[1] The starting point of the exclusion period for exercising the right of revocation under Article 146 of the Civil Code

[2] The starting point of the exclusion period of the revocation of a gift where the transfer of ownership has been made based on the protocol of compromise because the telephone damage to file a lawsuit to register the transfer of ownership based on the gift after the gift was made by duress (=the starting date of the judgment on quasi-deliberation case where the protocol of cancellation of

[1] The former part of Article 146 of the Civil Code provides that "the right of revocation shall be exercised within three years from the date on which it can be ratified." On the other hand, Article 144 (1) of the Civil Code provides that "no person shall have the effect unless the reason for revocation is terminated." In light of the purport of each of the above provisions and the fact that the ratification is an expression of intent that is to waive the right of revocation, the starting point of the limitation period for the right of revocation under the former part of Article 146 of the Civil Code is the date on which the right of revocation can be inferred" as the starting point of the limitation period for the right of revocation under the former part of Article 146 of the Civil Code is the date on which the cause for revocation is terminated and there

[2] In case where a donation contract on real estate has been concluded by the investigator of the Martial Law Headquarters by coercion, and the transfer of ownership has been made based on the composition of the lawsuit telephone for the registration of transfer based on the gift, even if the above donation contract has been revoked after escaping from the state of coercion due to the rescission of emergency martial law, while the res judicata of the above protocol of lawsuit is in existence, it shall be deemed that there is a legal obstacle to cancel the donation contract on real estate made by duress as it is impossible to make the validity of restoring the property right, and therefore, it shall be reasonable to view that the period of cancellation of three years under the former part of Article 146 of the Civil Act is in progress from the time when the res judicata effect of the above protocol of lawsuit telephone becomes final and conclusive.

[1] Articles 110, 144(1), and 146 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 110, 144(1), and 146 of the Civil Act; Articles 206 and 431 of the Civil Procedure Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 96Da25371 delivered on September 20, 1996 (Gong1996Ha, 3152) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 92Da8521 delivered on November 27, 1992 (Gong1993Sang, 243), Supreme Court Decision 92Da14632 delivered on February 23, 1993 (Gong193Sang, 1056), Supreme Court Decision 95Da1460 delivered on October 11, 196 (Gong196Ha, 3285)

Plaintiff 1

Plaintiff 2 (Attorney Kim Jong-sik et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Republic of Korea and three others (Cheongyang Law Firm, Attorneys Lee Jae-hun, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Hyundai Motor Corporation (Attorney Jeon Byung-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 92Na49715 delivered on December 26, 1997

The part of the judgment below against the plaintiffs is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The appeal by the defendant Hyundai Motor Vehicle Corporation is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the same defendant.

1. Judgment on the grounds of appeal by the plaintiffs' attorney

A. On the first and second grounds for appeal

According to the records, the court below is justified in holding that the real estate of this case was originally owned by the non-party, and that the lawsuit telephone protocol was used as a means of completing the registration of transfer from the gift, and that the above donation contract cannot be deemed to have been invalidated due to the preparation of the lawsuit telephone protocol, and there is no error of law such as the theory of lawsuit. All arguments are without merit.

B. On the third, fourth, and fifth grounds

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the non-party, the title truster of the real estate of this case, who donated the real estate of this case to the defendant Republic of Korea does not seem to have reached the degree of coercion completely deprived of the freedom of decision-making, and it cannot be deemed as null and void as an anti-social juristic act or an invalidation in violation of the Constitution, and the time when the status of the non-party's coercion terminated is the time of rescission of emergency martial law performed on May 1980. In light of the records, the court below's above decision is acceptable, and there is no error of law such as the theory of lawsuit. All arguments are without merit.

C. As to the sixth and seventh points

The court below held that the registration in the name of Defendant Republic of Korea as to the real estate of this case is a valid registration that conforms to the substantive relation, on the ground that the right to cancel the said gift becomes null and void as the non-party’s right to cancel the said gift becomes null and void after the lapse of the exclusion period of three years under the former part of Article 146 of the Civil Act, which was set forth in the former part of Article 146 of the Civil Act, from the point of time when the non-party’s declaration of intention

The former part of Article 146 of the Civil Code provides that "the right of revocation shall be exercised within three years from the date on which it can be ratified," while Article 144 (1) of the Civil Code provides that "the person who is presumed to have no effect unless the cause for revocation ceases to exist after the termination of the cause for revocation." In light of the purport of each of the above provisions and the fact that the ratification is an expression of intent, which is the waiver of the right of revocation, the starting point of the limitation period of the right of revocation under the former part of Article 146 of the Civil Code is the date on which the right of revocation can be presumed to be the starting point of the limitation period of the right of revocation under the former part of Article 146 of the Civil Code, because the cause for revocation ceases to exist

However, as recognized by the court below, in the case of this case, the above non-party, as duly admitted, is in fact owned by investigators of the Martial Law Headquarters Joint Investigation Headquarters, and submitted to the investigators a letter of donation (Evidence B No. 3) that the real estate of this case, which was held in title trust to the plaintiffs, was donated to the defendant Republic of Korea, and the contract of this case was concluded by preparing and submitting a written consent (Evidence B No. 1-3) to give consent to the act of donation of the above non-party, who is the title truster, as the title trustee, and thereafter, the contract of this case was concluded on August 1, 1980 by telephone damage to the plaintiffs to register the ownership transfer on the ground of donation to the defendant Republic of Korea, and the ownership transfer registration was completed in the name of the defendant Republic of Korea on January 21, 1981. Even if the contract of this case was revoked after the plaintiffs or the non-party deviates from the state of emergency martial law cancellation on January 21, 1981.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misunderstanding of legal principles as to the exercise period of the right of revocation under the former part of Article 146 of the Civil Code, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

2. Judgment on the grounds of appeal by Defendant Hyundai Motor Vehicle Corporation (hereinafter “Defendant Hyundai Motor Vehicle Corporation”)

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the facts based on the evidences, and found that the transfer registration of ownership completed in the future of the defendant Republic of Korea on the real estate of this case was invalid as it was revoked by the quasi-rejudgment and finalized by the quasi-rejudgment, and therefore, each transfer registration of ownership in the name of the defendant Hyundai Motor Vehicle Corporation, which was based on the above registration, shall be deemed invalid. Therefore, since the transfer registration of ownership in the name of the defendant Hyundai Motor Vehicle Corporation, which was completed based on the above registration, shall be deemed invalid, the court below held that the defendant Hyundai Motor Vehicle Corporation is liable to the plaintiff 2 to take the procedure for cancellation registration of each registration in its name

In light of the records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just, and there is no error of law as to the theory of lawsuit. The ground of appeal cannot be accepted.

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiffs shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. The appeal by the defendant Hyundai Automobile Corporation shall be dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Sung-sung (Presiding Justice)