In the event a motor vehicle which is unable to drive a motor vehicle due to a preceding accident on an expressway or a motorway stops on the main lane of the motor vehicle, a drilling accident by a motor vehicle followed by the preceding one. In the event that the preceding motor vehicle driver causes a preceding accident or fails to take safety measures after the accident, whether the relevant negligence shall be taken into account in calculating the scope of liability for damages due to a subsequent protruding accident (affirmative in principle)

Articles 393, 396, 750, 760, 763 of the Civil Act, Article 60 of the Road Traffic Act, Article 40 of the Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act

Samsung Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Bae & Yang LLC, Attorneys White-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Lawing Loss Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney Lee Jae-hoon, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Busan High Court (Chowon) Decision 2011Na19 decided November 17, 2011

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. In a case where a drilling accident by a motor vehicle followed by a motor vehicle which stops on the vehicular lane without taking safety measures, such as moving the motor vehicle to a safe place even though it is impossible to drive the motor vehicle due to a prior accident, etc. on the expressway or motorway, or installing signs of the motor vehicle broken down, etc. as prescribed by the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, if the driver was negligent in not taking safety measures after the accident, the negligence should be taken into account in determining the scope of liability for damages due to a subsequent accident, barring special circumstances, in light of the concept of the damage compensation system, which provides fair sharing of damages. In such a case, if the driver was negligent in the "accident" of the preceding motor vehicle, the same shall apply even if there was no time to take safety measures after the accident, or there was a situation where it is difficult to expect such measures due to the injury, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da64925, Dec. 10, 2009).

2. On December 3, 2008, the court below accepted the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, found that the non-party 1 died of the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the non-party 2, the non-party 1, the non-party 2, the non-party 1, the accident of the non-party 2, the non-party 1, the non-party 1, the two-party 1, the accident.

According to the above facts, the court below held that the death of Nonparty 1 was caused by the negligence of each driver of the 8th vehicle, 10 vehicle, and 6 vehicle without sufficient speed while on the road, and due to the negligence of failure to operate the brakes and steering gear, and further, Nonparty 1's death was caused by the joint tort committed by all the 10th vehicle drivers in the judgment pertaining to the traffic accident in this case, and accordingly, the defendant's assertion that the driver of the 2nd vehicle, the preceding vehicle of the 1st vehicle in this case, should set their respective negligence rates and accordingly set the defendant's responsibility. However, the court below rejected the defendant's argument that the 1nd vehicle in this case, the driver of the 2nd vehicle in this case, who was the first vehicle in this case, had witness a separate traffic accident prior to the traffic accident in this case, caused a shock of the central separation unit, and that the 1st through 8th vehicle in this case did not appear to have been negligent in the driver's safety measures at the time immediately after the 2nd vehicle in this case.

3. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine, the lower court’s determination that the vehicles directly related to the death of Nonparty 1 are eight vehicles, ten vehicles, and six vehicles, and that other vehicles cannot be deemed as having any relation to the death of Nonparty 1 is not correct.

In other words, according to the reasoning of the judgment below, 5 vehicles have been concealed due to the occurrence of the 5th, 6th, and 8th accident in the judgment of the court below, while 8 vehicles, 10 vehicles, and 6 vehicles, which directly concealed 5 vehicles at the time of the instant traffic accident on the expressway at night, had not been able to move their respective vehicles to a safe place or take safety measures before they arrive at the accident site. Therefore, even if the aforementioned 5th, 6, and 8 accidents are found to have been negligent in the occurrence of the preceding accident, if the driver of a vehicle parked due to the preceding accident at the time of the said 5th, 6, and 8 accidents, even if there was no time to take safety measures after the snow accident, or there was a situation where it is difficult to expect such measures due to the injury, etc., their negligence should be taken into account in determining the scope of the liability for damages due to the subsequent 5th

Therefore, the court below should have determined the defendant's liability according to the fault ratio of the 10 driver of the 10th vehicle involved in the death of the non-party 1, but the defendant's claim was rejected and the defendant's liability ratio was recognized as 50%. Thus, the court below erred in failing to exhaust all necessary deliberation by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the scope of the liability for damages caused by traffic accidents, and it is clear that such errors affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

4. Accordingly, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal by the assent of all participating Justices, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Justices Ahn Dai-hee (Presiding Justice)