The judgment below

Of them, the part on Defendant B shall be reversed.

Defendant

B A person shall be punished by imprisonment for six months.

except that this judgment.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal against the Defendants (e.g., the Defendant A: 2 years of suspended sentence in August; 120 hours of probation order; 2 years of suspended sentence in June; 120 hours of probation order in June; and 120 hours of probation, community service order, etc.) are too uneased and unreasonable.

2. We examine ex officio the judgment on the grounds of appeal against Defendant B, prior to the judgment on the grounds of appeal against Defendant B.

“Juvenile” to which the Juvenile Act applies refers to a person under the age of 19 (Article 2 of the Juvenile Act). Thus, if a defendant wishes to be subject to the Juvenile Act, he/she shall be under the age of 19 at the time of adjudication, and whether a juvenile is a juvenile under Article 60(1) and (2) of the Juvenile Act shall be determined at the time of adjudication of fact-finding

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 90Do539, Apr. 24, 1990; 2000Do2704, Aug. 18, 2008). Defendant B, who was born on Oct. 7, 2000, constitutes “juvenile” as provided by Article 2 of the Juvenile Act at the time the lower judgment was declared, and thus, was legally mitigated pursuant to Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act, but it is apparent that the juvenile was under 19 years of age at the time of the trial. Thus, the lower judgment that applied the statutory mitigation under Article 60(2) of the Juvenile Act to Defendant B was no longer maintained.

3. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the judgment of the first instance court on Defendant A, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). Even in light of the materials submitted at the trial court, there is no significant change in the sentencing conditions compared to the lower court’s judgment, and comprehensively considering various circumstances that form the conditions for sentencing specified in the record and pleading of the instant case, the lower court’s sentencing is too unhued so far as it exceeds the reasonable scope of discretion.

Therefore, the prosecutor's assertion of unfair sentencing is without merit.

4. Conclusion.