Main Issues
The case holding that the guarantee limit under this letter of credit guarantee includes not only the purport that the limit of the guarantee obligation shall be reduced to the remaining amount of the principal obligation under the existing collateral guarantee but also the purport that the existing obligation is secured by a new collateral guarantee in case where the obligation to perform the guarantee obligation under the previous letter of credit guarantee is in existence, including the balance of the guarantee under the previous letter of credit guarantee.
Summary of Judgment
The case holding that the guarantee limit under this letter of credit guarantee includes not only the purport that the limit of the guarantee obligation is reduced to the remaining amount of the principal obligation under the existing collateral guarantee but also the purport that the existing obligation is secured by a new collateral guarantee in case where the obligation to perform the guarantee obligation under the previous letter of credit guarantee is in existence, including the balance of the guarantee under the previous letter of credit guarantee.
[Reference Provisions]
Article 105 of the Civil Act, Article 28 of the Credit Guarantee Fund Act
Plaintiff, Appellee
Industrial Bank of Korea (Law Firm Il, Attorneys Kim Young-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Defendant, Appellant
(Attorney Hong-chul et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul District Court Decision 99Na29687 delivered on August 12, 1999
Text
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. On the first and third grounds for appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below comprehensively based on the evidence adopted in its judgment and acknowledged that (1) since the plaintiff entered into a trade limit transaction agreement with Dong Young-gu Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Dong Young-gu Co., Ltd.) on September 26, 1992 and extended a gold of KRW 37 million with Dong Young-gu Co., Ltd. on the basis of the credit guarantee stated in the judgment of the court below, (3) since it renewed the trade limit transaction agreement and credit guarantee every time limit as stated in the above table, and then continued to provide Dong Young-gu Co., Ltd. with the above credit guarantee loan and then continued to provide a trade loan to Dong Young-gu Co., Ltd. for the above credit guarantee at the end of the period of time, and (5) it stated the remaining balance of the loan within 160,000 won after the above credit guarantee was issued 160,000 won after the expiration of the existing credit guarantee period of 19,000 won.
In light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the scope of collateral guarantee or the scope of application of credit guarantee terms and conditions. The grounds of appeal on this point cannot be accepted.
2. On the second ground for appeal
In light of the language and form of the credit guarantee terms and conditions (hereinafter referred to as "term terms and conditions") as shown in the record, it is clear that Article 15 of the term and conditions only delegates the authority to determine the standards (liability criteria) for the specific scope of exemption applicable to the scope of exemption stipulated in Article 14 of the term and conditions to the defendant, but does not delegate the authority to newly determine the scope of exemption not stipulated in the term
Therefore, even if the Defendant revised the previous exemption criteria and added the new exemption requirements, “if the loan is implemented after the lapse of 60 days from the date of issuance of the letter of guarantee, since there is no time to limit the guarantee limit including the balance of the guarantee in the old guarantee,” such addition goes beyond the scope of delegation under Article 15 of the Terms and Conditions, and thus, it is not effective to detain the parties.
Under the same purport, we affirm the decision of the court below rejecting the defendant's claim for exemption that established the new standard of exemption by deeming that the newly amended standard of exemption has no effect as a standardized contract or a contract, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the meaning or validity of the newly amended standard of exemption. In addition, even if the court below's decision that the newly amended standard of exemption is null and void is justified, such error does not affect the conclusion of the decision. The grounds for appeal on this point cannot be accepted.
3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant who is the appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.
Justices Lee Yong-woo (Presiding Justice)