bid for the purchase of underground power lines for the strengthening of smoke performed by the plaintiff, and the company awarded the successful bid was ordered to re-distribution the successful bid amount to the company that did not receive the successful bid price.

From September 25, 2004 to October 13, 2004, the defendant et al. agreed to the basic distribution ratio of the large-scale small and medium-sized enterprises to the total bidding quantity (including underground leading power for the purpose of strengthening the above) by bidding for each type of 2004 with respect to the purchase of the plaintiff's electric power line in 204, except for the above cutting-off underground power line after undergoing several meetings at the conference room of the defendant Electric Cable Association, 49.7%: 50.3% of the ratio of the distribution of the small and medium-sized enterprises of the small and medium-sized enterprises except for the above cutting-off underground power line for the above cutting-off. 40.3% of the ratio of the distribution of the underground power line to the small and medium-sized enterprises of the small and medium enterprises, 59.7% (4% where the above cutting-off underground power line is included, 51.6% of the above cutting-off underground power line, 36.28% of the total electric power, 10.3% of the low-ray.

From October 20 to November 10, 2004, the defendant et al. implemented an agreement by bidding in accordance with the bidding scenario agreed in the plaintiff's bid for purchase of electric power lines, and thereafter, the small and medium enterprises awarded the successful bid among the defendant et al. ordered OEM by ordering OEM according to the shares of the defendant's electric wire association.

8) Agreement and implementation of 2005

From August 24, 2005 to October 24, 2005, the defendant et al. agreed to the basic distribution ratio of the large enterprise to the total bidding quantity by bidding of the large enterprise to the bidding price of the small and medium enterprise in relation to the purchase of the plaintiff electric power at the conference room of the defendant Electric Cable Association: 51.6%. As to the distribution ratio of the total bidding quantity by bidding of the large enterprise, the ratio of the small and medium enterprise to the large enterprise of the small and medium enterprise was 49.0%: 51.0% (5% for the underground power station of the bank, 45% for the underground power station of the fire prevention, 55% for the underground electric power station of the year 205: 364% for the electric power station of the year 2005: 64% for the electric power station of the former electric power station, 10% for the high-speed 10% of the total tender volume, 10% for the defendant electric power company of the first 10%.

From November 13, 2005 to December 30, 2005, the Defendant et al. conducted an agreement by bidding in accordance with the bidding scenario agreed in the Plaintiff’s bid for the purchase of electric power vessels (Provided, That although the tender of 2005 Na-dong Cable was conducted on December 12, 2005, the Defendant et al. concluded a contract for the supply of goods from March 22, 2006 to March 21, 2007 with the period of contract from March 22, 2006 to the period of contract from March 21, 2007, the agreement was concluded on March 2006, but the agreement was concluded on March 6, 2006 with the pre-sale of the electric power cable from March 206 to the pre-sale of the pre-sale of the bid to the pre-sale of the tender to the pre-sale of the tender to the pre-sale of the tender to the pre-sale of the 20005.

9) The agreement and implementation of 2006, 2007.

From September 19, 2006 to October 19, 2006, the defendant et al. agreed to adjust the basic distribution ratio of the large enterprise to the total bidding quantity into 60%: 40% as the defendant et al. incorporates the plaintiff's power line purchase bid from the meeting room of the defendant Electric Cable Association into the defendant's electric power company in 2006 through several meetings, and then the defendant et al. agreed to adjust the basic distribution ratio of the large enterprise to the total bidding quantity into 60%: 40%. The ratio of the large enterprise of the underground power line to the large enterprise: 5%: 45%; 59.3% for the large enterprise of the underground power line, the public power line for the electric power station for the steel tower into 40.7%; 0% for the low voltage line: 100%; and 100% for the reduced quantity of the total bidding quantity from the small and medium enterprise to the small and medium enterprise of the defendant Association.

From December 8, 2006 to September 12, 2007, the Defendant et al. implemented an agreement by bidding according to the bidding scenario agreed in the Plaintiff’s bid for the purchase of electric power vessels, and thereafter, the Defendant Electric Cable Cooperative re-distributioned the underground power lines, electric poles, etc. awarded the successful bid to the small and medium enterprises in accordance with the shares of the Defendant Electric Cable Cooperative.

In addition, as seen earlier, according to the agreement between the large enterprise and the small and medium enterprise at the end of OEM, part of the successful bid price for the Defendant Handong Cable, LSS Cable, and Gaon Cable were re- apportioned to the small and medium enterprise from January 19, 2007 to December 4, 2007.

In particular, the Defendant Electric Wire Cooperative, together with Defendant Aion Electric Cable and Iljin Holdings, entered into a contract for the supply of goods from March 15, 2007 to June 22, 2007 to increase the successful bid price of the Nade-ray (as seen above, at the wind that the Nade-ray tender to be entered into in 2006 at the latest after the contract for the supply of goods from Nade-ray in 2007 was entered into in 2007). On July 11, 2007, the Defendant Electric Cable Cooperative: (a) entered into a contract for the supply of goods from July 12, 2007 to July 11, 2008; (b) concluded a contract for the supply of goods from 2007 to 20 July 11, 2008; and (c) concluded a contract for the supply of goods from Nade-ray Line to 2008.

In addition, the Defendant Electric Cable Association, together with Defendant Aion Cable and Es.S. Electric Cable, conducted from July 20, 2007 to September 5, 2007 for the price enhancement of 600V cV (600V) (as seen earlier, the bid for 600V cV cV is not conducted in 2005, and the tender for the goods was conducted around February 23, 2006, and the contract for the supply of the goods was concluded at the latest in 2006; the bid for the 600V c. Electric Cable was conducted at the latest in 2007; the bid for the 805 c.m. Electric Cable was conducted at the 2007 e.g., the average bid rate of 9.6% around September 12, 2007; the 195 e.g., the e., the e., e., e., 1007 e., the e., the goods supplied period from September 28.

D. Disposition by the Fair Trade Commission and the defendants' objection

1) In accordance with the instant agreement and practice, the Fair Trade Commission agreed on the allocation ratio between the large enterprise group and the small and medium enterprise group in order to prevent the price decline due to competition in the bidding for power line purchase conducted each year by the Plaintiff with respect to the purchase contract of around 1998 and the Nos. 1 to 350, which the Defendant et al. concluded with the Plaintiff in accordance with the agreement and practice of this case.

2) In addition, the Fair Trade Commission, based on the fact that Defendant NON Korea voluntarily filed a voluntary report and cooperates in an investigation in the second order after the commencement of the investigation by the Fair Trade Commission, and thus, constitutes Article 22-2(1)2 of the Fair Trade Act, imposed a reduction of penalty surcharge on Defendant NON Korea as shown in attached Table 3, on May 6, 2012, by its resolution No. 2012-074.

3) Of the Defendant and other companies, 22 companies including Defendant NON Korea, KON Korea, Eschina Electric Cable, Kukdong Cable, Kukdong Cable, and Hank Cable were dissatisfied with the above disposition of the Fair Trade Commission, and filed an administrative litigation seeking the revocation of the corrective order and the penalty surcharge payment order with Seoul High Court 2012Nu16529. On February 7, 2013, the said court revoked the order to pay a penalty surcharge for reasons that the base rate for imposition of a penalty surcharge was erroneously applied as the termination date of the voluntary declaration, and revoked the order to pay a penalty surcharge for DNA on the grounds that the base rate for imposition of a penalty surcharge was erroneously applied as the termination date of the voluntary declaration, but the corrective order was lawful by recognizing the collaborative act of the said Defendants and dismissed the rest of the said Defendants’ claims and the rest of the company’s claims. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs filed an appeal with Supreme Court Decision 2013Du6169.

4) The Seoul High Court (Seoul High Court 2012Nu30952) filed an administrative litigation seeking revocation of the disposition against the above Defendant among the instant dispositions. On August 28, 2013, the said court dismissed the Defendant’s claim and the said judgment became final and conclusive around that time.

5) As Seoul High Court Decision 2012Nu36868, Defendant Iljin Holdings filed an administrative litigation seeking revocation of the disposition against the said Defendant among the instant dispositions. On December 20, 2013, the said court revoked the penalty surcharge payment order on the ground that the said Defendant’s collaborative act was recognized on December 20, 2013, but the agreement in 1998 was deemed a separate agreement and was included in the relevant sales. Accordingly, the Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court Decision 2014Du1819 and is currently pending in the final appeal.

[Ground of recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 400 (including each number in case of a tentative number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Judgment on the defenses before the merits against the intervention of an independent party

A. The Intervenor filed an independent party intervention with the intent to seek confirmation of the absence of each obligation, claiming that the Intervenor did not bear the obligation to compensate the Plaintiff and the Defendants for damages according to its unique circumstances, as a business operator who voluntarily reported the instant collusion. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claim did not meet the requirements for participation of the independent party, and thus, filed an objection on the merits, which is unlawful.

B. We examine the legitimacy of the application for intervention by the independent party. The independent party intervention under Article 79 of the Civil Procedure Act is intended to claim that the whole or part of the subject matter of the lawsuit is his own right, or that the third party asserting that the subject matter of the lawsuit is infringed upon by the result of the lawsuit is the party, and settle in a lump sum without inconsistency between the two parties' rights or legal relations by judgment. Among the independent party intervention, the intervention of the right owner may be allowed if the plaintiff's principal claim and the intervenor's claim cannot be viewed as a relationship which is incompatible with the assertion itself. The prevention of harm can be permitted in a case where it is objectively recognized that the plaintiff and the defendant have the intent to harm the intervenor through the lawsuit, and it is acknowledged that the plaintiff's right or legal status is likely to be infringed upon (see Supreme Court Order 2005Ma814, Oct. 17, 2005; Supreme Court Decision 2006Da1110, May 11, 2006).

3. Judgment on the principal lawsuit

A. Establishment of liability for damages

1) The parties' assertion

A) The plaintiff's assertion

Article 19(1)1, 3, and 4 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act is an unfair collaborative act prohibited under Article 19(1)1 of the Fair Trade Act, and the Defendant Electric Cable Association is liable to compensate the Plaintiff for damages in accordance with Article 56 of the Fair Trade Act, since it constitutes an unfair collaborative act prohibited under Article 26(1)1 of the Fair Trade Act and the Defendants violated Article 56(1)1 of the Fair Trade Act.

In addition, the Fair Trade Commission deemed that the Plaintiff ordered the above power line for the first time in 2004 with respect to the underground power line (TR-CN/CV-W), but the Plaintiff ordered the above power line on June 24, 2003, and the bid for the power line was made during the period when there was a fundamental agreement between the electricity manufacturers, including the Defendants, on the total bid volume and the ratio of the product distribution by item. Thus, the Defendants' collusion in the above power line purchase bidding is recognized, so the damage of the Plaintiffs should also be included in the above 2003 purchase bid.

B) The remainder of the defendants except the defendant Han Han Electric Cable

Of the power lines ordered by the Plaintiff, the 600V smoke wires, bal-ray wires, and bal-ray wires (hereinafter “three items”) were designated as competing products among small and medium enterprise owners in 2006 for which high level of technology is not required. The said three items were offered by bidding and contract around March 2006 and around July 2007, and tender and contract was concluded at the end of 2005 and at the end of 2006, and the remaining items were offered. In light of the fact that the three items were small enterprises and the Defendant Electric Cable Association, the said Defendants do not incur any damage due to the bidding of the said three items.

2) Determination

A) Part concerning the act subject to a disposition by the Fair Trade Commission (attached Table 1 Nos. 1 to 350 each purchase contract)

According to the above facts, the defendant et al. agreed on the allocation ratio between large enterprise groups and small and medium enterprise groups with regard to the conclusion of each purchase contract of the attached table 1 or 350, the ratio of allocation between large enterprise groups and small and medium enterprise groups was agreed, and the company belonging to the relevant enterprise group was selected to allocate the quantity according to the allocation ratio agreed, and the successful bid price was conducted under the agreement on the bidding price and the bid price according to the bidding scenario for the prevention of decline in the successful bid price and the increase of the plaintiff's estimated price, and re-distribution of the successful bid price by the above agreement. These acts were jointly conducted by the defendant et al. by restricting the production and transaction of power lines to be jointly purchased by the plaintiff and unfairly restricting competition in the manufacturing and sale market of power lines by determining, maintaining, and changing the price. The defendant Electric Cable Group is liable to compensate the plaintiff for damages under Article 26 (1) 1 and 5 of the Fair Trade Act.

B) The part concerning the purchase contract for underground power lines (TR-CN/CV-W) for the purpose of strengthening smoke in 2003 (Annex 1 List 351 to 357)

(3) Around September 204, around November 2005, around December 2006, the Plaintiff offered a bid for the purchase contract with the underground power line (TR-CN/CV-W) with a size of 60S Q, 200S Q, and 325S Q. At the time, the fact that the agreement and practice by the Defendant were recognized as collusion and thus became subject to disposition by the Fair Trade Commission is as seen above. Meanwhile, according to the respective statements of evidence No. 219-1 through 4, evidence No. 220-1 through 7, evidence No. 221-1 to 3, the Plaintiff did not comply with the above agreement of the Fair Trade Commission regarding the above disposal of the Defendant’s bid price and the above disposal of the same article and the above disposal of the bid price No. 80-CN-200, and the above disposal of the bid price by the Defendants were no more than the above disposal of the same article and the above disposal of the bid price of the company.

C) Determination as to the Defendants’ assertion

The facts established earlier and the evidence revealed as follows. ① The agreement of this case provides for an agreement between large enterprises and small-medium enterprises on the total quantity of bidding in order to prevent price decline due to competition in the Plaintiff’s purchasing bid. ② The implementation ratio between large-sized enterprises in total bidding items is set between large-sized enterprises in 2002 and small-medium enterprises in 21.9%: 78.1%: (i) the implementation ratio of large-sized enterprises in 600 V large-sized enterprises in 2002 was set (the implementation ratio was set by 600V small-medium enterprises as a result of the implementation thereof) and the distribution of all three items in 201 to small-medium enterprises in 3 items, regardless of whether three items are designated as competing products among small-medium enterprises in 3 items, and (ii) the remaining distribution ratio between large-sized enterprises in 2007 and small-medium enterprises in 3 items in 207 can not be seen as having been set by the Defendants’ bidding among the small-medium enterprises in 2007 medium enterprises.

D) Sub-determination

Therefore, the Defendants are liable to compensate the Plaintiff for the damages incurred by the Defendants due to the Defendants’ collusion with regard to the purchase agreement after October 9, 2002 (attached Table 1 Nos. 105 through 357), excluding the purchase agreement concluded before October 19, 2001 by the Plaintiff, among each purchase agreement entered into by the instant agreement and the implementation thereof, which was entered into in the separate sheet No. 1 list. 1.

(b) Scope of damages;

1) Calculation method of damages

Damage caused by an illegal bidding collusion refers to the difference between the successful bid price formed by such collusion and the price formed in the event there was no such collusion (hereinafter referred to as “provisional competition price”). Here, the virtual competition price should be calculated by the method of excluding only the price fluctuation portion caused by the collusion while maintaining the other factors for price formation in the market in which the collusion was committed as it is. Although it is difficult to accurately measure the virtual competition price, it is difficult to say that it is based on the simple trend or is not infringed on the Plaintiff’s right to receive compensation, so if the amount of damage is deemed to have been fairly presumed by a scientific and reasonable method based on the theoretical basis and materials, the court shall order compensation for the amount of damage calculated as such (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Da93790, Nov. 29, 2012).

(ii) method of estimating virtual competitive prices;

The virtual competitive price, at the price formed when all other market conditions are excluded only from the effect of collusion in the same situation, and in order to estimate it, only the effect of collusion should be examined by controlling other factors affecting the price. The method of estimating the virtual competitive price lies in ① front and rear intersection, ② comparative market, ③ double segment method, ④ cost and finish estimate method, etc.

In this case, the Nonparty calculated the virtual competitive price in accordance with the Before and after the comparison method. In the case of the Before and after the comparison method, the price at the time when there was no collusion for the same market and the time when there was no collusion for the same market may vary due to various causes, in addition to the collusion, in addition to the collusion, the market price at the same market in the same market may vary depending on the flow of time in addition to the collusion. In order to use this method, the effect of bid collusion can be inferred after controlling various other conditions that may affect the price. As seen in the following 3), the appraiser can calculate the price at the time of production cost and linkage by the method of comparison and control to some other factors that affect the price in addition to the collusion. The Plaintiff is supplied with electric wires from multiple suppliers by purchasing different kinds of electric wires of 12 items 52 items as public enterprises, and there is no similar domestic and overseas markets, so it is difficult to use the comparative market law, and thus, the Plaintiff and the Defendants do not have any damage before and after the comparison method.

(iii)calculated by the successful bid rate;

A) In the instant case, the appraiser estimated the competitive price according to the “successful bid ratio” in the collusion period and the “successful bid ratio” period. The bid price ratio expressed in the figures of the successful bid price compared to the estimated price. Based on factors affecting the product price, the appraiser estimated, instead of promptly estimatinging the virtual competitive price, “the virtual competitive bid price ratio” which is the ratio compared to the estimated price, was based on the estimated price, and calculated the competitive price that would have been formed in the event there was no collaborative act by comparing it with the estimated price for the collusion period.

B) The Plaintiff’s contract for the purchase of electric power vessels covers 52 kinds of electric power lines of 12 items. Among these products, there is no product that has been tendered throughout the entire period. However, there is no sufficient observation value for each type of product, and there is a limit to estimating virtual competition price by each type of product, such as supplier, competitive mode, etc., and each type of product has the same competitive value. If the method of estimating the successful bid price is selected, the Plaintiff can calculate virtual competition price by using the successful bid rate of the same group of product group or similar competitive situation. As seen earlier, when ordering the contract for the purchase of electric power vessels, the Plaintiff determines the price based on the cost and labor cost of the electric power line when considering the market situation, etc., and the estimated price can be determined without reduction from the price based on the preliminary price calculated at a certain level by considering the same price. According to the appraiser’s appraisal result, the change in the estimated price can be seen to have been relatively different from the estimated bid price in each case without any significant difference between the bidding price and the estimated price.

C) Generally, the Plaintiff’s damages caused by the collaborative act or unjust enrichment by the Defendants

Unjust gains of collusion = (Actual unit price - virtual competitive unit price 】 Purchase quantity) 】

However, in this case, “actual unit price 】 purchase volume” is the actual successful bid price that is identical to “successful bid price 】 the estimated price 】 the actual successful bid price.” Since “provisional competitive unit price 】 purchase volume” is the same as “Virtual competitive bid bid price 】 the estimated price amount,” the amount of damages for the case of a contract for the collaborative period is indicated as follows, when using the successful bid price rate:

The amount of damages = (The actual successful bidder ratio - the competitive bidder ratio) ¡¿ the estimated price amount.

(iv) setting a competition period;

A) General theory

In order to compare the competition period and the price of the collusion period in accordance with the Before and after the commencement of the collaborative act, the competition time when there is no collusion between the business operators should be determined. There are three major standards to be used for the determination of the competition time. "The methods of "bee and rewing" are to compare the price before and after the commencement of the collaborative act with the price during the collaborative act period, and the "deme," and the "deme and sub-water method" are to compare the price during the collaborative act period with the price after the collaborative act period, and all the prices before and after the commencement of the collaborative act are to be used as the basis for calculating the virtual competitive price.

The reason why the decision at the time of competition is important is that, even in a period in which the collusion has not been conducted according to the market, the competition price (in this case, the bid price rate) may be excessively or insufficiently formed due to factors other than the act of collusion and may distort the amount of damages. The competition price or the scale of the bid bid rate may vary depending on which the price may be reduced or the bid price may be reduced depending on which the price may be reduced by the practice in which the price was set for the collusion period after the completion of the collusion, and the price may be higher than the competition price due to the practice in which the price was set by mutual cooperation during the collusion period, or the price may be reduced by the lower vertical diameter.

B) Results of the appraiser’s appraisal

(1) As seen earlier, if an agreement was reached between the Defendant, etc. around 1998 (hereinafter “the 1998 collusion”), the agreement was not reached between the Defendant, etc. around October 199, and the agreement was reached again around August 30, 200, which continued until September 2007, and there was no circumstance that there was an agreement and the implementation thereof between the Defendant, etc. after September 2007. Thus, the collusion period from around August 200 to September 207 (hereinafter “the instant collusion period”) may be deemed as the non-conforming period (hereinafter “the remainder of the non-conforming period”).

(2) The appraiser divided the power lines purchased by the Plaintiff into public power lines, underground power lines, low voltage clothes, and bareboat lines, depending on the characteristics of the market and the competitive aspects. According to each product group, the bid bid price ratio for the instant collusion period and non-conforming period was calculated as follows.

The period prior to the collusion period of 99.17 99.63 99.64 9.7 9.43 9.7 9.47 199.37 80.374.74 74.75 2007.75 85.7 85.7 95.7 97 85.7 983 983.83 983 98.07 98.07 99.83 98 9.6 98.31, 2008 98.298 97.84 97 984,828 97.98 97 97.84, 1997 97.84, 1984, 2008 98.7586, 19687.86, 1997

Note 6) Non-conforming period

(3) In the initial appraisal statement, the appraiser sought the average bid price rate by the equal weight of each product group by simply averaging the annual bid price rates for each product group, and also calculated the average bid price rate by adding a small amount of weight to the discount method that gives a small amount of weight as time from the collusion period to the time. The appraiser considered the average bid price rate calculated as above as the virtual competitive bid price rate and calculated the amount of damages for each purchase contract.

(4) At the request of the Plaintiff and the Defendants, the appraiser calculated each amount of damages according to the bid price ratio calculated by excluding both the bid in 1999 and 2007, or excluding the bid in 199 or 2007, and the bid price rate calculated by excluding the bid in 199 or 2007, ② from 1999 to 201, regarding only one of the entire periods as the period of competition as the period of competition, and ③ the amount of damages according to the method of granting different weight by year.

C) The parties’ assertion

(1) The Plaintiff asserts that if the effect of collusion is continuously affected in the formation of successful bid price for a bid after the completion of collusion, and the period after the termination of collusion is presumed to be the competition period, the effect of collusion is likely to be underassessment. Therefore, the period after the collusion cannot be the competition period, and the agreement should be deemed to be the competition period in 199, which is the period for which the agreement was temporarily destroyed during the collaborative period. Therefore, the Plaintiff asserts that the amount of damages should be calculated based on the virtual competitive bid bid rate calculated by including only the year 199 among the appraisal results by the appraiser.

(2) The Defendants asserted that the 1999 period of competition was extremely unstable and abnormal during which the former collusion and the instant collusion period had occurred, and that the bidding case on December 28, 2007 and December 29, 2007, which occurred immediately after the instant collusion period, fell under the time when abnormal competition was held, and thus, the said period should not be considered as the competition period in calculating the successful bid price rate, and that there is no ground to grant weight to 5% or 10% discount from the collusion period, and therefore, the competition period should be considered as 2008 or 2011 for the determination of the successful bid price rate for calculating the amount of damages.

D) Determination

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the facts and evidence as above, it is reasonable to view the remainder of the non-conforming period of 199 and 2007 during the non-conforming period as the competitive bid period, excluding the competitive bid period. The average of the bid bid price ratio during the pertinent competitive period as the virtual competitive bid bid ratio is calculated by comparing the above virtual competitive bid ratio with the estimated bid price during the pertinent collaborative period. Considering the results of the appraiser’s appraisal of the non-party and the results of the inquiry of the non-party on October 26, 2014, the appraiser calculated the amount of damages by taking an average of the successful bid ratio by product group during the remaining period of 1999 and 207, excluding the actual successful bid ratio - the estimated bid price x the estimated bid price x the amount of damages - 36,260,626,00 won for the defendant et al. al. (hereinafter referred to as 7060,000 won) - 5060,2060 won amount of damages calculated by the plaintiff's 16070.

① The average bid price rate of the Plaintiff’s contract for the purchase of electric power lines was 99.4% in collusion in 1998, which was 99.75% in 199, and was 98-9% in 199 during the instant collusion period. At the same time, the average bid price rate in 2007, immediately after the collusion period, was 83.83% in 2007, was reduced again to 83.83% in 2008. However, the average bid price rate in 2008 was sharply increased to 98.31% in 2008, and the average bid price rate in 95.36-98.13% in 201 was maintained until 201.

② From 2008 to 2011, the bid price rate for the year 1998 was maintained at a higher level than an average of 97%, and the bid price rate for the year 1999 between the collusion period and the instant collusion period and the year 2007 immediately after the instant collusion period was sharply lower rapidly. However, it appears that there was a difference in other factors affecting the price, such as the change in the scale of the Plaintiff’s bidding during the period 1999, 2007 and the remaining year 2008 to 2011, such as the increase in the scale of the Plaintiff’s bid or the decline in the amount of material costs, or the decrease in the ratio of the estimated price to the price, or the inappropriate calculation of the estimated price, the Plaintiff’s pre-sale purchasing contract for the power of the Plaintiff appears to have not significantly changed the structure of the market in accordance with the flow of time between the Plaintiff and the single consumer, compared with the normal bid price rate for the year 209 to 2017.

③ As seen earlier, there is a possibility that the price may be excessively or insufficiently calculated due to factors other than collusion in the previous and following Before and after the date of collusion, and the trend of the same direction overlaps or the opposite direction might be offset in the formation of price.

④ In this case, if the estimated price is determined before entering into a purchase contract, the Defendant et al. company will enter into a bid at a lower price than the estimated price. The Defendant et al. company gains the Plaintiff from purchasing the power line at a lower price, depending on the degree of lowering the estimated price through competition. If the supplier excessively lowers the bid price due to an excessive competition beyond normal competition, the Plaintiff et al. gains the profit that the Plaintiff would enter into a purchase contract at a lower price than the normal competitive level. However, this is merely the benefit that the Plaintiff would gain from a purchase contract at a lower price than the normal competitive level. Therefore, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s gains that the Plaintiff could not gain due to its failure to attract excessive competition among the suppliers are the Plaintiff

⑤ In the case of 199 and 2007, there is a difference from the competition market where there was no collusion at the beginning due to the termination of collusion as a market immediately after the collusion at the immediately preceding time. In the case immediately after the collusion, bidding participants have to determine the price in a situation where all information is not available, and there is a possibility that time will take place until the price is collected through the adjustment and adaptation process in the market. Accordingly, the price determined by the bidding participants at the time of information shortage is likely to distort the competition price and the Plaintiff’s amount of damages caused by the lack of information. However, when considering the changes in the bid price ratio for the non-conforming period in this case, the bid price rate after the collusion is temporarily lowered, and the bid price rate is maintained at a certain level without a big change in the bid price rate. This can be seen as the price formed through the adaptation process in the market.

5) Limitation on liability

① As seen earlier, in calculating the Plaintiff’s amount of damages, the method of estimating the former and latter comparative law and the bid bid price rate is not entirely reasonable compared to the method of calculating other damages, and it is not entirely reasonable, and the statistical presumption method has inherent in incompleteness. In such a case, the court has no choice but to recognize a reasonable amount of damages based on the overall purport of pleadings and the result of examination of evidence (see Article 57 of the Fair Trade Act). ② In the bid conducted during the 1998 collusion and the instant collusion period, the Plaintiff continuously participated in the price close to the expected price, and the Defendants failed to pay due attention to the possibility of suspecting the possibility of collusion by the above facts; ③ The possibility that part of the damages suffered by the Plaintiff due to the Defendants’ collusion cannot be ruled out at all through the electricity charge. In light of the ideology of the damage compensation system, the court is reasonable to determine the amount that the Defendants had to compensate the Plaintiff by 70% of the damages recognized earlier.

6) Sub-determination

Therefore, the Defendants are obligated to pay to each of the Plaintiff 19,401,631,00 won ( = 27,716,617,000 won x 70%) and to pay damages for delay at each rate of 20% per annum under the Civil Act from February 15, 2012, which is the date of the final delivery of a copy of the complaint of this case containing the Plaintiff’s expression of intent to claim, until January 23, 2015, the date of which the Defendants rendered a substantial judgment to dispute the existence and scope of the Defendants’ obligation to perform, and from the next day to the date of full payment.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the Intervenor’s motion for intervention of the independent party of this case is unlawful and dismissed. The Plaintiff’s motion against the Defendants is accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remainder of the motion is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment Omission]

Judges Lee Jong-soo (Presiding Judge)

1) On July 1, 2008, LSS Electric Co., Ltd. changed its trade name to LSSS Co., Ltd., and the investment sector remains in LS Co., Ltd., the surviving company; the electric cable division was incorporated into LS Cable Co., Ltd.; the machinery division was divided into ELS Cable Co., Ltd.; and the ELSN Co., Ltd.

2) On July 2, 2008, Jinjin Electric Co., Ltd. divided the company into a company on July 2, 2008, the name of the surviving company was changed to Jinjin Electric Co., Ltd., and the one-way Electric Co., Ltd. in charge of the electric cable business sector was newly incorporated and divided, respectively.

3) In addition to the above Defendants and intervenors, Matern Industries Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Matern Industries Co., Ltd. on Apr. 10, 200 to Maternos Co., Ltd., Ltd., on Mar. 21, 2006; hereinafter referred to as Matern Link Co., Ltd., Ltd., 2006), Seoul Electric Cable Co., Ltd., takes place, Matern Cable Co., Ltd., 199 (mutual change from Matern Cable Co.,, Ltd. to 1 December 1, 2001); Matern Cable Co.,, Ltd., Ltd., Ltd., 199; 200,000,000,000,000,000,0000,000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000).

4) The minimum bid price method is the method of determining the successful bidder as the successful bidder. The method of successful bidder qualification examination is the method of determining the successful bidder by examining the bidder’s performance record, technical ability, financial standing, etc. in order of the bidder’s bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s successful bidder’s price and desired quantity

5) There is a difference between scholars regarding classification and terms, but in this case, the classification and terms indicated in the appraiser’s appraisal document are to be followed in this case. ① The front and rear comparison method is to estimate an unfair price increase due to collusion by comparing a market where there was no collusion for the same market and the price at the time of the collusion for the same market; ② The comparison market method is to estimate an unfair price increase due to collusion by comparing a market where there was no collusion for the market and the price at the market where there was collusion for the market. ③ The double allocation method is a mutually complementary method between the front and rear comparison market method and the comparison market method. ③ The double allocation method is to seek the difference of the price at the time when the collusion was committed in the collusion market and to calculate the difference by deducting the price at the time of the collusion in the comparison market. ④ The method of estimating the cost and the margin is to identify the producer’s cost (cost) and estimate the aggregate of the normal margin in the competition market.

6) An appraiser failed to calculate the bid price rate due to lack of data in the case of 1998, and, in distinguishing the period of the non-conforming period of the instant non-conforming period, the period from October 15, 1999 to December 12, 1999 entered into with the Plaintiff and the purchase contract concluded with the Defendant, etc. for convenience was divided into 1999 and 2007 after December 2007.

7) The amount of damages calculated by the appraiser is the sum of the amount of damages for an individual purchase contract concluded during the instant collaborative period. The actual successful bid ratio in the said contract is lower than the virtual competitive bid ratio, and the amount of damages shall be deemed zero in the event there is no estimated amount of damages under the said contract (Evidence A, 32, 38, and 40). However, even though there is no estimated amount of damages under the said purchase contract, it constitutes a purchase contract concluded during the period when the Plaintiff completed the extinctive prescription, and the amount of damages presumed by the appraiser is included in the scope