[1] Whether a trade union may waive or delay payment under a collective agreement between the employer and the employer only with respect to the individual worker's wages or retirement allowances for which the right to claim specific payment has already occurred (negative)

[2] Whether a collective agreement has the normative effect against a person who is not a trade union member (negative in principle)

[3] Requirements to revise the rules of employment to disadvantage workers

[4] In a case where there is a ground for dispute as to the existence of an obligation to pay wages, etc., whether the employer has the intention to commit a crime of Articles 112 and 36 of the former Labor Standards Act (negative), and whether there is a ground for dispute as to the existence of an obligation to pay wages, etc.

[5] The case holding that it is difficult to readily conclude that the representative director of a company had intent to commit a crime under Articles 112 and 36 of the former Labor Standards Act on the grounds that there are reasonable grounds for not paying bonuses and retirement allowances to employees

[1] Wages (including bonuses) or retirement allowances for which a specific right to claim the payment has already occurred are transferred to the worker's private property area and entrusted to the worker's disposition. Thus, a trade union cannot take such action as waiver or postponement of payment, only by a collective agreement between the employer and the employer, unless the worker has obtained an individual consent or authorization from the worker.

[2] The normative effect of a collective agreement shall not extend to a person who is not a member of the trade union, unless the collective agreement is extended in accordance with Articles 35 and 36 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

[3] In order to unilaterally revise the existing working conditions through the amendment of the rules of employment, consent by the collective decision-making method of a group of workers to whom the previous rules of employment was applied should be required, and if there is a labor union consisting of a majority of workers, consent by the labor union, and if there is no such labor union, consent by the majority of workers at the meeting method should be required, and it shall not be effective as a modification of the rules of employment unless

[4] If there is a ground for dispute as to the existence of the obligation to pay wages, etc., it shall be deemed that there is a reasonable ground that the employer has not paid such wages, etc. so it is difficult to find that the employer had the intent to commit a crime under Articles 112 and 36 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 8372 of Apr. 11, 2007). Whether there is a ground for dispute as to the existence and scope of the obligation to pay wages, etc. shall be determined in light of the circumstances at the time of dispute as to the existence and scope of the obligation to pay wages, etc., such as the reason for refusal of payment by the employer, the ground for the obligation to pay, the organization and size of the company operated by the employer, the purpose of the business, and other matters, such as the existence and scope of the obligation to pay wages, etc., and it shall not be concluded that the employer

[5] The case holding that it is difficult to conclude that the representative director of a company had intent to commit a crime under Articles 112 and 36 of the former Labor Standards Act (wholly amended by Act No. 8372 of Apr. 11, 2007) on the grounds that there are reasonable grounds for not paying bonuses and retirement allowances to employees

[1] Article 29 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act / [2] Articles 35 and 36 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act / [3] Article 97 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 8372 of Apr. 11, 2007) (see Article 94 of the current Act) / [4] Articles 36 and 112 (see Article 109 of the current Act) of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 8372 of Apr. 11, 2007) / [5] Articles 36 and 112 (see Article 109 of the current Act) of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 8372 of Apr. 11, 2007)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 99Da67536 delivered on September 29, 200 (Gong2000Ha, 2195) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 91Da17542 delivered on September 24, 1991 (Gong1991, 2602) / [4] Supreme Court Decision 2005Do1089 Delivered on June 9, 2005 (Gong2005Ha, 1193)

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Jeong-hee

Daejeon District Court Decision 2006No2115 Decided January 25, 2007

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Daejeon District Court Panel Division.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. As to the grounds of appeal on the duty to pay bonus, etc.

Specifically, wages (including bonuses) or retirement allowances that have the right to claim payment have already been transferred to the worker's private property area and are entrusted to the worker's disposition, so long as the trade union does not obtain individual consent or authorization from the worker, it cannot take any action such as waiver or postponement of payment, solely with the collective agreement between the employer and the employer (see Supreme Court Decision 9Da67536, Sept. 29, 200). The normative effect of a collective agreement does not extend to a person who is not a member of the trade union under Articles 35 and 36 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, unless it extends the validity of the collective agreement, and in order to unilaterally change the contents of the existing working conditions to the worker disadvantage by the amendment of the rules of employment, the consent shall be required by collective decision-making method of the worker group to which the previous rules of employment is applied, and if there is a labor union consisting of a majority of the workers, the consent shall be required by the majority of the workers' meeting method if there is no such labor union.

In light of the above legal principles and the reasoning of the judgment below, it is just for the court below to recognize the defendant's duty to pay the difference between each bonus and retirement allowance in this case to workers stated in the facts constituting the crime of the first instance judgment (hereinafter "the petitioner of this case"), and there is no violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds of appeal

2. As to the ground of appeal on intention

If there is a ground for dispute as to the existence of the obligation to pay wages, etc., it shall be deemed that there is a reasonable reason that the employer has not paid such wages, etc. Therefore, it shall not be recognized that the employer had the intent to commit the crime of Articles 36 and 112 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 8372 of Apr. 11, 2007; hereinafter the same shall apply). Whether there is a ground for dispute as to the existence and scope of the obligation to pay wages, etc. shall be determined in light of the circumstances at the time of dispute over the existence and scope of the obligation to pay wages, etc., such as the reason for refusal of payment by the employer, the ground for the obligation to pay, the organization and size of the company operated by the employer, the purpose of business, and other matters, such as other matters as the purpose of business operation, should be determined after the employer's civil liability for payment is recognized. Thus,

기록에 의하면, 피고인은 공소외 1 주식회사의 대표자로서 상시 130여 명의 근로자를 고용하여 금속제품(밸브) 제조업을 경영하여 온 사실, 공소외 1 주식회사의 노동조합(이하 ‘노조’라고 한다)은 기능직 사원들을 조합원으로 하여 구성되어 있는데 원래는 전체 근로자 수의 과반수 이상이었으나 2003. 8. 31.경부터 과반수에 미치지 못하게 된 사실, 피고인은 노조측과 단체협상을 하여 2003년도 및 2004년도 상여금으로 기본급의 650%를 지급하되, 2월 말, 4월 말, 6월 말, 8월 말, 10월 말, 12월 말 각 100%씩을, 7월 말 50%를 각 지급하기로 약정하였으며, 노조원이 아닌 관리직 사원에 대하여도 관례적으로 노조원인 기능직 종업원과 동일한 기준으로 상여금을 지급하여 온 사실, 피고인은 회사 경영수지 악화에 따른 난관극복의 일환으로 2003. 9.경 관리직 사원들로부터 2003년도 상여금인 기본급의 650% 중 400%만을 지급하고 나머지는 결산 결과 이익이 발생될 경우 지급하는 것에 대해 서면 동의를 받고서도 전액을 그대로 지급하였으나, 계속해서 막대한 영업 손실이 누적되고 차입금으로 인한 이자부담이 가중되자 2004. 7.경 진정인 공소외 2와 공소외 3을 포함한 관리직 전 사원에 대한 2004. 7.분 상여금(기본급의 50%, 공소장 기재 2004. 7.분 상여금)을, 2004. 12. 진정인들( 공소외 4 제외)을 포함한 관리직 및 기능직 전 사원에 대한 2004. 12.분 상여금(기본급의 100%, 공소장 기재 2004. 12.분 상여금)을 각 지급 유보한 후 그 자금으로 금융권 부채를 상환하여 이자부담을 줄인 사실, 피고인은 2005. 1. 5. 노조위원장에게 공문을 보내, ‘누적된 적자로 인해 회사 경영여건이 악화되고, 지속적인 원자재 가격인상과 환율인상 등으로 인해 국제경쟁력 유지 및 이익창출이 어려운 상황이므로 경영 합리화를 위한 조치로서, 원가절감을 위해 관리비 부담을 최소화하기 위하여 은행부채 상환을 최우선하고, 2004년도 지급 유보된 상여금인 기본급의 150%는 2004년도 결산 결과에 따라 그 지급시기를 재검토하며, 2005년도 상여금인 기본급의 650% 중 400%는 지급하고 나머지는 2005년도 결산 결과에 따라 사업목표 달성시에 지급할 것’임을 통보하며 이에 관한 노조의 의견을 물었고, 이에 대해 노조위원장은 2005. 2. 2. 위 공문의 내용을 충분히 인지하였음을 알리며 최선을 다해 열심히 일할 것을 다짐함과 아울러 2005. 1. 28. 노·사 간에 합의된 내용을 이행하여 줄 것을 요청하는 취지의 회신을 하였으며, 피고인은 그 합의된 내용을 이행한 사실, 피고인은 다시 2005. 4. 8. 노조위원장에게 공문을 보내, “2005. 3.말까지도 사업계획에 턱없이 모자라는 실적을 보이고 있어서 회사운영에 상당한 어려움을 겪고 있으므로 2004년도 잔여 상여금은 지급하지 아니하고, 2005년도 상여금은 기본급의 400%를 기준으로 지급하되 2005년도 결산 결과 소기의 목표 달성시에 재조정하겠다.”고 통보하였고, 이에 대해 노조위원장은 2005. 4. 13. ‘회사의 경영상 어려움에 대하여 책임을 통감하고 추후에는 2004년도 잔여 상여금에 대하여 재론하지 않겠으며 다만 직원들의 사기 앙양을 위하여 2005. 7.분 상여금(기본급의 50%)을 지급하여 줄 것을 요청하는 취지의 회신을 하였으며, 피고인은 그 상여금을 지급한 사실, 피고인과 노조위원장은 2005. 7. 27. 단체협상을 하여 2005년도 상여금을 기본급의 400%를 기준으로 4회 분할하여 매 분기 말 100%씩 지급하고, 250%는 사업목표 달성시에 성과급으로 지급하기로 약정한 사실, 피고인은 당초 2005년도의 사업목표로 400억 원의 매출을 정하였다가 380억 원으로 수정하였음에도 278억 원의 매출에 불과하자 매 분기 말에 지급하기로 한 기본급의 400%와 7월 말에 지급한 50%를 제외한 나머지(공소장 기재 2005. 4.분 및 같은 해 8.분 상여금)를 지급하지 아니한 사실, 위와 같은 상여금 삭감조치에 대해 다른 사원들은 모두 수긍하였으나 이 사건 진정인들만이 불만을 가지고 공소외 1 주식회사를 퇴사하기에 이른 사실, 피고인은 이 사건 각 상여금 및 퇴직금 외에는 사원들에 대하여 모든 임금을 지급하였고, 특히 2002년경부터 계속된 적자로 사업이 어려워지자 수십억 원의 사재를 출연하는 등으로 회사의 영업을 정상화시키기 위하여 노력한 사실 등을 알 수 있다.

In light of the above legal principles and the above facts, it is true that the defendant did not pay the difference between each bonus and retirement allowance in this case even though he acknowledged the duty to pay it. However, the defendant's failure to pay the difference between each bonus and retirement allowance in this case is not a unilateral measure of the defendant, but a attempt to rationalize management in extremely difficult circumstances, and asked the opinion of the union with official procedures. Trade union understanding the difficult conditions of the company and response to the collective negotiation on February 2, 2005 and April 13, 2005, and each of the defendant's arguments as to the difference between the retirement allowance and retirement allowance in this case were accepted. Since the defendant's failure to pay the difference among the members who are not union members, it is difficult to think that there was a ground for the difference between the defendant's duty to pay the retirement allowance in this case and other retirement allowance in each of the above cases, and it is hard to see that there was a different ground for the defendant's failure to pay it as to the difference in the circumstances of the retirement allowance in this case.

The court below affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance which convicted the defendant of each of the charges of this case on the ground that it is difficult to deem that the defendant and the chairperson of the Trade Union have reached a complete agreement with respect to each of the charges of this case, and it is difficult to see that the Trade Union and the chairperson of the Trade Union and Labor Union have been representing the whole workers at the time of the collective agreement as of July 27, 2005, and that the defendant did not obtain legal advice with respect to the validity of the agreement or collective agreement with respect to the reduction of bonuses already generated by the defendant, and therefore, it is reasonable to see that the defendant had committed each of the crimes of this case. The court below's measures are erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the intention to commit the crime of violation of Articles 36 and 112 of

3. Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Hwang-sik (Presiding Justice)