Materials concerning protective dispositions and habitual recognition under the Juvenile Act;

Since evidence to recognize habitual theft cannot be limited to evidence, it can be recognized that habitual larceny can be recognized inasmuch as the habitive behavior repeatedly committed by a judge's free evaluation of evidence is recognized based on evidence. Thus, the fact that a protective disposition under the Juvenile Act is issued cannot be viewed as evidence for habitual larceny, and Article 30 (4) of the Juvenile Act limits the protective disposition under the Juvenile Act to the extent that it is materials for habitual recognition.

Article 332 of the Criminal Act; Article 30(4) of the Juvenile Act

Supreme Court Decision 73Do1255 Decided July 24, 1973

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Lee Young-chul

Seoul High Court Decision 85No3403 Decided March 26, 1986

The appeal is dismissed.

The number of detention days after the appeal shall be included in the calculation of the original sentence.

The defendant and his state appointed defense counsel's grounds of appeal are also examined.

Examining the evidence in the first instance judgment maintained by the court below, since it is sufficiently recognized that the crime of larceny in the judgment of the court below was committed, and there is no error in law in finding the defendant's habitual nature. Thus, the argument about this point is without merit, and since there is no limitation on the evidence to acknowledge habitual nature of larceny, so long as the behavior of repeatedly committing larceny by using the judge's free evaluation evidence is acknowledged as evidence, it can be recognized habitual larceny. In this case, in this case, the facts that the defendant was sentenced to a protective disposition under the Juvenile Act on two occasions in the past and once again, and that the defendant was convicted of committing the crime in this case in the same manner as that of larceny in the probation period, it cannot be said that there is no error in finding the habitual nature of the defendant. Further, if the purpose of the protective disposition is identical to that of the protective disposition, it cannot be viewed that it cannot be viewed as materials to recognize habitual nature, and if interpreted together with the arguments, it cannot be interpreted that there is no provision of Article 375 of the Juvenile Act.14.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges who are to include thirty days of detention after the appeal in the principal sentence.

Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)