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(영문) 서울고등법원 2017.08.25 2017노834
아동ㆍ청소년의성보호에관한법률위반(알선영업행위등)
Text

The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (unfair sentencing) of the lower court’s sentence (one year and six months of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

2. There is no change in the terms and conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and where the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect such a case (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). Based on the foregoing legal doctrine, there is no change in the sentencing conditions compared with the lower court on the grounds that new materials for sentencing have not been submitted in the trial, and in full view of the factors revealed in the arguments in the instant case, the lower court’s sentencing was too too excessive and exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

It does not appear.

The defendant's ground of appeal is without merit.

[Defendant’s defense counsel’s defense counsel’s written opinion submitted to the trial on June 12, 2017, “G” (hereinafter “instant business establishment”) owned and operated M other than the Defendant, and ② The instant business establishment is a key room or room room, and thus, “providing and arranging a place of sexual traffic” was “business.”

(3) The Defendant newly asserted misunderstanding of facts and misapprehension of legal principles to the effect that the J, etc. working at the instant establishment was not aware of the fact that he was a juvenile (the summary of his argument as to August 11, 2017). This is raised after the lapse of the submission period, and thus, does not constitute legitimate grounds for appeal. However, this is examined ex officio.

First, according to the health team, M’s trial statement, and the police statements of J, K, I, and H, which are juveniles working at the instant establishment, it is difficult to see that the person operating the instant establishment is the Defendant, not M, and that the Defendant was merely the so-called “the so-called “the second president” of the instant establishment.

The defendant also has the substance of this case at the prosecutor's office and the court below's court.

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