Where the disposition of the inspection property made with the permission of the Minister for Delivery becomes null and void;

Where an inspection is to dispose of the property owned by a inspection, if it is impossible to achieve the purposes of the inspection due to the disposal of such property, or if the existence of the inspection itself is in danger or the existence of the inspection is denied, such disposal shall be null and void regardless of the purpose or procedure of such disposal.

Article 103 of the Civil Act

69Da2293 delivered on March 31, 1970 (Supreme Court Decision 5947 delivered on March 31, 197, Supreme Court Decision 18Da295 delivered on June 18, 199, Supreme Court Decision 18Da295 delivered on March 228, 199)

The educational foundation succeeding to the lawsuit of the plaintiff foundation

Defendant Inspection

Daejeon District Court (61A421) in the first instance

The original judgment shall be revoked.

The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff in the first and second instances.

The plaintiff confirms that 175-7 seedlings 175-7 of 19-1 forest land in Cheongyang-gun, Cheongyang-gun, Cheongyang-gun, Cheongyang-gun, is owned by the plaintiff.

The court costs are assessed against the defendant, and the defendant is dismissed.

The judgment that the lawsuit cost shall be borne by the plaintiff was sought.

The defendant has sought the same judgment as the disposition, and the plaintiff has sought the judgment dismissing the appeal.

The facts that the Plaintiff Incorporated Foundation, the heir of the Plaintiff Incorporated, was established by the permission of the Minister for Delivery of sentence No. 1952, Jul. 28, 1952 and completed the registration of its establishment on September 12 of the same year, and that the 175-7 forest land No. 19-1 forest land No. 175-7 forest land No. 19-7 forest land in Chungcheongnamyang-gun, Cheongyang-gun, Yangyang-gun

In light of Gap evidence No. 1-1 (the plaintiff foundation's permission to establish the above Institute) and Eul evidence No. 5 (the plaintiff foundation's permission to establish the above Institute) without dispute, Eul evidence No. 3 (the case concerning the certification of copy of the permission to transfer the temple forest land free of charge) presumed to be established by the testimony of non-party No. 1, the non-party No. 2-4 (each certificate of donation) of the court below's witness No. 2-1, and the testimony of non-party No. 1, the defendant temple contributed the above forest land to establish the Institute as basic property of the above Institute on March 19, 1952, before the plaintiff foundation is established, and the above Institute's permission to make the above contribution from the Minister for Delivery of literature July 23, 1952, with the basic property including the above forest and other property established with the permission of the Minister for Delivery of literature No. 5, as the above facts without dispute. The above evidence No. 5-3 cannot be trusted otherwise.

As to the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff acquired ownership of the above forest land due to the above contribution, the defendant defense that the above forest contribution was invalid as it was an act deviating from the basic purpose scope of the inspection. Thus, if the inspection is impossible to conduct the inspection due to the disposal of the property, or if the disposal of the property is in danger of the existence of the inspection itself, or the existence of the inspection is denied, such disposal act is null and void regardless of the purpose of the disposal or the procedure of the inspection. In light of the result of the party members' verification in each testimony of non-party 2, 3, and 4 of the court below's witness, the main building above the defendant's main office of the inspection and other non-designated cultural properties as stipulated in subparagraphs 272, 293, and 292 of the National Treasury, as well as the above non-designated cultural properties, the defendant's inspection owned only the land of 4,698 square field, 4,272 square field, and there is no other property in the above forest and field, and it cannot be acknowledged that it does not endanger the existence of the inspection of the defendant's.

Therefore, the plaintiff's main claim based on the premise that the above forest contribution act of the defendant is valid is clearly dismissed without merit, and the original judgment which differs from this conclusion is unfair, and the defendant's appeal is with merit, so it is so decided as per Disposition by applying Articles 386, 96, and 89 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Judges Kim Jung-tae (Presiding Judge)